Explaining climate-sensitive decision-making : on the relationship between cognitive logic and climate-adaptive behaviour by Findlater, Kieran Mark
Explaining Climate-Sensitive Decision-Making: 
On the Relationship Between Cognitive Logic and Climate-Adaptive Behaviour 
 
by 
Kieran Mark Findlater 
 
B.Sc., University of Alberta, 2005 
M.Sc., The University of British Columbia, 2009 
 
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF 
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
in 
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE AND POSTDOCTORAL STUDIES 
(Resources, Environment and Sustainability) 
 





© Kieran Mark Findlater, 2017 
ii 
Abstract 
The harmonization of climate-adaptive behaviour with pre-existing decision-making processes is 
central to the way climate change adaptation is described in the literature. Yet such behaviour is 
largely understudied, making it difficult to predict whether and how individuals can integrate 
(i.e., ‘mainstream’) climate change with risk management processes for weather and other 
‘normal’ stressors. In this dissertation, I examine the decision-making processes of South Africa’s 
commercial grain farmers, as a uniquely informative case, through five complementary studies of 
two original datasets. I seek to better understand the relationship between risk perceptions and 
climate-adaptive behaviour in this group, who are known to be sensitive to weather risks and who 
are adopting climate-resilient farming practices (i.e., Conservation Agriculture (CA)), but who are 
nonetheless perceived by local experts to be insensitive to climate change risks. In doing so, I 
distinguish between weather-sensitive decision-making, in which farmers perceive and react to 
weather risks in conjunction with other ‘normal’ risks, and climate-sensitive decision-making, in 
which they also perceive and react to the anticipated effects of climate change.  
 
Using mental models interviews in the Western Cape province (N = 90), I first reconceptualise 
farmers’ risk-based decision-making processes, drawing on theories of risk perception and 
framing from cognitive psychology and behavioural economics to interpret the empirical 
evidence. Second, I explain the variation in farmers’ adoption of climate-resilient CA practices 
based on the different cognitive frames (expressed as linguistic frames) that they use to perceive, 
interpret and respond to weather risks. Third, I use these results to guide the quantitative analysis 
of a national survey (N = 441), with which I assess the utility of the CA concept in promoting, 
monitoring and evaluating sustainable and climate-resilient farming practices, as envisioned by 
the Climate-Smart Agriculture and Sustainable Intensification frameworks. Fourth, I use the 
interview data to evaluate whether and how farmers integrate climate change and weather risks 
in farm-level decision-making. Fifth, I build on these findings by using the survey data to 




Climate change will make life harder for farmers around the world, in part by creating worse and 
more frequent weather extremes. Many experts want to reduce the economic and social harm by 
helping farmers adapt to these expected changes through improvements in farming practices 
known as Conservation Agriculture. However, we currently know little about how farmers 
combine decisions about weather, longer-term climate risks and other goals, like financial 
security or family legacy. Borrowing methods and insights from cognitive psychology and risk 
communication, I use five data-rich studies of South African commercial grain farming to show 
that farmers have unexpected difficulty integrating climate risks into ongoing decisions, making 
their adaptations less effective. Farmers and experts think and talk about weather, climate and 
farming practices differently, creating crucial challenges for communication. The concept of 
‘climate change adaptation’ itself seems to create barriers to farmers’ responses to climate risks, 
and may need rethinking. 
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In the monumental halls of storied Disciplines, one may find  
comfort and stability in the Great Works of Great Scholars. But for  
an interdisciplinarian, the landscape of potentially crucial intellectual 
unknowns is unbounded, its dominions nebulous. The Great Scholars of 
one grand school are the Evil Charlatans of another. These giants are to be 
found at every turn, and must be tiptoed amongst for fear of mortal wounds 
inflicted by the myriad complex and contradictory traps they have taken 
lifetimes to carefully lay. The unknowing Integronaut will otherwise be 
baited, ambushed and pilloried by the Great Scholars' disciples. 
 
As with those of many prior, my journey was ever winding, often harrowing 
and sometimes filled with Terror. Setting out from a signpost that pointed 
towards my intended and comfortable destination, I stepped one foot 
before the other on a long and lonely road. At my side, sprightly days and 
weeks were quickly shadowed by hulking Months and Years. I whispered 
through the Forest of Forgotten Figments, tiptoed around the Desert of 
Disappearing Delight, swam desperately across the Overwhelming Ocean, 
trudged among the Perilous Pondering Peaks, and shaded my eyes from the 
Expanse of Ephemeral Epiphanies. Upon raising my gaze, I found myself in 
an altogether unforeseen and fantastical place, effervescent with Possibility 
and buzzing with Questions. 
 
Trembling with nerves and coursing with expectation, I raised my net high 
and drew long arcs, hoping to catch the fluttering wings of Success, with 
which I might triumphantly return home. Alas, these fickle creatures were 
but mist, never to be so entrapped. Exhausted but with heart rekindled, I 
set resolutely to task laying the foundations of a refuge from Things to 
Come. Five winters passed, the landscape frigid but the hearth warm, a 
great many new companions drawn briefly to its flame in my unfinished 
house. Each brought a small gift of stone, wood, iron or thatch. In time, I 
rhapsodized and soliloquized, hammered and hewed, tinkered and tailored, 
painted and polished. At the end of the longest day, on the back of the 
longest year, I sank into my chair, eyelids heavy and fingers raw. And in the 





As greenhouse gas emissions continue apace and global mean temperatures rise (IPCC, 2013), 
policymakers’ attention has steadily pivoted towards governance innovations that will help 
individuals, institutions and businesses adapt to the impacts of anthropogenic climate change 
(Bassett & Fogelman, 2013). The ways in which these diverse actors perceive and respond to 
climate change’s anticipated effects will determine in large part the efficacy of these policies and 
the societal harms ultimately exacted by this epochal event (IPCC, 2014). Climate change’s 
uncertainty, long timescale and incremental rate of change present unique cognitive challenges 
that are beyond those of more short-term weather and climate variability (Hallegatte, 2009). 
However, we know very little about how individual actors will actually interpret and respond to 
climate change risks (Clayton et al., 2015; Dilling et al., 2015; Grothmann and Patt, 2005). Most 
allied literatures implicitly assume that individual decision-makers who are sensitive to climate 
change risks will respond to them as an equivalent long-term extension of the processes by which 
they presently manage risks stemming from weather and climate variability (e.g., Reidsma et al., 
2010; Smit & Skinner 2002; Thomas et al., 2007). In this context, commercial farmers are 
conceptually vital – they are numerous, relatively autonomous actors who are explicitly weather-
sensitive. They manage myriad other uncertain risks on multiple overlapping timeframes, related 
to markets, finance, ecology, technology and society (Eakin et al., 2014). They are thus widely 
expected to harmonize (i.e., ‘mainstream’) climate change adaptation into their existing decision-
making processes with ease (e.g., Mertz et al., 2009). However, a growing number of empirical 
case studies suggest that farmers’ climate-sensitive decision-making processes are less 
straightforward and economically rational than previously understood (Eakin et al., 2016; 
Kenny, 2011). Climate change may thus magnify existing cognitive challenges in decision-
making, creating unforeseen barriers to action. 
 
In many ways, South African commercial grain farmers are an archetypal case study, 
epitomizing the autonomous private actor foundational to the climate change adaptation 
literature. They have high theoretical adaptive capacity, and receive little support from 
government. They perform large-scale, high-input, mechanized, rainfed grain farming 
(Bernstein, 2012) in a variable Mediterranean climate that is physically vulnerable to climate 




principles recognized by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as contributing 
simultaneously to food security and climate resilience (Niang et al., 2015), and key to the Food 
and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) Climate-Smart Agriculture and Sustainable Intensification 
programs (FAO 2013a; FAO, 2013b).  
 
In this dissertation, I aim to enhance our understanding of climate-adaptive behaviour by 
studying South African commercial grain farmers. In examining the relationship between risk 
perceptions and climate-adaptive behaviour, I ask why this group of farmers appears to be 
sensitive to weather risks and to be adopting climate-resilient farming practices, yet they are 
nonetheless perceived by local experts to be insensitive to climate change risks (i.e., the farmers 
are not thinking much about climate change and are unlikely to respond to its effects proactively). 
The work addresses this puzzle using five interlinked studies derived from two original data sets: 
(1) mental models interviews with farmers in the Western Cape province (N = 90), and (2) a 
national survey of commercial grain farmers (N = 441). Each study addresses an aspect of 
decision-making that is critical to the ‘mainstreaming’ of climate-adaptive decisions. To 
illuminate the urgent and overlapping problems motivating these inquiries, and to contextualize 
the five empirical chapters that seek to address them, I first describe the broader arc of the 
relevant literature and the case at hand (Section 1.1), the research goals (Section 1.2) and 
questions (Section 1.3), and the methods (Section 1.4). I then provide a brief synopsis of each 
chapter in describing the structure of the dissertation (Section 1.5). 
 
1.1! The arc of knowledge: Literatures relevant to climate-adaptive behaviour 
This research seeks to help fill the gap between decision-making as it is conceptualized in 
cognitive psychology, behavioural economics and decision science, and as it is represented in 
studies of climate change adaptation, climate-resilient futures and agricultural risk management. 
Within each chapter, I synthesize the state of knowledge in relevant literatures, including those 
related to climate change adaptation (e.g., Bassett & Fogelman, 2013), farm-level risk 
management (e.g., Moschini & Hennessy, 2001), Conservation Agriculture (e.g., Pittelkow et al., 
2015), decision-making (e.g., Evans, 2008) and heuristic shortcuts (e.g., Shah & Oppenheimer, 
2008), the role of cognitive framing in shaping choices (e.g., Thaler, 1999), social cognition (e.g., 




weather and climate change risk perceptions (e.g., Dilling et al., 2015). Here, I present an 
introductory overview of these literatures prior to their in-depth treatment in the relevant 
chapters. 
 
Anthropogenic climate change is anticipated to exacerbate the risks posed by weather and 
climate variability (IPCC, 2013). Its effects are expected to cascade through climate-exposed and 
interconnected systems in ways that we do not yet fully understand (IPCC, 2014). Meanwhile, 
human systems are constantly shifting – adapting to changes in stressors that evoke overlapping 
and competing responses. The decision-making processes that determine risk-mitigating 
responses are strongly shaped by the nature of those risks – their timeframes, magnitudes and 
uncertainties (Thaler, 2000). Climate change is unique, in part because its effects are uncertain 
and will tend to manifest incrementally over decades, with the attribution of its impacts 
challenging at best (Hallegatte, 2009). Therefore, climate change’s effects are and will continue to 
be numerous, multi-faceted and poorly predicted. In this way, it is misaligned with many 
‘normal’ risks, including weather, to which decision-makers are historically used to responding 
(Kunreuther et al., 2013). This misalignment makes it difficult to integrate (or ‘mainstream’) 
climate change into overarching risk management strategies, as is widely recognized to be best 
practice (Dovers & Hezri, 2010; Howden et al., 2007). 
 
To reconcile this misalignment, the climate change adaptation, climate resilience and allied 
literatures have promoted numerous adjusted modes of decision-making to enable the 
‘mainstreaming’ of climate change adaptation into policy-level, institutional and business 
decisions (Kunreuther et al., 2013). Yet there have been few empirical investigations of the 
behavioural processes by which individuals have and will continue to adapt to its effects (Dilling et 
al., 2015; Grothmann and Patt, 2005). Though psychologists have sought to understand how 
broader publics perceive climate change risks, they have yet to characterize the ways in which 
individual climate-exposed decision-makers perceive, understand, and respond to specific climate 
change stressors (Clayton et al., 2015). Meanwhile, in the subfield known as judgment and 
decision-making, researchers influenced by cognitive psychology and behavioural economics 
have clearly demonstrated that human decision-making processes are constrained by limited 




rational actors and utility maximization (Levine et al., 2015; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006; Thaler, 
2000).1 However, these evolving theories of individual decision-making are underrepresented in 
the literatures relevant to climate-adaptive behaviour. 
 
Motivated by this gap in knowledge, I seek to better understand the challenges faced by 
individuals in undertaking climate-sensitive decisions (i.e., those that harmonize, or ‘mainstream’, 
climate change with broader decision-making processes). In doing so, I argue that South African 
commercial grain farmers, as a group of climate-sensitive decision-makers, are highly 
informative. Commercial farmers are conceptually unique – they are an abundant, global 
population of decision-makers who are explicitly sensitive to weather risks and have relatively 
abundant resources compared with their subsistence counterparts (Eakin et al., 2014). They 
operate in diverse environments, managing many interconnected risks related to climate, 
markets, technology, agronomy, ecology and society (Eakin et al., 2016; Ellis & Ramankutty, 
2008). Their careers are devoted to the explicit management of these diverse risks – most of 
which are highly uncertain and some of which are long term – supported by the field of 
agricultural economics (Moschini & Hennessy, 2001). Yet they are hybrid actors, making 
decisions that range from the explicitly rational choices of a small business (e.g., calculating a 
maximum budget for inputs using expected crop yields and market prices) to the intensely 
personal choices of the individual (e.g., legacy planning on family farms) (Farmar-Bowers & 
Lane, 2009; Pannell et al., 2006). 
 
In South Africa, in particular, this large population of small business owners is climate-exposed, 
with ostensibly high adaptive capacity and the incentive to address uncertain long-term risks. 
They perform large-scale, mechanized, high-input, rainfed grain farming (Bernstein, 2012) in a 
variable Mediterranean climate that is physically vulnerable to climate change (RSA, 2011), and 
are immersed in a culture that reveres multi-generational farming heritage (Devarenne, 2009). 
They are relatively well educated, with good access to financial, informational and institutional 
resources. Yet since most are white beneficiaries of South Africa’s apartheid past, they receive 
little support from government (e.g., the subsidies enjoyed by commercial farmers in higher-
                                                
1 The literatures relevant to climate-adaptive behaviours, including psychology and behavioural 




income countries) (Bernstein, 2012). Though some characteristics of the sector are thus unique to 
South Africa, most are not. Their methods of farming are very similar to those of their better-
known brethren in the United States, Canada, Europe and Australia, often with identical 
implements imported from these countries (Wilk et al., 2013). In sum, they epitomize the 
autonomous private actor foundational to the climate change adaptation and allied literatures. 
 
Further, they are differentially adopting Conservation Agriculture (CA) (RSA, 2013c)2 – a set of 
three principles (permanent soil cover, minimum soil disturbance and advanced crop rotations) 
promoted by the FAO as a key part of their Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA) and Sustainable 
Intensification (SI) foci (FAO 2013a; FAO, 2013b). The IPCC has affirmed that CA has the 
potential to simultaneously contribute to food security and climate resilience (Niang et al., 2015). 
Recent meta-analyses have found that comprehensive CA adoption can improve average crop 
yields and reduce yield variability in dry climates like that of South Africa (Pittelkow et al., 2015; 
Rusinamhodzi et al., 2011; Van den Putte, 2010). However, these same analyses suggest that 
when adopted incompletely, these benefits are sharply curtailed or even reversed, particularly 
when minimum soil disturbance (also known as no-tillage, low-tillage, or minimum tillage) is 
applied in the absence of advanced crop rotations and permanent soil cover (Pittelkow et al., 
2015). They have long been targeted by risk communications efforts that emphasize the threat of 
climate change and the need for climate-adaptive responses (RSA, 2013c), yet in preliminary 
interviews, local experts were skeptical that farmers were thinking about climate change or were 
prepared to respond to it. 
 
1.2! Overarching goals 
The goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the better understanding of individuals’ climate-
adaptive behaviours. To pursue this goal, I undertake two analytical branches using the case of 
South African commercial grain farmers. First, I seek to better understand how farmers presently 
perceive and respond to weather and other ‘normal’ risks (i.e., their weather-sensitive decision-
making). Second, I seek to understand how farmers’ perceptions of and responses to climate 
change (i.e., their climate-sensitive decision-making) are related to normal risk management. 
                                                
2 Patterns of CA adoption are explored in depth in Chapters 3 and 4, which each contain a deeper review 




Each chapter of the dissertation is intended to stand alone,3 but the sum is greater than its parts. 
The specific goals, objectives and hypotheses of each chapter are summarized in Table 1.1. 
 
The problem identification and study designs were crucially informed by a set of semi-structured 
expert interviews that I conducted in 2012. Over the course of four months in South Africa, I 
explored the juncture of climate change, food, water and energy in individual meetings with 
more than a hundred different local experts in the fields of climate science, water governance, 
ecology, economics, energy policy, soil science, climate change adaptation, mechanical 
engineering and remote sensing, along with six outspoken and engaging commercial farmers in 
the Western Cape province.4 Throughout these conversations, many of them wide-ranging on 
the topics of climate change, energy, development and food security, I asked about the most 
important challenges facing South African agriculture in the coming decades: How would 
climate change, growing inequality, the national energy crisis, limited and highly variable water 
resources, and South Africa’s apartheid legacy converge in the 21st century with the 
constitutionally recognized need for a strong, fair and sustainable food system?5 
 
In these conversations, as rich and diverse as they were, among the countless pressing issues, 
intersections and intriguing cruxes, many of my participants noted the same phenomenon with a 
mixture of hope and skepticism. They had heard or had themselves observed that commercial 
grain farmers, particularly those in the Western Cape province, were shifting towards more 
sustainable and climate-resilient methods of food production, largely of their own initiative and 
with little guidance or support from government and private extension services. However, most 
of these experts did not think that these farmers were actually responding to climate signals. 
                                                
3 I anticipate submitting the chapters to peer-reviewed journals. They are thus each written to stand 
alone, and contain some measure of overlapping content in their introductory and methods sections. The 
synopsis at the beginning of each chapter is in the form of an abstract for journal submission. Further, 
these chapters are written in first person plural, in recognition of the broader intellectual contributions of 
my committee members and local partners who may be included as co-authors at the time of journal 
submission. 
4 Of these meetings, I sought the participants’ consent to record and transcribe 50 as formal expert 
interviews, as detailed in the methodology in Section 1.4. 
5 South Africa’s constitution, arguably the most progressive in the world when it was adopted in 1996, 





Though the farmers were explicitly sensitive to weather risks and adopting climate-resilient 
farming practices, local experts were skeptical that they were thinking about climate change and 
were prepared to respond to its effects. I thus set out to understand why experts’ perceptions 
appeared to be misaligned with farmers’ behaviours.
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1.3! Overarching question 
 
How do risk perceptions influence farmers’ climate-adaptive behaviours? 
 
In attempting to answer this question, I distinguish between two different modes of risk 
management that correspond to distinct branches of inquiry. In the first three chapters, I 
examine whether and how farmers perceive and respond to weather risks among myriad other 
‘normal’ risks at the farm level (i.e., their weather-sensitive decision-making). In the last two 
chapters, I then assess whether and how they perceive and respond to climate change risks in 
concert with weather (i.e., their climate-sensitive decision-making). The specific questions and 
hypotheses relevant to each chapter are shown in Table 1.1. 
 
1.4! The arc of methodology: Designs, datasets and analyses 
This dissertation draws conceptual and policy-oriented conclusions from five problem-centered 
empirical studies of South African commercial grain farming, using two major data sets: (1) 
structured mental models interviews with farmers in the Western Cape province (N = 90), 
conducted in 2013; and (2) a national survey of grain farmers (N = 441), conducted in 2015. The 
mental models interviews provide insight into the processes by which individual farmers perceive 
and respond to weather and climate change risks in conjunction with myriad others at the farm 
level. This allows for the analysis of cause and effect, as described by participants. In parallel, the 
survey data provide a larger sample in which to identify statistical relationships among different 
demographics, farm characteristics, risk perceptions and farming practices, complementing and 
confirming earlier qualitative findings. Each chapter includes a detailed account of the methods 
relevant to the analysis therein, but it may be useful to understand the broader arc of the 
methods that have contributed to this body of work. The data collection and analysis are 
visualized as a flowchart in Figure 1.1, illustrating the scope and structure of the research 
program. The five studies are roughly divided into two analytical streams, indicated by their 
colour: weather-sensitive decision-making (blue) and climate-sensitive decision-making (red). 
Those steps that contribute equally to both streams are indicated in purple. 
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Figure 1.1: Flow chart of the data collection and methods contributing to each chapter. The two 
analytical streams are distinguished by colour: weather-sensitive (blue) and climate-sensitive (red) decision-making. 
Those steps that contribute equally to both streams are indicated in purple. 
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As described above, the problem identification and study designs were framed by a set of 50 
semi-structured interviews that I conducted in 2012. These suggested that South African 
commercial grain farmers were explicitly sensitive to weather risks and were differentially 
adopting climate-resilient farming practices, but that they were perceived not to be sensitive to 
climate change risks. Following a preliminary analysis of these interviews, I delved into the 
literatures on climate change adaptation and resilience, agriculture and food security, and 
judgment and decision-making to better understand the state of knowledge in relevant fields of 
scholarship. I then designed a program of doctoral research to unravel the conundrum of 
weather vs. climate change as a contribution to the harmonization of climate-adaptive 
behaviours with decision-making more broadly. 
 
To better understand farmers’ weather-sensitive decision-making and its relationship to climate 
change, I designed, piloted and implemented a set of structured mental models interviews in late 
2013. Mental models attempt to capture the cognitive representations of reality that participants 
use to perceive, process and respond to a given situation, idea or stimulus (Jones et al., 2011; 
Morgan et al., 2002). These are visualized as influence diagrams that describe perceived causal 
relationships. Their contents and structure are then analyzed to provide insights into participants’ 
understanding of the particular processes of interest – in this case, weather and climate change 
risk management. Each of these interviews included two major components: (1) a risk elicitation 
exercise in which participants first defined the landscape of risks relevant to their farming 
enterprises, and (2) mental models sections related to farming practices, weather and climate 
change. I analyzed the data from these interviews qualitatively and quantitatively, providing the 
empirical foundations for Chapters 2, 3 and 5. 
 
To complement and confirm the findings from these interviews, I designed, piloted and 
implemented a national survey of South African commercial grain farmers in 2015. The survey 
instrument included major sections related to farm characteristics (e.g., farm size, crops grown, 
profit), farmer demographics (e.g., age, education, political identity), farming practices (e.g., 
tillage, soil cover, crop rotations, use of cover crops), and risk perceptions (i.e., a broader risk 
ranking exercise, and Likert-scale questions about climate change). This approach is broadly 
similar to that used by van Duinen et al. (2015). The data from this survey provide the empirical 
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foundations for Chapters 4 and 6. These chapters comprise quantitative investigations of 
narrower research questions implied by the earlier studies. The quantitative CA analysis in 
Chapter 4 builds from the analysis of cognitive framing and CA adoption in Chapter 3, while the 
quantitative risk ranking analysis in Chapter 6 complements the finding of climate change’s 
cognitive isolation in Chapter 5. 
 
1.5! The arc of inquiry: Structure of the dissertation 
In Chapter 2, I examine farmers’ risk-based decision-making, and their treatment of weather 
risks in conjunction with other ‘normal’ risks. I argue that the climate change adaptation 
literature is steeped in theories of weather-sensitive decision-making that are inconsistent with 
real-world risk management behaviours. This has persisted both because its conceptualization is 
still shaped by rational economic theory, which ignores values, preferences, heuristics, biases and 
frames (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006), and because most research on judgment and decision-
making focuses on narrower decisions made within well-controlled environments of limited scope 
and complexity (Levine et al., 2015). To build a new working theory of farmers’ risk-based 
decision-making, I analyze their in situ thinking about weather within the broader landscape of 
risks that shape their commercial farming enterprises. I find that their risk management is not the 
result of a single, cohesive decision-making framework. Instead, farmers make frequent iterative 
decisions to address multiple competing objectives on different scales and in response to different 
stressors, a process that is strongly mediated by social and experiential learning. Their behaviours 
suggest that they are satisficing to ensure “good enough” outcomes under largely unknown risks, 
rather than optimizing towards the “best” outcome under known and calculable risks.  I argue 
that they use two important decision-making heuristics to make practical trade-offs within and 
between different domains of uncertain risk, respectively: (1) they use multiple simultaneous risk-
mitigating responses that are not necessarily coordinated and may consequently undercut some 
of the benefits of other concurrent behaviours; and (2) they use “good enough” thresholds rather 
than precise calculations to make trade-offs among variables measured on uncertain and often 
incompatible scales. I argue that the predictability of these processes of decision-making is 
complicated by farmers’ use of different cognitive frames to address different risks – such a frame 
being the set of specific perceptions, preferences, memories and mental models that an individual 
uses to understand and respond to a particular problem (Thaler, 1999). 
 14 
 
In Chapter 3, using the conceptual framework established in the preceding chapter, I study the 
role of cognitive frames in farmer decision-making. Specifically, I examine the behavioural effects 
of a suite of cognitive orientations to weather and climate change risks evident among these 
farmers. Previous studies have established that there are strong linkages between cognitive 
framing and its linguistic expression (Lakoff, 2012; Porter & Hulme, 2013), and that the use of 
different cognitive frames can result in choices that differ in their apparent rationality (Thaler, 
1999). I thus seek to explain differences in farmers’ behaviours by testing the relationship 
between their linguistic expression of weather and climate change risks and their use of climate-
adaptive best practices (exemplified by CA). I find that participants use six “languages” to frame 
weather and climate change risks: agricultural, cognitive, economic, emotional, political and 
survival. I show that the prevalence of these languages among those interviewed differs markedly 
between farmers who are adopting CA in a comprehensive manner and those who are not. 
High-adopters frame weather risks using “rational” agricultural, economic and cognitive 
languages. Low-adopters additionally frame weather risks using “irrational” emotional and 
survival languages. The prevalence of the emotional and survival languages among low-adopters 
suggests that the investments in knowledge, technology and land necessary for comprehensive 
CA adoption are inhibited by economic anxiety expressed in terms of the survival of the farm. 
Short- to medium-term concern for the survival of the farm can therefore impede adaptation to 
changes in climate that may threaten that very survival in the long term. 
 
In Chapter 4, I build from the findings on CA adoption in the preceding chapter, investigating 
the concept of CA as a means by which to frame sustainable and climate-resilient farming 
practices. Meta-analyses of CA’s benefits have suggested that comprehensive CA adoption 
produces crop yield gains in dry climates, but that these are curtailed or even reversed when its 
principles are applied piecemeal (Pittelkow et al., 2015; Rusinamhodzi et al., 2011; Van den 
Putte, 2010). This implies that the extent of CA’s complete – and therefore beneficial – adoption 
has been broadly overestimated, because researchers typically use narrow proxies (e.g., the use of 
minimum-till machinery) to monitor its spread (Knowler & Bradshaw, 2007), rather than by 
assessing outcomes aligned with its three principles. I analyze patterns of CA adoption in South 
African grain farming to evaluate the utility of the CA concept in promoting and monitoring the 
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adoption of sustainable agricultural practices in this group, and to compare farmers’ shared 
definition of “conservation” farming with experts’ definition of CA. I find that farmers are not 
adopting CA as a comprehensive package; instead they decide whether and how to adopt its 
three principles using different rationales, while demonstrating some difficulty in estimating CA 
outcomes directly. Farmers’ definition of “conservation” farming is strongly influenced by older 
concepts; though related, these are mismatched with the terms used by experts in promoting CA 
adoption. In combination, these findings suggest that beneficial CA adoption is best promoted, 
monitored and evaluated using specific bundles of locally tailored practices that contribute to 
each of its overarching principles. Otherwise, the mismatched definitions of experts and farmers 
and the piecemeal adoption of CA principles will likely lead both to the underestimation of the 
agricultural extension challenge and to the overestimation of its results. 
 
In Chapter 5, having gained a better understanding of weather-sensitive decision-making, I 
revisit farmers’ mental models to evaluate the harmonization of climate change with weather and 
other ‘normal’ risks (e.g., economic, ecological). The literature holds that farmers ought to 
integrate (i.e., ‘mainstream’) their management of climate change risks with ‘normal’ risks (e.g., 
Howden et al., 2007), yet the mechanisms by which they might do so are poorly understood 
(Clayton et al., 2015). To better understand the mainstreaming challenge, I evaluate the extent to 
which these farmers have integrated climate change risks into the mental models that they use to 
manage weather risks and to make decisions around farming practices. I find that participants’ 
causal mental models of climate change risks are distinct from their mental models of weather 
and other ‘normal’ risks – that is, their stated and implied logic of climate change risk 
management is linguistically and structurally isolated from that of weather. They frame climate 
change in different terms, and their proposed responses to climate change are largely novel. 
Their climate change logic contains more intuitive leaps, where they suggest adaptive responses 
without describing the intermediate problems and/or effects that these responses are intended to 
mitigate. I argue that this linguistic and structural isolation is indicative of farmers’ use of 
misaligned cognitive frames in understanding and responding to climate change and weather 
risks. In turn, such a misalignment will make it more difficult for these farmers to mainstream 
their climate-adaptive behaviours. 
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In Chapter 6, I address a complementary and confirmatory question using the broader sample 
afforded by the national survey. In the literature addressing the mainstreaming of climate change 
adaptation, commercial farmers are often assumed to have already done so, intuitively treating 
climate change risks as an equivalent, long-term extension of risks stemming from weather and 
climate variability (e.g., Mertz et al., 2009). In fact, a small but growing number of in-depth case 
studies suggest that they do not (e.g., Eakin et al., 2016). Using a risk ranking exercise, I seek to 
quantitatively test the proposition that farmers treat the two risks as equivalent. I find that 
individual farmers tend to prioritize one over the other, but which risk they prioritize varies; 
nearly identical proportions of farmers selected each risk as a high priority and not the other. 
Further, farmers who selected one were no more or less likely to select the other. The ranks of the 
two risks were driven by different demographic variables, farm characteristics and farming 
practices. Furthermore, all of the independent variables that were significantly associated with 
both weather and climate change ranks had effects on the two that were of opposite sign to each 
other. The findings suggest that the assumption of equivalence between climate change and 
weather risks is inaccurate, at best; these farmers do not generally think about climate change 
risks in the same way that they do weather risks. This implies a major, unrecognized risk 
communication challenge for climate scientists and policymakers. 
 
Finally, in Chapter 7, I summarize my findings and draw broader conclusions about climate-
adaptive behaviours and the cognitive challenge that individuals must overcome in responding to 
climate change effects. In combination, the findings from the five empirical chapters suggest that 
farmers will have difficulty mainstreaming climate change adaptation under risk communication 
regimes that presently assume the integration of weather and climate change in their decision-
making. They are therefore less likely than previously thought to respond to climate change risks 
rationally and proactively, in part because the frames used by farmers and experts are 
misaligned. I have further identified two specific risk communications challenges that will impair 
climate-adaptive policies if left unaddressed. 
 
1.6! Final opening remarks 
The realization of climate-resilient futures hinges on our ability to perceive, process and respond 
to climate change risks at many scales. The apparent climate-insensitivity of a group of weather-
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sensitive and climate-exposed individuals was a riddle in need of an answer. In systematically 
unraveling this particular conundrum, I hope that I may catalyze in some small way the 
harmonization of climate change knowledge with our growing understanding of human 
judgment and decision-making. 
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Chapter 2:!Hazy hedging and bounded trade-offs: Farmers’ risk-based 
decision-making strategies under ubiquitous uncertainty 
2.1! Synopsis 
The climate change adaptation literature is steeped in theories of weather-sensitive decision-
making that are inconsistent with real-world risk management behaviours. To better inform 
adaptation research and policy, this paper characterizes the messy practice of risk-based decision-
making among South African commercial wheat farmers (N = 90). Using a mental models 
approach, we analyze farmers’ in situ thinking about weather within the broader landscape of 
risks that shape the modern commercial farming enterprise. We first assess farmers’ direct 
relationships to weather risks, both in their perception and immediate mitigative responses. We 
then develop a working theory of farmers’ risk-based decision-making by analyzing the ways in 
which they make trade-offs among different weather risk-mitigating responses, and between 
weather and other domains of risk. Overall, we find that farmers’ decision-making is not rational 
with respect to standard economic models, but is rational with respect to the ubiquitous 
uncertainty in their decision environments (i.e., ecologically rational). Risk management, we find, 
is not the result of a single, cohesive decision-making framework. Farmers instead make frequent 
iterative decisions to address multiple competing objectives on different scales and in response to 
different stressors, all of which is strongly mediated by social and experiential learning. Their 
behaviours suggest that they are satisficing to ensure “good enough” outcomes under largely 
unknown risks, rather than optimizing towards the “best” outcome under known and calculable 
risks. They also demonstrate two important decision-making heuristics to make practical trade-
offs within and between different domains of uncertain risk, respectively: (1) they use multiple 
simultaneous risk-mitigating responses that are not necessarily coordinated and may each 
undercut some of the benefits of the other (i.e., hazy hedging); and (2) “good enough” thresholds 
rather than precise calculations to make trade-offs among variables measured on uncertain and 
often incompatible scales (i.e., bounded trade-offs). We illustrate these strategies by analyzing the 
relationship between two responses – Conservation Agriculture and livestock. These risk-
mitigating responses simultaneously complement and compete with one another as concerns 
weather risk, while both contributing to risk mitigation in other domains. Under pervasive 
uncertainty, it may be that the heuristics we see are not only “good enough,” but that they result 




In the past two decades, humanity’s failure to substantially slow emissions of carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gases has prompted the gradual reorientation of global climate change policy 
from mitigation towards adaptation. The volume of research on climate change adaptation is 
rapidly expanding (Bassett & Fogelman, 2013), yet its behavioural dimensions remain sorely 
understudied (Clayton et al., 2015). While policy-level analyses have discerned the need for new 
decision-making strategies that are robust to uncertainty (Kunreuther et al., 2013), our 
conceptualization of individual decision-making remains fraught with untested or disproven 
assumptions. In the absence of an alternative model of climate-adaptive decision-making, the 
literature on adaptation in commercial agriculture is implicitly founded on three simplifying 
assumptions: (1) that existing processes of risk management for weather and climate variability 
are generally rational and therefore predictable; (2) that climate change adaptation will largely be 
equivalent to a long-term extension of these existing processes; and (3) that farmers will therefore 
adapt to climate change as it occurs incrementally. 
 
In this paper, we test the first of these assumptions through an empirical study of commercial 
grain farming in South Africa. We evaluate the processes of decision-making that contribute to 
the perception and management of weather and climate variability among the diverse risks that 
shape the commercial farming enterprise. Beginning with risk frameworks defined by each 
participant, we elicited farmers’ causal mental models of weather and climate variability to 
understand the processes by which multiple stressors produce interconnected risk-mitigating 
responses. We then developed a working theory of participants’ risk-based decision-making by 
analyzing the ways in which they managed trade-offs among competing responses to weather 
risk, and between weather and other domains of risk. In turn, this revealed two important 
heuristics, which we refer to as hazy hedging and bounded trade-offs, that our participants used 
to make decisions under pervasive uncertainty. 
 
In what follows, we review the literature relevant to weather-sensitive decision-making in 
agriculture. We begin with a look at risk-based decision-making by individuals as conceptualized 
in cognitive psychology and behavioural economics, followed by theories of decision-making that 
 20 
are implicit and explicit in climate change adaptation and climate resilience research. In Section 
2.3, we describe our study area, sample and methods. In Section 2.4, we present the results of a 
mental model analysis aimed at elucidating causal relationships among weather-related stressors, 
risk-mitigating responses, and mediating variables representing other domains of risk. Finally, in 
Section 2.5, we discuss these findings in conceptualizing a working theory of farmers’ risk-based 
decision-making and two common heuristics. 
 
2.2.1! Theories of decision-making 
Rational economic theory, once predominant and still influential (Levine et al., 2015), is 
premised on the existence of stable preferences that guide optimization processes to maximize the 
utility of the outcome (Becker, 1976). However, myriad cognitive and environmental factors (e.g., 
values, preferences, heuristics, biases, frames) pervade working models of individual decision-
making (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006). Alternative theories of decision-making have instead 
turned to cognitive psychology and behavioural economics – the study of economic decision-
making in which the strong influence of context and framing is explicitly recognized. For a half-
century, these fields have been at the forefront of the reimagining of human choice, from the 
perfectly rational Homo economicus to the imperfect and often irrational Homo sapiens (Thaler, 
2000). Behavioural economists argue that individuals’ risk-based decision-making varies in time 
and space, shaped by cognitive, emotional and social factors, and enabled by cognitive short-cuts 
(Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008). 
 
Simon (1956) conceived of bounded rationality as a tension between competing behaviours: 
optimizing, in which utility is maximized, and satisficing (i.e., combining satisfying and sufficing), 
in which the choices made are “good enough” given limited time, knowledge and cognitive 
power. In defining prospect theory, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) further established the 
importance of context and framing. Since the publication of their seminal piece, countless studies 
have found that the framing of options (e.g., positively or negatively, as defaults or as conscious 
selections) strongly influences the subsequent choice (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Levin et al., 
1998). Context and framing in part determine the availability of specific perceptions, preferences, 
memories and mental models. In aggregate, these represent the cognitive frames, or schema, that 
individuals use to understand and respond to specific problems. Frame selection is influenced by 
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the nature of the problem, the way in which it is posed, the emotional and physical states of the 
individual, their recent and past experiences, and their social and physical environments 
(Goffman, 1974; Lerner et al., 2015; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Decisions about risk are 
imperfect and mutable; for objectively similar tasks, the use of different cognitive frames will 
result in different decision-making strategies that will differ in their apparent rationality (Thaler, 
1999). 
 
Researchers have also experimentally demonstrated dozens of common heuristics (i.e., cognitive 
shortcuts or rules of thumb) that people subconsciously apply to arrive at “good enough” 
decisions (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). To differentiate between automatic and purposeful 
reasoning, dual-process theory posits two generalized modes of cognition relevant to decision-
making (Evans, 2008), most popularly described by Stanovich and West (2000) as System 1, the 
intuitive, and System 2, the deliberative. System 1 is automatic, rooted in emotion and 
experience, and cognitively efficient, whereas System 2 is controlled, analytical, and cognitively 
taxing. Heuristics are therefore largely within the purview of System 1, serving to facilitate 
intuitive judgments. Prevailing wisdom holds that, as shortcuts, heuristics usually lead to sub-
optimal decisions. However, Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) argue that heuristics reflect 
“ecological” rationality; that they are rational with respect to complex environments that are 
defined by uncertainty (i.e., unknown risks) rather than by known and calculable risks. They posit 
that heuristics therefore evolved to help us make better – not simply easier – decisions. Their 
experimental results suggest that under some circumstances, people (and computers) make better 
judgments when given less information and less time than they otherwise make with more 
information and exhaustive reasoning (i.e., less-is-more effects). 
 
Furthermore, social relationships play a crucial role in decision-making. Human cognition is 
socially distributed, through knowledge-sharing and group norm setting (Zhang & Patel, 2006). 
Emotions, including peer validation and shame, are strong drivers of behaviour (Lerner et al., 
2015; Levine et al., 2015). Learning is contingent on social and institutional relationships  
(Bandura, 1977; Wenger, 2000) and, by extension, scientific knowledge is socially co-produced 
(Jasanoff, 2004). Individual agency can be reinforced in both perception and practice through 
social mechanisms. For instance, Eakin et al. (2016) emphasize the need for farmers to 
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collectively improve their decision-making environment by influencing processes of political 
action, collaboration across sectors and institutional change. Many recent studies of 
environmental behaviours (Goldstein et al., 2008; Pahl-Wostl, 2002; Reed et al., 2010) and the 
co-management of complex systems (Cundill & Rodela, 2012) suggest that public policies should 
therefore mimic social learning through facilitated knowledge brokerage rather than through 
conventional educational campaigns. 
 
Theories of cognition and behaviour, largely supported by laboratory or computer-based 
experiments, have fundamentally changed our understanding of the processes by which 
individuals make decisions. However, most such research necessarily focuses on narrow decisions 
made within well-controlled environments of limited scope and complexity. We have much less 
understanding of the messy processes by which individuals make decisions in situ. Decision-
making takes place in complex risk landscapes towards multiple overlapping and competing 
objectives that require myriad trade-offs using often-incompatible measures. Despite advances in 
the sophistication of computer simulations and challenges in the interpretation of observational 
data, field studies remain unmatched in the investigation of naturalistic decision-making within 
detailed, challenging, and varied cognitive and social environments (Hudson et al., 2012; Levine 
et al., 2015). 
 
Climate-adaptive behaviours, in particular, are understudied and under-theorized (Clayton et al., 
2015; Grothmann & Patt, 2005). Defined as responses that lessen the harms or magnify the 
benefits of climate change, adaptation has been variously categorized along complementary 
continua: autonomous or planned; reactive, concurrent or anticipatory; short-term or long-term; 
localized or widespread; capacity-building or direct action; and soft (flexible and reversible) or 
hard (inflexible and irreversible) (Adger et al. 2005; Füssel, 2007; Hallegatte, 2009; Smit et al., 
2000; Stern, 2007). However, all such frameworks distinguish between responses by policy-
makers and those by individual actors. Responses by individual actors are inherently local and 
context-specific, dependent on such variables as the climate-sensitivity of locally important 
economic sectors, the broad level of development, and the size and agency of vulnerable groups 
(Vincent, 2007). Because of the diversity of such responses, adaptation researchers have rarely 
attempted to relate their findings to the frameworks used by scholars of judgment and decision-
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making. Few efforts have therefore been made to generalize lessons from empirical studies of 
climate-adaptive behaviours. The adaptation literature thus typically falls into two distinct 
categories: (1) policy-oriented lessons and institutionally driven actions based on theories of 
adaptive capacity, systemic change, transformation, resilience, and vulnerability (e.g., McGinnis 
& Ostrom, 2014); and (2) detailed case studies of specific instances of adaptation to climate 
variability by individuals or groups (e.g., Wreford & Adger, 2011). 
 
Within these two adaptation literatures, assumptions about individual decision-making are more 
often implicit than explicit. Bassett and Fogelman (2013) argue that the vast majority of 
adaptation studies have adopted the rational language of adjustment or resilience to hazards, the 
persistence of which political ecologists have long criticized in the natural hazards literature. For 
agricultural risk management, in particular, theories of decision-making are firmly rooted in 
agricultural economics as a distinct branch of applied economics (Moschini & Hennessy, 2001). 
Expected utility theory, foundational to the discipline, conceives of farmers as optimizers with 
near-perfect information who select rationally from well-constrained but risky choices that will 
produce predictable outcomes with known probabilities and quantifiable values. Each choice has 
an expected value based on the probability and value of each possible outcome. The decision-
maker can thereby calculate precise trade-offs among responses and between domains of risk. 
They will then necessarily prefer the option with the higher expected value, contingent on their 
risk aversion. In the absence of an alternative paradigm, climate change adaptation researchers 
in the agricultural and resource economics traditions continue to rely on expected utility theory 
as the default method by which to integrate climate-adaptive behaviours into broader studies 
(e.g., Rosenzweig et al., 2013). Farmers are therefore conceived as profit-maximizers who will 
manage climate change risks rationally in conjunction with other important farming risks, as they 
have always done for weather (Eakin et al., 2016). The development of more realistic alternative 
theories of farmer decision-making will be crucial to the creation of pragmatic climate change 
policies that facilitate climate change adaptation not only in theory, but also in practice. 
 
To help better anticipate climate-adaptive behaviours, this paper therefore develops a working 
theory of farmers’ risk-based decision-making through the empirical analysis of South African 
grain farmers’ in situ risk perceptions and responses. South Africa’s climate is semi-arid with 
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highly variable rainfall (RSA, 2011), and anthropogenic climate change is expected to reduce 
mean rainfall in the Western Cape province and to further increase its variability (RSA, 2011). 
South African commercial grain farmers typically exhibit high adaptive capacity with little 
explicit support from the government. These farmers generally have good access to education, 
finance, information and technology, and have demonstrated their responsiveness to evolving 
external stressors (Wilk et al., 2013). Their farming enterprises are generally large, modern and 
highly mechanized, with advanced planting and harvesting implements alongside plentiful 
fertilizer and chemical inputs. These farmers are therefore well positioned to improve our 
understanding of the likely behaviour of the idealized private actor – autonomous, adaptive and 
resourceful – that is foundational to the climate change adaptation literature. 
 
While some environmental, social and political factors related to commercial grain farming are 
unique to South Africa, most are not. Many South African commercial farmers perceive land 
tenure risks from the ongoing land reform and restitution programs that have followed the end of 
apartheid (Bernstein, 2012). However, the land reform program remains premised on voluntary 
participation (i.e., the “willing buyer, willing seller” model), and the relatively low number of land 
claims pending in the Western Cape (RSA, 2013b) has made the political risks less immediate 
here than in other provinces. Cultural context is important in shaping judgment and decision-
making (Savani et al., 2015), but preferences can vary more within countries than between (Falk 
et al., 2015). Globalization and subsequent flows of technology and expertise have led to 
commonalities in the culture and practice of commercial farming (Ellis & Ramankutty, 2008). In 
practice, the grain farmers who participated in this study greatly resemble their peers in higher-
income countries. They practice high-input mechanized farming on large land areas, facilitated 
by crucial international, intercultural and interlinguistic flows of knowledge and technology 
through globalized markets, travel and the Internet. 
 
Western Cape grain farming is predominantly rainfed (i.e., dryland), and farmers have long used 
livestock to mitigate weather risks. They are now also adopting Conservation Agriculture (CA), a 
set of interlinked climate-resilient crop farming practices (Findlater, 2013). The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has affirmed with “high confidence” that CA has 
the potential to simultaneously increase food production and climate resilience (Niang et al., 
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2014). If adopted in concert, CA’s three component principles – advanced crop rotations, 
minimum soil disturbance and permanent soil cover – are expected to improve average crop 
yields, reduce input costs, and lessen the overall risk of farm failure (Derpsch et al., 2014; Giller et 
al., 2015; McCarthy et al., 2011). Concurrent benefits include crop yield stability, reduced labour 
needs, runoff and erosion control, and more moderate soil surface temperatures during hot and 
dry summers (Hobbs et al., 2008; Knowler & Bradshaw, 2007). This combination has led most 
grain farmers in the Western Cape to adopt some form of CA, the patterns and drivers of which 
are further explored in Chapters 3 and 4. In what follows, we use the relationship between 
livestock and CA to illustrate farmers’ risk-based decision-making. These competing and 
complementary responses to weather (among other) risks are crucial in revealing the heuristics 
that farmers use to make trade-offs under pervasive uncertainty. 
 
2.3! Methods 
In conducting this research, we sought to better understand how farmers presently respond to 
weather risks in conjunction with other unknown or highly uncertain risks. To this end, we 
conducted 90 structured interviews with individual South African commercial grain farmers in 
their normal decision-making environments, capturing their mental models of risks and adaptive 
responses in situ. The interviews had two major parts: (1) an open-ended risk elicitation exercise, 
in which the participants framed the conversation by characterizing the risks most important to 
their farming enterprises; and (2) a structured and indirect mental model elicitation of the 
processes by which farmers perceived and responded to weather (among other) risks. The 
sampling strategy and interview protocols were designed and piloted in consultation with 
partners from the University of Cape Town, Stellenbosch University, and the Western Cape 
provincial Department of Agriculture. In this section, we explain our data collection and analysis, 
including descriptions of the sample and sampling strategy, and the theory and practice of mental 
modeling. 
 
2.3.1! Sample and sampling procedure 
Ninety (90) participants were recruited through geographically stratified random sampling in the 
Western Cape, split evenly between the province’s two major grain-growing regions. None were 
given any material incentive to participate. In keeping with the local farming population, all of 
 26 
the participants were men ranging in age from 25 to 62 years (M = 43.9, SD = 9.3). Their 
available arable farmland ranged from 250 to 4500 hectares (M = 1443 ha, SD = 880 ha). All 
participants had finished high school, with the majority (76%) having a university or college 
degree. A plurality (39%) of participants had completed one- or two-year technical degrees, while 
one-third (33%) held Bachelor’s degrees and a small fraction (3%) held Master’s degrees. Though 
most spoke Afrikaans as their first language, all were conversant in English. 
 
The interviews were conducted over a two-month period in late 2013, shortly before the grain 
harvest. Participants were recruited with the assistance of liaisons from the four co-operatives and 
agribusinesses (also formerly co-operatives) that store and market grain produced in the region. 
From their organizations’ contact lists, these liaisons reached out to farmers in randomized order, 
and recruited willing participants in proportion to the number of farmers within each of their 
service areas. About 20% of those who were contacted declined to participate; most who did so 
cited time constraints, though some also expressed discomfort with English. Overall, the sample 
included approximately 10% of the commercial grain farmers in the province, in each region 
and in each service area. 
 
Most of the Western Cape’s grain farmers grow rainfed wheat during the region’s winter wet 
season (RSA, 2011). Summer rainfall is very low and the vast majority of farms lack irrigation, 
largely precluding summer crops. By value, wheat is the most important field crop in the Western 
Cape, and the third most important in the country (RSA, 2013a). Wheat is rotated with other 
grains (barley, canola, rye, oats, triticale) and legume pastures (lupins, clovers, alfalfa). Nearly all 
grain farmers in the Western Cape use mixed crop/livestock farming systems – most with sheep, 
but some with cattle and ostriches. Livestock are kept on pastures or fallow fields during the 
winter, and graze on crop residues during the summer. These farmers have variably adopted CA: 
most have implemented crop rotations that include legumes, nearly all have adopted some form 
of reduced tillage, and many intend to improve their permanent soil cover (Chapter 3). 
 
2.3.2! Mental models 
Mental modeling approaches to human cognition and behaviour use methods that attempt to 
capture the internal representations of reality, stored in memory, which participants use to 
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perceive, process and respond to a given situation, idea or stimulus (Jones et al., 2011). The 
technique employs a ‘broad-to-narrow’ question structure to encourage participants to express 
and explain causal relationships, in particular, which can be understood colloquially as their 
theories of explanation for a given phenomenon (Jones et al., 2011; Morgan et al., 2002). It does 
not allow for direct observation of the decision-making process, but rather for the observation of 
explicit and inferred reasoning. A mental models interview script is designed to avoid introducing 
concepts not previously raised by the participant. Progressively narrower questions and prompts 
encourage the participant to elaborate. During the analysis, the interview data are visualized as a 
network of nodes (concepts) and edges (causal relationships) to provide a rough approximation of 
the participant’s mental model. Its contents and structure are then analyzed to provide insights 
into the participant’s understanding of the overarching process of interest – in this case, weather 
risk management. 
 
Mental model elicitation can be direct or indirect. In the direct method, the interviewer clearly 
prescribes the model boundaries and asks the participant to define the model structure (Jones et 
al., 2011). The participant lists relevant concepts, arranges them, describes their causal 
relationships, and often weights these relationships to enable quantitative analysis. This simplifies 
the procedure by compelling the participant to visualize and consciously explore the structure of 
their mental model, but implies rationality and constrains both the model’s scope and the 
language that the participant uses. In the indirect method, the participant is discreetly prompted 
to elaborate on causal relationships, but they are not made explicitly aware that the interviewer 
seeks the overall model structure. The mental model is then derived in subsequent analysis, 
through the systematic coding of the interview transcripts for explicit and inferred causal 
statements. During the interview, participants are therefore less likely to consciously rationalize 
the contents and structure of their mental model, and to identify and resolve redundancies and 
inconsistencies. 
 
We used the indirect method of mental model elicitation to capture the multi-faceted nature of 
decision-making. Our interview protocol began with broad questions about the participant’s life 
history, their farming experience, and their farm. These contextual questions allowed for the 
building of a rapport between the interviewer and the participant. The participant was then 
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asked to list and explain the stressors or risks that they perceived as important to their farming 
enterprise. As each risk was raised by the participant, the interviewer documented it on a sticky-
note in the participant’s own words and placed it on a white board. At the end of the section, the 
participant was asked to organize the risks into ‘manageable’ and ‘unmanageable’ categories, and 
to explain how and to what extent they were each manageable. The risk-listing exercise allowed 
participants to frame the subsequent mental model elicitation in their own terms, and the 
discussion of their manageability catalyzed participants’ initial explanations of causation. This 
risk landscape, both physical and metaphorical, guided participants as they answered further 
questions about their sources of information, their agricultural practices (emphasizing the three 
CA principles) and, finally, their perceptions of climate change.6 Each of these more specific 
sections itself followed the ‘broad-to-narrow’ structure, beginning with a question in the form, 
“What comes to mind when you hear the term….” 
 
This indirect, weather-oriented mental modeling technique, which included participant co-
construction of the risk framework, is unique as far as we can tell, particularly as it pertains to the 
analysis of individual decision-making. Otto-Banaszak et al. (2011) used a similar method to 
study climate change adaptation options among experts in Europe, but at the policy level and 
with researcher-prescribed boundaries. With an average of only six participants per expert group, 
they also necessarily focused on the breadth of possible models rather than on the specific 
mechanics therein. Van Winsen et al. (2013) used an indirect mental modeling approach with 
five farmers, analyzing their choice of agricultural risk management strategies. However, their 
approach was not weather-oriented and they only chose the analytical technique after having 
completed their data collection. Because of our large sample recruited from a relatively 
homogeneous population, we were able to conduct more extensive analyses than in either of the 
above papers. 
 
While all 90 structured interviews were coded and analyzed with respect to risk perceptions and 
farming practices, only 30 were selected for formal modeling because of the time-consuming 
nature of the process and the diminishing utility of additional mental models (Morgan et al., 
2002). The candidates for modeling were selected on the basis of their farming practices, their 
                                                
6 The climate change elements of participants’ mental models are analyzed in Chapter 5. 
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language proficiency, and the extent to which they had elaborated on simple answers (whether 
prompted or unprompted) as a measure of interview quality. To capture a diverse range of 
practices, and to enable the subsequent analysis of the patterns and drivers of farming practice in 
Chapter 3, all 90 participants were scored on the extent to which they practiced CA.7 Ten 
participants were then selected for modeling from each of the three resulting categories of CA 
adoption (low, moderate and high). The language criterion may have led to some bias in the 
modeled subset, since the English language proficiency of Afrikaans-speaking farmers likely 
depends in part on their social integration; however, the inference of causal relationships during 
the analysis was expected to be more precise where participants were comfortable expressing 
nuance in English. 
 
Transcripts from the selected interviews were carefully coded for causal statements related to 
risks and risk-mitigating responses. For instance, SA050 said, “When you really go the minimum 
[tillage] way, you get more pests like snails that live underneath that material.” Therefore, his mental model 
showed that minimum tillage causes an increased risk of pests (and specifically snails). Those 
concepts and relationships that stemmed from weather and climate change problems were then 
imported into data visualization software and represented graphically as networks of nodes 
(concepts) connected by edges (relationships) (see Figure 2.1 for a simplified representation and 
Figure C.1 in Appendix C for a full-scale example). In these network graphs, the nodes were 
classified by function (causes, problems, effects, responses, and mediators of response), and the 
edges were directional (left to right, except for mediators). For this paper, the models were not 
simplified during analysis, nor were they aggregated across participants. This allowed for the 
analysis of the multiple cascading or divergent effects, and multiple sequential or competing 
responses that often branched from each effect. The 30 visualized mental models were then 
qualitatively analyzed in combination with the 90 coded interviews to explicate an overarching 
theory of farmers’ risk-based decision-making, and to describe two heuristics that farmers 
commonly used to make trade-offs under ubiquitous uncertainty. 
 
                                                
7 The CA scoring method is detailed in Chapter 3:. 
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Figure 2.1: Simplified representation of the mental model structure. Nodes (concepts) are displayed as 
shapes, and edges (causal relationships) are displayed as directional arrows. Causes (e.g., climate cycles) lead to 
problems (e.g., rainfall variability) that create negative effects (e.g., low soil moisture). Participants mitigate these 
effects through responses (e.g., increasing soil cover) that are mediated by non-weather variables (e.g., inhibited by 




By analyzing participants’ mental models, we found distinct patterns in their responses to 
weather that were strongly mediated by factors associated with other uncertain risks. As 
elaborated below, farmers’ risk-based decision-making was multi-faceted, incremental and 
iterative across domains. Weather risks produced both complementary and competing responses 
that were constrained by pervasive uncertainty in other domains. These patterns largely 
resembled satisficing rather than maximizing behaviours. The ways in which the participants 
described mediating variables suggested that they represented competing processes of risk 
management. Responses that mitigated weather risks were therefore not part of a comprehensive 
process of risk management, but rather the result of numerous interlinked decision-making 
processes. Participants made estimates of “good enough” outcomes for mediating variables in 
non-weather decision-making processes, largely verbalized as rough estimates or thresholds in 
place of precise calculations. These were then incorporated as satisficing criteria in undertaking 
weather-relevant responses. Mediating variables related to access to reliable information played a 
crucial role in determining the clarity of estimates or thresholds for other mediators, though they 
themselves did not necessarily represent trade-offs. Participants were very unlikely to adopt new 
strategies by rapidly changing their practices or reorienting their businesses, relying instead on 
constant experimentation and incremental change. They continuously updated their decisions as 
new information became available through multiple channels strongly shaped by social and 
experiential learning. Because of uncertainty in the predicted outcomes, participants often 
mitigated specific risks using multiple strategies that were uncoordinated or only loosely 
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coordinated. These strategies were therefore not fully optimized, and in some instances, each 
compromised the benefits of the other. 
 
In what follows, we elaborate on these observations using the risk-mitigating examples of 
Conservation Agriculture (CA) and livestock husbandry. These two distinct responses to weather 
risks simultaneously complemented and competed with each other, requiring trade-offs within 
and between domains of risk. Using data from 90 risk elicitation exercises, Section 2.4.1 first 
defines the broader landscape of farming-relevant risks within which weather interacts with other 
domains. From the 30 mental models, Section 2.4.2 gauges participants’ perceptions of weather 
risks (i.e., their causes, problems and effects (Figure 2.1)). Section 2.4.3 describes participants’ 
direct responses to weather effects, while Section 2.4.4 evaluates the largely external non-weather 
mediating variables that alternately enable and inhibit these responses (most prominently, 
information). Drawing from the 30 mental models in the context of the 90 structured interviews, 
Section 2.4.5 then analyzes emergent patterns of effect, response and mediation as they represent 
relationships among different weather responses and between weather and non-weather risks. 
These results provide evidence of the iterative and interconnected nature of participants’ risk 
management processes that we then use in the discussion to extrapolate a working theory of 
farmers’ risk-based decision-making and to elucidate two common decision-making heuristics. 
 
2.4.1!  Sketching the landscape of farming risks 
During the risk elicitation exercise, participants characterized farm-level risk management as a 
crucial and continuous process: “It’s easy to plant something; anyone can do that in life. But to manage the 
risk factors is the crux of any farm system.” [SA107]. They described numerous distinct and 
overlapping risks. Across all 90 structured interviews, participants introduced 1402 risks (15.6 per 
interview) that they perceived as important in their farming enterprises in the short to long term. 
These were iteratively coded and narrowed to 81 unique risks within 10 emergent categories.8 
For each risk category, Table 2.1 indicates the number of unique risks mentioned, the percentage 
                                                
8 A full list of unique risks within each category may be found in Table D.1 in Appendix D. Since the data 
used for this analysis were the sticky notes generated during the risk elicitation exercise, there was little or 
no information about the attribution of specific environmental problems to weather and climate change 
causes at this stage of the analysis. Climate change was therefore included within the Weather and 
Climate category. 
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of participants who introduced at least one such risk, and examples of specific risks. Economic 
and weather-related risks were most prevalent, with all participants listing at least one economic 
risk, and all but one participant listing at least one weather or climate risk. Section 2.4.5 
elaborates on patterns of interconnection among these domains of risk management. Crucially, 
non-weather risks often mediated actions that were also responses to weather and climate 
problems. For example, high or unstable input costs encouraged farmers to implement advanced 
crop rotations for natural fertilization. Similarly, difficulty in finding skilled and reliable labourers 
encouraged mechanization and minimum tillage. Weather was therefore only one among many 
domains of risk that participants deemed important, and explicitly interacted with other risks in 
evoking responses. 
 
Table 2.1: Elicited categories of risk and their frequencies. * The risk elicitation centered on grain 
farming within mixed farming systems. The prevalence of livestock-related risks is therefore not indicative of their 
importance in the farming business overall. 
 
 
2.4.2! Defining the weather problem 
Since weather is implicit in rainfed agriculture, it was often veiled in discussions of risk. Across 






Economic 21 100 Input.costs,.product.prices
Weather.and.Climate 12 98 Drought,.climate.change
Political 11 93 Rights,.services,.regulation
Labour.(excluding.cost) 3 60 Availability,.skill,.reliability
Crop.(excluding.weather) 6 59 Weeds,.pests,.diseases
Technological 8 59 Research,.availability
Societal 8 42 Crime,.strikes,.food.security
Personal 5 19 Health,.morale,.ability
Livestock.* 3 12 Mortality,.soil.compaction
Logistical 2 8 Transport,.infrastructure
Other.(uncategorized) 2 3 Availability.of.information
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distinguish between weather problems (e.g., variable rainfall or drought) and the causes of those 
problems (e.g., variable climate). Where they elaborated on such causes, these spanned local and 
regional climate, climate cycles, and God. Participants expressed a lack of direct agency over 
weather risks because of the universality of these causes: “Ask the Father above; He’s the only one that 
knows the weather.” [SA109]. Participants often dismissed weather as being so integral to farming 
that it was unworthy of much discussion. Only 47% of participants explicitly raised Rainfall 
(Mean or Variability) during the risk elicitation, though all later spoke of farming challenges 
stemming from rainfall. In dismissing weather, participants used such phrases as “farming is 
weather,” “we’re farming rain,” and “weather is everything.” SA126 expressed typical 
indifference: “The weather is the weather. It changes all the time. We are in the weather business. So you have to 
adapt to that as it comes.” Favourable weather conditions during the study period potentially 
contributed to the lower salience of weather risks. Western Cape grain farmers enjoyed near-
record wheat yields that year, just shy of the previous year’s record tally (RSA, 2013a). 
 
The reported problems stemming directly from weather and climate variability varied little 
among participants. Descriptions were typically broad, often referring to weather risks in general 
terms. References to drought and rainfall variability were common, driven primarily by concern 
for low soil moisture. Temperature and wind problems were secondary, driven by loss of soil 
biota in the summer and the potential loss of seed during harvest (particularly for canola), 
respectively. A few participants reported regular or occasional damage from flooding. Erosion 
(from wind and water) was not generally of acute concern, largely because of historic reductions 
in tillage. The negative effects created by these weather and climate problems were expressed in 
various terms, though agricultural and economic effects were most common.9 Effects expressed 
in agricultural terms included low mean crop yields, high yield variability, low crop quality, crop 
failure, and loss of soil resources; those in economic terms included financial insecurity, volatile 
income and low profit; those in terms of farm survival included loss of the farm due to sudden 
financial hardship or long-term accumulation of debt; those expressed in terms of decision-
making included greater uncertainty, difficulty planning and steep learning curves; those in 
emotional terms included low morale, stress and anxiety; and those in political terms included the 
potential failure of the land reform program. For example, SA085 described the emotional effects 
                                                
9 See Chapter 3 for an elaboration on the linguistic framing of weather effects. 
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of drought: “When it’s dry, the farmers are quiet. They don’t speak a lot. But as soon as the rain has come, it’s 
like a vibe in the air. Everybody’s up and going.” Overall, participants were therefore acutely aware of 
weather risks and characterized them as integral to farming, but simultaneously downplayed 
their importance in the broader context of farm-level risk management. 
 
2.4.3! Responding directly to weather 
Participants’ direct responses to problematic weather effects varied widely and included those 
framed as potential, planned and performed. Agronomic and economic responses were most 
common, but participants also described emotional and political responses, alongside 
adjustments to their planning or decision-making processes. Related or coordinated responses 
were clustered in participants’ mental models; primary responses to weather effects often 
prefaced secondary and tertiary responses that followed logically. Many participants argued that 
the most important overarching strategy was to be flexible and to constantly experiment: “I’m 
always trying something different and something new…. This whole farming exercise is an experiment. If something 
doesn’t work…I change it.” [SA050]. This allowed them to make incremental and proactive changes 
over time rather than attempting drastic and reactive changes all at once: “You can't jump around…. 
Never in a year must you change more than ten percent.” [SA090]. These incremental changes were 
described as leading to long-term transformations in farming practice, and were framed as 
crucial to participants’ survival under changeable political, economic and climatic conditions. 
 
Agronomic responses to weather effects were broadly characterized as improving soil health: 
efforts to improve soil fertility, increase soil water infiltration and retention, safeguard and 
strengthen preferred (“natural”) communities of soil biota, improve the balance of soil nutrients 
and pH, and manage soil erosion from both wind and water. While the focus on CA late in the 
interview protocol ensured that each participant discussed soil processes, the stated causal 
relationships varied. Additionally, CA practices were nearly always introduced first by the 
participants themselves, rather than by the interviewer. Further agronomic responses included 
measures to increase mean crop yields, and to reduce yield variability in an effort to forestall crop 
failures. Such efforts included minimizing evapotranspiration through increased soil cover (either 
using crop residues or cover crops), adopting new cultivars better suited to local climate and soil 
conditions, and better managing weeds, pests and plant diseases. 
 35 
 
Economic responses included income diversification within and beyond agriculture, the purchase 
of insurance products (e.g., crop, fire), farm expansion to leverage economies of scale and to 
broaden soil types, improved cost control and marketing, investment in better machinery or 
reliance on machinery contractors, and the establishment of cash reserves. Those framed in 
terms of farm survival included debt avoidance and repayment, farming on a cash basis, and a 
renewed focus on economic sustainability. Responses described in decision-making terms 
included changes in planning, flexibility, vigilance, focus, reactivity, learning, experimentation, 
improvement and adaptation. Those in emotional terms included humility, prayer, positivity, 
acceptance, love for farming, sense of duty and restrained expectations. Only two responses were 
indicated in political terms: lobbying and emigration. Direct responses to weather risks were 
therefore numerous and varied; however, they were strongly mediated by non-weather factors. 
 
2.4.4! Non-weather factors mediating weather responses 
In participants’ mental models, direct responses to weather risks were strongly shaped by factors 
associated with other domains of risk. Mediating variables enabled or inhibited specific weather-
related responses, spanning a wide range of endogenous and exogenous elements. These included 
myriad agricultural and economic factors at various scales; emotional factors related to personal 
and familial contexts; political factors related to land reform; and decision-making factors 
crucially dependent on access to reliable information. For instance, SA081 described his faith in 
God as mediating his decision about whether or not to plant wheat this year, in light of its high 
input costs and vulnerability to drought: “I didn't grow grain this year, because I just... I've got a special 
advantage to other farmers.  I can hear God's voice when he speaks to me.  So I know when He tells me to sow or 
not. This year, I asked Him, and He told me that I shouldn’t sow.” 
 
Figure 2.2 demonstrates the multi-faceted influence of mediating variables by showing the 
circumscribed mental model of sheep farming as a response to the financial insecurity caused by 
rainfall variability. This figure includes all of the non-weather mediators of sheep farming 
described across the 30 modelled interviews. Some mediators encouraged farmers to have sheep 
or to increase their number (green), while others discouraged sheep farming or limited the size of 
the flock (red). For instance, one positive (enabling) non-weather consequence of sheep farming 
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was the increased diversification of farm income in light of volatile market prices for other 
agricultural products. One negative (inhibiting) non-weather concern was that sheep are 
vulnerable to natural predation by leopards and jackals. 
 
Mediating variables related to information played a crucial role in defining uncertainty and 
clarifying trade-offs. Uncertainty was described as pervasive in the commercial farming 
enterprise, shortening the planning horizon: “The biggest problem is that uncertainty. We don’t know 
what is going to happen next week, next year, and the next five years.” [SA072]. Participants reported 
continually updating their risk management strategies based on the availability of trusted 
information from other farmers (locally and globally), private and public sector experts, and the 
Internet. They recognized plentiful sources of information in the modern world, but distrusted 
most and approached them with substantial caution. For instance, SA125 was skeptical of advice 
from the consultants employed by agribusinesses and preferred to ask other farmers: “It’s difficult. 
Agronomic-wise, you would talk to your chemical guys. But they’re usually biased towards what they want to sell. 
The more successful farmers – we go look at what they do and chat to them.” In contrast, SA105 distrusted 
advice from other farmers: “I think there’s most of the time a competition. The one guy wants to be better than 
the other one, and it’s very easy to be better. You just don’t tell people about your expenses…. When you start to 
hide some of your costs you can look very smart.” Reported mediators related to information included the 
need for diverse sources of information and good on-farm record-keeping; the availability of 
localized knowledge, from crop trials and leading farmers; distrust of other farmers, experts, 
salesmen, and agribusiness consultants (employed by chemical, machinery or seed companies); 
the perceived inaccuracy of weather and climate forecasts; low levels of public investment in 
research; the long-term decline of agricultural extension services; and the lack of readily available 
information from neutral third parties. 
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Figure 2.2: Partial mental model of sheep farming as a response to weather risks. The figure includes all of the factors that participants described 
as mediating sheep farming, aggregated across the 30 mental models. In particular, this illustrates the multi-faceted relationship between sheep and Conservation 
Agriculture, involving both trade-offs (e.g., sheep decrease soil cover) and complementarities (e.g., sheep help to prevent cross-contamination and weed 
germination). Variables that encouraged farmers to have sheep or to increase their number are shown in green (+), while those that discouraged sheep farming or 
limited the size of the flock are shown in red (-). 
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Participants generally described themselves as risk averse and therefore cautious in adopting new 
farming practices. Without strong evidence under agronomic conditions perceived as very similar 
to their own, many indicated that they were loath to commit to changes in practice: “Every farm, 
and every piece of land on this farm, is different…. Let your farm tell you what to do.” [SA049]. For example, 
SA078 was distrustful of crop yield results from nearby trials: “The best experimental farm is your own 
farm.” SA104 emphasized the importance of good record-keeping: “You must [keep records]. How else 
do you make tomorrow’s decision?” However, some farmers kept no records of their own inputs and 
crop yields, and many recorded only the average yield for each year. For instance, SA081 was 
dismissive of written records: “I don't normally [keep] a track record of those things. I have it in my head.” 
SA163 argued that he had more pressing concerns: “Not too much [in the way of records], no. I’m living 
from day to day.” Most participants were therefore deficient in storing and accessing reliable 
information, even when the source was within their immediate control. 
 
Though participants widely described extension services as insufficient, CA programs at the 
provincial Department of Agriculture, the Agricultural Research Council, Grain SA, 
agribusinesses, co-operatives, and local farmer associations were reported to have provided 
valuable information, training and demonstrations. Early adopters of CA were said to have 
predated publicly financed experiments and outreach; however, subsequent local access to 
persuasive demonstrations, whether by neighbours or at experimental farms (public or private), 
was reportedly pivotal in convincing most farmers in the Western Cape to adopt at least some 
aspects of CA.10 Agricultural programs at technical schools and universities have also helped to 
provide a foundation for life-long learning among younger farmers, alongside standard models of 
practical and theoretical learning about new methods and alternative paradigms. Educational 
institutions have facilitated changes in the shared definition of “good” farming. SA051 
emphasized that norms related to ploughing have changed drastically and may yet change back: 
“My dad and them, they fucked up the soil. They ploughed it and they ploughed it. It's crazy. I bet one day my kids 
are going to tell me, ‘Hey, daddy. Why don't you plough this thing? Plough the bloody soil man.’” SA096 was 
more contemplative in describing the obsolescence of older farming practices: “I've got two ploughs 
                                                
10 See Chapters 3 and 4 for quantitative analyses of CA adoption rates in the Western Cape and South 
Africa, respectively. 
 39 
there. I've got a nice place for them; they look out on the sun with a nice roof on them. They just look out on the 
farm; they're never used.” 
 
The information seeking behaviours described by farmers were consistent with theories of social 
learning. These farmers were willing and able to adapt proactively, but they perceived themselves 
as having only limited access to imperfect knowledge. They defined their own success – what was 
“optimal” or “good enough” – using normative criteria that were socially constructed. Individual 
farmers expressed a strong sense of agency, but they relied heavily on social learning for 
knowledge and validation. By this, we mean that intergenerational flows of knowledge have 
provided crucial transfers of experience from the older generations and innovations from the 
younger, both within and between farms. For instance, SA056 emphasized the importance of 
intergenerational knowledge transfers: “I trust my dad and his dad before that. Things – technologies – do 
change, and ways of farming do change…. But just your regular day-to-day crisis, if there’s something that you 
don’t know, maybe the guy that’s been farming for 30 years knows.” Similarly, SA090 argued that 
knowledge transfers between farms have become increasingly important among younger farmers: 
“When my father was young, they never used to talk about stuff to their neighbours or other farmers, but the younger 
generation is much different. We talk about stuff, and if we do something right we go and tell our neighbour.” 
Social learning and access to trusted information have therefore been vital to the adoption of CA 
practices and other technologies in the Western Cape. Other mediating variables, representing 
trade-offs with other domains of risk, were similarly crucial in shaping responses to weather risks 
in farmers’ mental models. 
 
2.4.5! Making trade-offs among domains of risk and between alternative 
responses 
Participants’ mental models suggested that they mitigated negative weather effects using multiple 
complementary and competing responses shaped by implicit trade-offs with other domains of 
risk. As elaborated below, they did not use a single rationale for their choices, but rather 
combined various overlapping rationales in seeking to mitigate multiple risks simultaneously 
towards “good enough” outcomes within each domain. The use of rough estimates to make 
trade-offs among these various objectives allowed them to make constrained decisions within a 
landscape of pervasive uncertainty stemming from largely incalculable risks. Success and failure 
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were often verbalized in terms of thresholds established through experiential or social learning. 
The iterative re-calculation of these thresholds over time allowed for some measure of 
optimization, but participants’ rationales were primarily expressed in satisficing terms. 
 
In mitigating each risk, participants often described alternative responses as competing with each 
other or as mutually incompatible. For instance, to mitigate the long-term risk of bankruptcy 
during severe droughts, many farmers diversified their financial assets beyond the farm. 
However, this meant that they had less capital to invest in the new planting equipment needed to 
improve their crop farming practices and thereby to reduce the vulnerability of their crop 
production to weather risks. SA107 described his tendency to prioritize off-farm investments as 
contrasting with his neighbours’: “Put your money many places, that’s how I feel about it. Other people don’t 
agree. They try to put everything back in farming.” This tension between competing responses applied 
equally to non-economic risks. SA140 observed that many farmers had responded to the political 
risks of land reform by isolating themselves socially, while others had sought instead to improve 
the societal perception of commercial farmers by better integrating their labourers economically: 
“[Since] the big change in South Africa, a lot of people have still not adapted to it. They live in their little corner – 
not that they’re bad. But their circle in which they think is too small.” 
 
CA and livestock have an especially multi-faceted and illustrative relationship as they represent 
competing responses by which to mitigate the risks of weather and climate variability (Figure 2.2). 
CA requires the application of three principles – advanced crop rotations, minimum tillage, and 
permanent soil cover – each of which is enabled or inhibited by livestock production. Participants 
said that livestock grazing provided supplementary income during the non-cash crop (nitrogen-
fixing legume) phases of crop rotations. Grazing also reduced the density of older crop and weed 
seeds that would otherwise germinate during the following growing season, contaminating the 
new crop. However, the subsequent soil surface compaction by animal traffic was difficult to 
resolve without some form of tillage. Grazing also reduced soil cover; therefore, comprehensive 
CA implementation implied low livestock ratios to ensure that sufficient crop residues remained 
on the soil surface at the end of the dry season. Paradoxically, livestock were sometimes used to 




Income from crop production was higher but also more variable than that from animal 
husbandry, and livestock provided insurance against crop failures. Livestock therefore regulated 
income variability while reducing average income, whereas CA reduced income variability but 
maintained or improved average income. Low-CA farmers had generally responded to weather 
risks by increasing livestock and reducing their cropping area, whereas high-CA farmers 
experiencing the same stimuli had responded by planting more crops and improving their CA 
practices. During the study period, no participants practiced continuous cropping (i.e., crop 
rotations that excluded pasture and therefore livestock), but many expressed that preference. For 
instance, though SA055 still had sheep on his farm, he recognized that they compromised his 
ability to practice CA comprehensively: “The really serious no-till farmers, conservation farmers...they don’t 
have sheep on their fields. They know the negative effects of that.” However, most of those who 
acknowledged this compromise nonetheless felt constrained by the need for livestock during 
severe droughts. For instance, SA050 emphasized the importance of sheep to the survival of the 
farm: “If I let the sheep go, I can go as well, because the sheep keep me here in that drought – in those ugly years.” 
 
Participants tended to describe livestock as immediately beneficial in insuring against severe 
droughts, whereas they perceived that the maximum benefits of CA – insuring against moderate 
droughts and frequent rainfall variability, while simultaneously reducing other long-term non-
weather risks (e.g., climate, markets, input costs) – were fully realized only after years of careful 
implementation. Therefore, high-CA farmers seemed to be risk averse in the long term, while 
low-CA farmers were more risk averse in the short term. For instance, SA107 acknowledged that 
crop rotations reduced the average area on which he grew lucrative wheat each year, but he 
argued that CA’s long-term risk-mitigating benefits were well worth that foregone profit: “You can 
go play the lotto – throw it all at once and see if it’s a jackpot – but that’s not sustainability. That’s my aim: I 
want sustainability.” However, when decision-making was shared, differences in risk aversion 
caused conflicting attitudes towards CA and livestock: “My uncle puts lots of animals on [the fields]. I 
would like him to stop doing that. I don't think we get any returns from that. I think we should just sell the bloody 
things.” [SA051]. The simultaneous use of livestock and CA therefore represented a form of 
‘hedging one’s bet’. That is, CA was understood to be most profitable when implemented 
without livestock, but lingering doubts about its performance during severe droughts were 
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addressed by diversifying with livestock. Each adaptive response was perceived as insufficient 
alone. 
 
However, farmers rarely characterized comprises between the two strategies as calculated trade-
offs. For instance, when balancing CA and sheep, SA049 used time limits and visual thresholds to 
avoid over-grazing and soil compaction: “Sheep…. Two weeks [in the field]. Don’t put them there and 
leave them there…. I will say that they mustn't start walking paths. If they start walking paths you must take them 
out. It's almost too late then.” SA049 expressed his grazing threshold as a ratio: “You must try to manage 
it. That's why I say [that the sheep should be in the field only] one week in a month. Don't overdo it. Don't overdo 
it. Balance; balance is very important. Everything must be in balance.” In contrast, SA050 described his 
difficulty in finding such a balance: “You must manage it your way: not disturbing the ground that much 
with your livestock, not trampling it with your livestock, and not taking away the stubble [by grazing] livestock or 
baling it. It’s a very tricky combination. I definitely don’t have the answer.”  
 
Beyond CA and livestock, other mediating variables were also often expressed in satisficing terms 
(e.g., as “too high”, “too much”, “too low”, “not enough”) rather than as precise effects, because 
they inevitably represented sources of uncertainty. For instance, SA077 was frustrated with the 
inclination of his past instructors to insist on more precise calculations of input costs and 
projected crop value, because of the inescapable uncertainty in growing conditions: “My instructor 
told me: you must plan for three scenarios – an average scenario, a best scenario, and a worst scenario. Now how 
the hell do you plan for that? So, in other words, you have to give a little bit of fertiliser, and then when you see it 
rains, then you give a bit more fertiliser. And how do you know that it’s going to keep on raining? In this world of 
ours, it’s not easy…. My best year in production was my worst year in profit.” 
 
Though participants differed in their tendency to maximize or to satisfice, depending on the 
domain of risk, most decisions were expressed in terms that suggested satisficing. The trade-off 
between CA and livestock was the most clearly expressed as such, but other trade-offs that were 
deemed important were similarly described as “good enough” thresholds. For instance, SA087 
specified his threshold for input costs as a function of the price of wheat: “Maximum: we'll never go 
over 100 [kg of fertilizer per hectare]. But it's one of the things I'm starting to realize. If you want to make a good 
crop, you need to do that…. My input cost mustn't be more than [the price of] two tonnes of wheat.” Thresholds 
 43 
of success towards narrower goals reflected underlying uncertainties in their achievement. For 
example, SA084 defined successful yields in reference to the rough average among his peers: “I 
can tell you roughly. When I started on my own, [I harvested] 1.5 [tonnes per hectare] for wheat…. That’s 
roughly what you can work on, around here.” SA081 used a rough yield threshold in concluding that a 
mistake had not cost him too dearly: “I had a bit of a frost problem, I think I sowed a little bit too late…. 
But I still did good, I made about two tonnes [per hectare] last year.” 
 
Those farmers who kept poor records had little choice but to satisfice; they tended to use vague 
estimates of past crop yields and input costs in evaluating their own performance. For example, 
SA077 explained that he only keeps track of farm-wide average yields from memory: “I’ve got it in 
my head, but I do not specifically say, ‘This [field] did this and this one did this....’ I don’t have a formal set of 
records.” SA071 expressed a similarly casual attitude towards record keeping: “I’m a bit lazy in that 
aspect…. I can tell you more or less what [the yields are] in the area, and what I’ve had the last few years. And my 
cost more or less.” SA088 described his exasperation at such poor record keeping practices among 
his peers: “If you don't keep records, how can you compare this year to last year? Did you make a profit and how 
much? My own brothers don't [keep records]. They write on the back of a cigarette box.” However, pervasive 
uncertainty forced satisficing even by farmers who were very diligent record-keepers. SA087 kept 
detailed records, but used his worst-ever crop yield as a threshold to limit his input costs rather 
than trying to optimize them for maximum profit: “I work it out at the end of the year, every year. The 
co-op gives us an average [for input costs], and I always try to be underneath that…. My belief about input costs is 
really easy; my worst year was 2010, and my input costs can't be more than 2010's income. As easy as that. 
That's on a basis of one tonne [of wheat produced] per hectare.” 
 
Even profit and financial success, firmly in the purview of the rational actor model of decision-
making, were often characterized in satisficing terms. For example, SA108 described making a 
rough estimate of the income he needed to break even each year, as a measure of his financial 
success: “My financial record keeping: I’m not good at that, but touch wood, we’re doing alright…. I like to make 
my calculations in such a way that I know what it basically costs me in a month, to live…. I just multiply that by 
12, and I know that’s the kind of money I need to get at the end of the year; that’s easy.” Understanding that 
he could not manage economic risks in a calculated manner, SA141 tried to establish 
redundancies and to avoid making explicit trade-offs among his income-generating strategies: 
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“Like this chair, [there] must be three legs…. There’s no subsidy or cross-subsidy. Everything must be on its 
own…. I steal from all three of them, but it works.” Some participants also expressed rough trade-offs 
between profit and other objectives, including quality of life (e.g., stress, time with family, 
stability) and the provision of economic opportunities for their labourers. For instance, SA141 
warned of the dangers of over-emphasizing profit: “If you are greedy, greediness kills you. It destroys you. 
You will make a lot of money if you are greedy, but it will take you five years to make that lot of money, and in one 
month you will have nothing. That’s the thing of greediness.” [SA141]. 
 
Overall, participants avoided making explicit and calculated trade-offs within and between 
multiple uncertain domains of risk in which the criteria for success were often measured on 
incompatible scales. These trade-offs were rather expressed as thresholds, be they implicit or 
explicit, illustrating a tension between maximizing and satisficing strategies. With respect to CA 
alone, farmers tended to optimize their implementation of its three component principles to 
maximize its benefits. However, the benefits of livestock as a hedge against the risk of severe 
drought were only roughly weighed against the costs of lost soil cover and increased soil 
disturbance, in part because the benefits and costs were intractably uncertain. In place of precise 
trade-offs, participants used rough estimates expressed as boundaries or thresholds that resulted 
in “good enough” outcomes in concurrent risk management strategies. This tendency to satisfice 
under pervasive uncertainty resulted in two distinct decision-making heuristics that are 
elaborated below: (1) multiple simultaneous risk-mitigating strategies that are only loosely 
coordinated in response to the same risk; and (2) the use of rough thresholds to make trade-offs 
among parallel decision-making processes towards the same or different objectives. 
 
2.5! Discussion 
The messy practice of weather-sensitive decision-making is mismatched with the theories of 
decision-making and risk management prevalent – implicitly and explicitly – in the climate 
change adaptation literature. The commercial farming enterprise is primarily defined by 
pervasive uncertainty rather than by calculable risks. Participants typically highlighted weather 
or climate as the most important risk in their farming business, but their mental models show that 
such stimuli do not translate directly into specific responses. Instead, weather permeates the 
decision-making process, where most responses are undertaken for other proximate reasons. The 
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choice of response is contingent on the perceived importance of the myriad non-weather 
variables that mediate agricultural practice, as well as on competition among various responses. 
Trade-offs between alternative responses and among various domains of risk are usually 
expressed in terms of rough thresholds that represent “good enough” outcomes, rather than as 
optimized calculations. In what follows, we extrapolate a theory of farmers’ risk-based decision-
making in the context of weather, and identify two heuristics, one decision-making and one 
cognitive, that participants use to make intractably uncertain trade-offs among competing risk 
management strategies and domains of risk, respectively. 
 
2.5.1! Practical decision strategies for a messy world 
Family farms are a hybrid of personal and business-oriented decision-making, but farmers are 
often assumed to make structured decisions in the manner of institutions. In reality, they make 
many strongly interlinked decisions every day with respect to varied objectives. In general, 
farmers make frequent, iterative and largely incremental decisions towards multiple competing 
and complementary objectives on different scales and in response to different stressors. Their risk 
management is not the result of a single, cohesive decision-making process. It is rather the result 
of multiple, parallel and continuous processes that are alternately prioritized based on the most 
salient objective, which is rarely the minimization of weather risk. This produces a combination 
of decisions that appear economically rational at the micro scale but are not often optimized at 
the macro scale. Standard models of decision-making may appear to explain farm-level outcomes 
well for constrained problems, but they mask a multitude of parallel risk management processes 
that result in networked responses that both compete and cohere, depending on the frame of 
reference. 
 
Our results imply two satisficing heuristics that farmers use to navigate uncertainty. The first, 
hazy hedging, appears to be a conscious decision-making strategy to reduce the likelihood of 
severe loss in the face of diverse and uncertain risks. The second, bounded trade-offs, appears to 
be a subconscious cognitive heuristic to integrate diverse objectives subject to multiple risks, by 
simplifying the representation of trade-offs as rough thresholds. The decision-making strategy of 
hazy hedging is therefore supported by the cognitive heuristic of bounded trade-offs. Levine et al. 
(2015) suggest that heuristics are the default mode of human cognition, and that exhaustive 
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rationalization occurs only infrequently. Rather than being cognitive shortcuts that systematically 
cause people to make irrational errors, heuristics can offer methods by which to make better 
decisions with less information in an uncertain world. As strategies by which farmers make 
practical decisions under pervasive uncertainty, these two heuristics may reflect the “less-is-more” 
effects postulated by Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996; 2002). However, most evidence of such 
effects is limited to narrow, mutually independent decisions. Further study will be needed to 
determine whether these heuristics do indeed exhibit “less-is-more” benefits, as implied by the 
data. 
 
2.5.2! Hazy hedging: risk management strategies under pervasive uncertainty 
Farmers are likely to undertake multiple simultaneous responses to the same or similar weather 
stimuli, because (1) there is uncertainty in the success of each response, (2) farmers make parallel 
decisions on multiple timescales and in multiple domains, and (3) there is competition between 
the management of weather risks and progress towards competing objectives (including the 
economic objectives of yield and profit maximization, and the non-economic objectives of 
farming lifestyle, stewardship and family legacy). Each response usually provides benefits towards 
multiple objectives, and each requires trade-offs, either in the allocation of scarce financial, 
social, institutional or cognitive resources, or in the exacerbation of other risks that may endanger 
competing objectives. 
 
Multiple simultaneous responses that are explicitly undertaken with respect to the same objective 
may compete with or complement each other, depending on the frame of reference. For 
instance, CA and livestock are both used for weather risk management, reducing the damaging 
impact of rainfall variability on farm profit. However, each requires trade-offs from the other 
while also providing mutual benefits. During the study period, no participant pursued only one 
or the other strategy, yet the two were not necessarily coordinated. The chosen balance suggests 
divergent timescales of risk aversion. Those who are risk averse on shorter timescales tend to 
invest more heavily in livestock to protect against periodic drought, whereas those who are risk 
averse on longer timescales tend to invest more systematically in long-term improvements in 
cropping practices. While they are often explicitly separate choices in risk management, and each 
undermines the idealized implementation of the other, the combination of CA and livestock is 
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perceived as nearly unavoidable. Overall, farmers are often conscious of the macro-scale 
inconsistencies in their multiple responses. Individual farmers recognize the apparent irrationality 
of specific decisions as perceived through other, equally valid, frames of reference. 
 
Hazy hedging is therefore the use of simultaneous risk management strategies that are not 
necessarily coordinated and that may each undercut some of the benefits of the other. These 
simultaneous strategies are arrived at through parallel decision-making processes across multiple 
domains of risk. This produces relatively independent responses that might otherwise be linked if 
they were to be optimized. It suggests the conscious non-optimization of decision-making in the 
rational economic sense, and provides evidence of satisficing within domains of uncertain risk. It 
is ecologically rational because of intractable uncertainty in the success of any particular strategy 
(i.e., conditions under which strict economic rationality is impossible). An appropriate balance 
between the multiple strategies is determined through rough trade-offs among domains of risk, 
described in the following section. 
 
2.5.3! Bounded trade-offs: using satisficing thresholds in place of optimization 
Diverse measures of success and pervasive uncertainty suggest that trade-offs between domains of 
risk are cognitively challenging. Bounded trade-offs are a practical, satisficing-based heuristic 
approach to trade-offs among variables measured on uncertain and often incompatible scales. 
Farmers use rough thresholds as stand-ins for calculated costs and benefits. For instance, the 
extent to which participants kept records of inputs and crop yields was far less than expected on 
the basis of prior expert interviews, suggesting that most participants were not tracking the 
precise costs and benefits of fertilizers, chemicals, seeds, fuel, etc. These thresholds are primarily 
stored in memory, and shaped by social and experiential learning. They are updated iteratively 
with the accumulation of experience, the evolution of norms, and the cautious adoption of expert 
advice. This iteration underscores the need for incremental experimentation in modifying 
agricultural and business practices, since the thresholds are recognized as imperfect. 
 
These thresholds bound the present decision without requiring the precise calculation of effects 
across multiple domains infused with uncertainty, ensuring “good enough” outcomes for 
decisions in which optimization is impossible. Because the comprehensive decision environment 
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is large and multi-faceted, farmers appear to use various cognitive frames to parse it into 
narrower and simpler systems relevant to specific objectives. They thus seem to lose clear focus of 
competing objectives, and must make trade-offs imprecisely. Thresholds allow for multiple risks 
to be treated in concert, while most cognitive resources are directed at the immediate problem. 
More precise trade-offs would imply that farmers had accurate information, and that outcome 
probabilities were well defined. It may therefore be ecologically rational to represent trade-offs as 
thresholds in highly risky environments where uncertainties are difficult or impossible to 
calculate. It is in similar circumstances that Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996; 2002) have detected 
less-is-more effects, where simpler decision strategies using less information can perform better 
than exhaustive strategies incorporating more information. 
 
2.6! Conclusions 
The risk-mitigating behaviours of South African commercial grain farmers are rooted in social 
and experiential learning. Iterative and incremental experimentation drives small but continuous 
changes in personal, business and agricultural behaviours that result in systemic changes over 
time. Within a multi-faceted landscape of risk, they use multiple simultaneous risk management 
processes to narrow their decisions. Each process occurs in its own cognitive frame, with different 
relevant endogenous and exogenous factors, available information, and coupled experiences and 
emotions. Farmers are variably risk-averse as individuals, and in reference to different domains of 
risk. To integrate their risk management approaches more broadly, they imperfectly coordinate 
and optimize their strategies within and between domains of risk. 
 
Commercial farmers represent a vast and understudied population of naturalistic decision-
makers. They are foundational to the climate change adaptation literature, epitomizing the ideal, 
autonomous, adaptive and resourceful private actor. However, prevalent theories of farmers’ 
climate-adaptive behaviours fail to capture the messy practice of real-world risk management. In 
practice, weather is rarely the most salient concern in farmers’ risk-based decision-making and 
responses to weather risks are strongly mediated by concerns in other domains. Because of such 
competing rationales, farmers often choose not to undertake available actions that would reduce 
their vulnerability to weather risks. The same can be expected for climate change. Naïve theories 
of decision-making therefore underestimate the individual challenge of adaptation to climate 
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change, and the inaccurate archetype of the economically rational farmer is likely to lead 
researchers and policy-makers astray. 
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Chapter 3:!Six languages for a risky climate: The cognitive framing of 
agriculture 
3.1! Synopsis 
This study examines the behavioural effects of a suite of cognitive orientations to weather and 
climate change risks evident among commercial grain farmers in South Africa. Previous studies 
have established that there are strong linkages between cognitive framing and its linguistic 
expression, and that the use of different cognitive frames can result in choices that differ in their 
apparent rationality. We thus seek to explain differences in farmers’ behaviours by testing the 
relationship between their linguistic expression of weather and climate change risks and their use 
of climate-adaptive best practices (exemplified by Conservation Agriculture (CA)). We first use a 
mental models protocol to evaluate farmers’ performance on three CA-related practices and to 
elicit their understanding of weather and climate change risks – that is, the logics that they use in 
processing and responding specific problems, ideas or stimuli. We then algorithmically cluster 
these mental models to illuminate a set of exhaustive and mutually exclusive “languages” with 
which farmers frame weather and climate change risks. Lastly, we quantitatively analyze the 
prevalence of these languages in farmers’ mental models across three levels of CA adoption (low, 
moderate and high). Specifically, we find six languages with which participants (n=30) frame 
weather risks: agricultural, cognitive, economic, emotional, political and survival. We show that 
the prevalence of these languages among those interviewed differs markedly between farmers 
who are adopting CA in a comprehensive manner and those who are not. High-adopters frame 
weather risks using “rational” agricultural, economic and cognitive languages. Low-adopters 
additionally frame weather risks using “irrational” emotional and survival languages. The 
prevalence of the emotional and survival languages among low-adopters suggests that the 
investments in knowledge, technology and land necessary for comprehensive CA adoption are 
inhibited by economic anxiety expressed in terms of the survival of the farm. Short- to medium-
term concern for the survival of the farm can therefore impede adaptation to changes in climate 





“ Adapt or die. If you're stuck to one thing… you're not going to survive. ”  –  SA087 
 
Climate change adaptation policies have garnered increasing scholarly attention as greenhouse 
gas emissions continue apace and global mean temperatures climb (IPCC, 2013). The volume of 
adaptation research is rapidly expanding (Bassett & Fogelman, 2013), yet its behavioural 
dimensions are sorely understudied (Clayton et al., 2015). This remains so despite the recognition 
that climate-adaptive decision-makers face unique cognitive challenges created by long-term 
climatic uncertainty alongside incremental changes on decadal timescales (Grothmann & Patt, 
2005; Pidgeon & Fischhoff, 2011). Many scholars have published conceptual models of 
adjustments to institutional decision-making – robust, iterative, adaptive, mainstreamed (Füssel, 
2007; Hallegatte, 2009; Kunreuther et al., 2013; Weaver et al., 2013) – but little empirical work 
has examined the ways in which individual decision-makers filter climate signals within a 
landscape of multi-causal risks, and with respect to differences in their climate vulnerabilities. 
 
The conceptualization of decision-making on behalf of individuals facing climate change risks 
(e.g., farmers) thus remains particularly fraught with untested or disproven assumptions. The 
literature on agricultural adaptation is founded on three such simplifying assumptions: (1) that 
existing processes of risk management for weather and climate variability are generally rational 
and therefore predictable; (2) that climate change adaptation will largely be an extension of these 
existing processes; and (3) that farmers will therefore adapt to climate change as it occurs 
incrementally. In Chapter 2, we investigated the first assumption by analyzing the structure of 
the mental models used by South Africa’s commercial grain farmers to perceive and respond to 
weather risks. This group closely resembles the idealized autonomous private actor foundational 
to the adaptation literature – physically vulnerable to climate change, but relatively well educated 
and with good access to financial, informational and institutional resources. There we found 
evidence that farmers’ risk-based decision-making is messy and difficult to predict. Pervasive 
uncertainty causes farmers to satisfice (i.e., undertaking risk-mitigating strategies, and trade-offs 
among them, that result in “good enough” outcomes) rather than optimizing (i.e., choosing those 
that will result in the “best” outcome through exhaustive reasoning). The results suggest that 
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farmers may be undertaking parallel risk management processes within different cognitive frames 
– the set of specific perceptions, preferences, memories and mental models that they use to 
understand and respond to a particular problem (Thaler, 1999). It has previously been shown 
that different cognitive frames can trigger different decision-making strategies that vary in their 
apparent rationality (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006). 
 
In the present paper, we extend this analysis by identifying those cognitive frames that have 
explicit implications for climate-resilient behaviours. Specifically, we test the relationship between 
linguistic expressions of weather risks11 and the adoption of Conservation Agriculture (CA) – an 
important measure of climate-resilient best practice. We first score our participants on the extent 
to which they have adopted CA, and qualitatively assess the drivers and barriers of this major 
change in practice. Using a mental models interview protocol, we then show that farmers use 
various cognitive frames for weather and climate change risks, as evidenced by their use of six 
different languages to describe those risks. We finally combine the quantitative analysis of these 
languages with farmers’ CA scores to identify key frames that enable or inhibit CA adoption. We 
close by inferring a set of recommendations for how public policy might best address the barriers 
to CA adoption in these and equivalent contexts. 
 
3.2.1! Climate change adaptation and the archetype of the rational commercial 
farmer 
Research on proactive and reactive responses to climate change impacts has focussed heavily on 
broad theories that might help explain adaptation, maladaptation, transformation, resilience, 
thresholds and limits (Adger et al., 2009; Barnett & O'Neill, 2010; Dessai et al., 2009; New et al., 
2011; O’Brien, 2012). Such highly conceptual contributions are in part a function of the decadal 
rate of change and the challenge of differentiating climatic stressors from myriad others drivers of 
change. Together, these make strongly empirical work difficult and time-consuming. Empirical 
work has thus generally been limited to small case studies of highly vulnerable groups under 
marginal climatic conditions (Tschakert, 2007), the examination of pre-emptive policy changes 
                                                
11 Though climate change risks were included in the mental models and in the identification of the six 
languages, their implications are assessed separately in Chapter 5. The smaller size and greater variability 
of the climate change branches of farmers’ mental models made the quantitative analysis of their cognitive 
framing more challenging. 
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explicitly addressing climate change adaptation (Berrang-Ford et al., 2011), cross-sectional 
studies of implicit adaptation to variable climates using Ricardian methods (Seo & Mendelsohn, 
2008), or studies of historical cases (Orlove, 2005). Fewer scholars have examined the 
relationships between stressors and responses in situ – i.e., the effects of weather and climate 
variables within pre-existing and multi-faceted decision-making processes (Eakin et al., 2014; 
Eakin et al., 2016; Risbey et al., 1999). 
 
These foci have led to some failure to illuminate the challenging practice of adaptation, enmeshed 
as it is in messy webs of attributed causation (Chapter 2) that are further complicated by decision-
making and information processing governed by human irrationalities (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 
2006; Thaler, 2000). Consequently, the logic of the economically rational actor persists (e.g., 
Anton et al., 2012; Menapace et al., 2013) despite decades of social science research to the 
contrary (Levine et al., 2015). Many public policy processes are implicitly shaped by the rational 
actor model, and so fail to tailor policies to real-world human responses to climate change 
impacts at the global, regional, national, provincial/state, municipal, community, household and 
individual scales.  Instead, such policies are premised on the ability of individual decision-makers, 
at each scale, to systematically incorporate changing climatic conditions into their existing 
decision-making processes. At the individual scale, this idealized decision-maker is autonomous, 
flexible, knowledgeable, resourceful and rational, making full and efficient use of available 
technologies and institutional support. In what follows, we critique this assumption as evidenced 
by the thinking and behaviours of commercial grain farmers, whom we argue are numerous, 
autonomous and deeply climate-sensitive. They thus represent a vast and underutilized source of 
information about individual decision-making and human-environment relationships. 
 
Commercial grain farming is conducted using broadly similar techniques worldwide, despite 
enormously variable socioeconomic and environmental contexts (Ellis & Ramankutty, 2008). 
Agricultural economists conceive of commercial farming enterprises as small businesses that are 
economically rational (Moschini & Hennessy, 2001). However, their management is contingent 
on the many and varied irrational facets of individual decision-making, which we know are 
deeply embedded in social and cultural systems that introduce myriad non-economic 
considerations, particularly for those farms that are family-owned (Eakin et al., 2014). 
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Commercial farmers are more accurately understood as hybrid actors, combining explicitly 
rational and inherently human models of decision-making. Seemingly dispassionate agricultural 
or economic decisions about the future of the farming business become acutely personal (and 
often shared) when enmeshed in complex identities of family, culture and place (Pannell et al., 
2006). For instance, many farmers have an emotional attachment (whether personal or familial) 
to their farms that makes them reluctant to sell unprofitable land, and may lead to seemingly 
uneconomical investments in stewardship and conservation measures (Farmar-Bowers & Lane, 
2009). Some farmers even anthropomorphize their land, speaking of it as if it were a family 
member (Sullivan et al., 1996). Similarly, farming practices may be shaped by undercurrents of 
social performance and social symbolism (Burton, 2004). 
 
South Africa, in particular, provides a uniquely informative environment – climatically, 
agriculturally, politically, culturally and developmentally – within which to examine climate-
adaptive responses. The country has a semi-arid climate with highly variable rainfall and scarce 
water resources (RSA, 2011). Its commercial grain sector is well developed and highly 
mechanized, but without the subsidies common in other industrialized agricultural systems. 
However, grain farming in the Western Cape province, where this work is located, is 
overwhelmingly rainfed and the use of crop insurance is uncommon, implying that these farmers 
are less buffered against weather risk than some others (e.g., the irrigation farmers studied by 
Eakin et al. (2016)). These agronomic conditions are overlain upon a dynamic socioeconomic 
environment in which post-apartheid programs of land restitution and land reform aim to create 
and nurture a new generation of emerging farmers (Bernstein, 2012). Though no emerging 
farmers were included in the present study because of their scarcity in the Western Cape, the 
challenges of commercial farming will be amplified for this group, who generally have less 
farming experience and less access to external resources. The largely white, Afrikaans-speaking 
commercial farmers of the Western Cape are also steeped in a culture that reveres 
multigenerational farming heritage (Devarenne, 2009), which encourages them to plan for long-
term risks (Chapter 2). The Western Cape case, as presented herein, therefore combines climatic 
vulnerability, individual adaptive capacity, broader social imperatives, and cultural obligations. 
 
 55 
Over the past two decades, the sweeping deregulation of South Africa’s agricultural sector has 
introduced considerable financial insecurity, not unlike that which is also expected to result from 
climate change risks. Following the end of apartheid, in 1994, the newly democratic government 
eliminated agricultural subsidies, including price floors linked to variable crop production costs 
(Bernstein, 2012). Consequently, South African commercial farmers became less buffered against 
the economic impacts of weather extremes, and the high and variable costs of wheat production. 
This increased their sensitivity to climate variability and made it riskier to plant wheat on 
climatically marginal lands. Farming, including wheat production in the Western Cape, therefore 
shifted to better account for the underlying climate variables. From 1994 to 2012, the total area 
planted with wheat declined by half, though total production remained flat as technologies, and 
therefore crop yields per hectare, improved (RSA, 2013a). This policy change exposed 
commercial grain farmers to greater risks of farm failure during wet and dry years, making 
farmers more sensitive to weather and climate stimuli. It also forced those that survived to adopt 
weather risk-mitigating practices that would help them to avoid future yield losses (Chapter 2). 
 
3.2.2! Conservation Agriculture as climate change adaptation in the Western 
Cape 
The ongoing adoption of Conservation Agriculture (CA) in the Western Cape grain sector is 
among the most prominent transitions towards weather- and climate-resilient agricultural 
practices in South Africa (RSA, 2013c). CA consists of three principles – advanced crop 
rotations, minimum soil disturbance and permanent soil cover – that are strongly promoted by 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) as part of the Climate-
Smart Agriculture and Sustainable Intensification frameworks (Giller et al., 2015; FAO, 2011). 
When adopted in concert, they are considered best practices in maintaining soil health and soil 
moisture (Hobbs et al., 2008). CA aims to make crop production less sensitive to climate 
variability and weather extremes, especially short- and long-term droughts, primarily by 
moderating soil moisture (improving both water-logging and drought performance) and by 
reducing planting times (requiring a smaller window of good weather) (Holland, 2004; 
Thierfelder & Wall, 2010). Overall, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change affirms 
with “high confidence” that CA has the potential to simultaneously increase food production and 
climate resilience (Niang et al., 2014). 
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Though no-till or minimum-till planting techniques have been promoted as methods of soil 
erosion control since the 1930s “dust bowl” in the United States (Hobbs et al., 2008), recent 
advances in crop cultivar research, crop rotation planning and chemical pest control (enabled by 
herbicide-resistant transgenic cultivars) have prompted the spread of more comprehensive CA 
adoption (Bolliger et al., 2006). Major global drivers of CA uptake have been reported to include 
soil degradation, soil erosion, water scarcity, rising input costs, globalized markets and low profit 
margins (Findlater, 2013; Hardy et al., 2011; Knowler & Bradshaw, 2007). Further benefits 
include runoff and erosion control, moderate soil surface temperatures, lower labour 
requirements and long-term improvements in soil fertility, soil structure, nutrient cycling, natural 
pest control, input costs and crop yield stability (Hobbs et al., 2008; Knowler & Bradshaw, 2007). 
 
The dilemma for farmers is that the inconsistent adoption of the three CA principles may 
jeopardize their long-term benefits (Giller et al., 2015). For instance, farmers’ use of livestock 
(another weather risk management strategy) can inhibit the comprehensive implementation of 
CA (Chapter 2). Livestock compete for the crop residues that are needed to maintain permanent 
soil cover. The presence of livestock also encourages farmers to perform periodic soil disturbance 
to reduce soil surface compaction. Such disturbance can lead to rapid nutrient mineralization 
and soil carbon loss (Jat et al., 2012). CA’s incomplete application may therefore lead to crop 
yield losses relative to conventional techniques (Hobbs et al., 2008; Knowler & Bradshaw, 2007; 
Pittelkow et al., 2015). Other barriers to full adoption include the high capital costs of the 
precision planting equipment necessary for CA, the potential for temporary yield reductions 
following its initial implementation, the foregone ability to control weeds through mechanical 
tillage and residue burning, and the need to improve drainage when implementing CA with 
some soil types (Giller et al., 2009; Hobbs et al., 2008; Jat et al., 2012; Knowler & Bradshaw, 
2007). 
 
In Chapter 2, and as detailed above, patterns in farmers’ risk-based decision-making suggested 
that they may be undertaking parallel risk management processes in different cognitive frames. 
To better understand the effect of cognitive framing on climate-adaptive behaviour, we here use 
the same set of structured interviews with South African commercial grain farmers to reveal the 
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cognitive frames that they apply to weather and climate risks, in particular. We argue that these 
frames are evident in the words (or languages) that they use to describe these risks, as scholars 
have previously found in other contexts (Goffman, 1974; Lakoff, 2012; Porter & Hulme, 2013; 
Werner & Cornelissen, 2014). These farmers’ mental models of the problems, effects, responses 
and mediators of response stemming from weather risks are then mapped and analyzed 
quantitatively in reference to six languages that are representative of identifiably different 
problem framings. Finally, we analyze the prevalence of each of these languages across different 
levels of CA adoption, as an example of climate-adaptive behaviour. 
 
3.3! Methods 
To evaluate the relationship between cognitive framing and climate-resilient behaviours, we 
interviewed 90 grain farmers in South Africa’s Western Cape province (Section 3.3.1). In doing 
so, we used a mental models protocol to elicit their farming behaviours and cognitive logic 
(Section 3.3.2). We then conducted a multi-stage analysis, each step of which is elaborated in 
Section 3.3.3: 
 
1.! We scored each of the 90 participants on the extent to which they had adopted CA 
practices, assigning them to three groups (i.e., low, moderate and high adopters). 
2.! We qualitatively analyzed their stated and inferred drivers and barriers to CA adoption. 
3.! We coded 30 participants’ causal statements stemming from weather and climate change 
risks. 
4.! We used these causal statements to construct influence diagrams showing weather and 
climate change problems, their negative effects, farmers’ risk-mitigating responses, and 
the non-weather variables that mediated those responses (see simplified example in Figure 
2.1). 
5.! We used an automated clustering algorithm to identify groups of mental model elements 
that were well connected and thus formed natural “communities”. We used these groups 
to identify six exhaustive and mutually exclusive “languages” with which participants 
expressed logic related to weather and climate change risks. 
6.! We coded each element of each participant’s mental model into one of these six 
languages. 
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7.! We counted the instances of each language within each participant’s mental model as 
captured in both the number of nodes (concepts) assigned to each language, as well as the 
number of directional edges (causal relationships) originating from each of those nodes. 
8.! We quantitatively analyzed these counts (both in absolute terms and in proportion to the 
size of the mental model) against participants’ CA scores and the CA adoption groups 
from (1). 
 
The study protocols were designed, piloted and implemented in consultation with partners at the 
University of Cape Town, Stellenbosch University and the Western Cape Department of 
Agriculture. 
 
3.3.1! Sample and sampling procedure 
The recruitment procedure was designed to produce a random but geographically representative 
sample of commercial grain farmers in the two major grain-growing regions of South Africa’s 
Western Cape province ( 
 
 
Figure 3.1). The Western Cape grain sector is anchored by wheat production but includes barley, 
canola, rye, oats, triticale, lupines, medics (clover) and lucerne (alfalfa). By total value, wheat is 
the most important field crop in the Western Cape, and third-most in the country (RSA, 2013a). 
Most grain farmers raise livestock – commonly sheep but also cattle and ostriches. Farmers in 
both regions have been adopting CA step-wise over the past decade, though adoption in the 
Southern region is more advanced. Farmers in the Southern region are largely on long-term crop 
rotations with lucerne (for five to seven years), often including wheat, barley, canola, oats and 
lupines during the cash-cropping phase. Those in the Western region mainly use short rotations 
of biennial clovers (medics) and wheat, with some incorporating other annual crops (e.g., canola, 





Figure 3.1: Map of the two study regions. For the purposes of this study, the Southern study region (blue) 
broadly corresponds to the Overberg District Municipality and part of the Eden District Municipality, bordered to 
the west by the Hottentots-Holland Mountains, to the south by the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, to the north by the 
Cape Fold Mountains, and extending east to the town of Mossel Bay. The Western study region (orange) broadly 
corresponds to the Saldanha Bay, Swartland and Bergrivier local municipalities, bordered to the east by the Boland 
Mountains, to the west by the Atlantic Ocean, to the south by the City of Cape Town, and extending north to the 
town of Eendekuil. Map data ©2017 AfriGIS (Pty) Ltd, Google. 
 
 
Ninety (90) structured interviews sought to capture the breadth of current agricultural practices 
across varied farm sizes, with equal representation from each of the two climatically distinct 
grain-growing regions. Generally, 30 interviews are considered adequate to capture the breadth 
of thinking in a homogenous group (Morgan et al., 2002). We added to that to ensure 
representation in the two primary regions; however, as described below, we used a subset of 30 
interviews for the more intensive analyses. In keeping with demographic trends in the local 
farming population, all of the participants were male, ranging in age from 25 to 62 years (M = 
43.9, SD = 9.3). Their available arable farmland ranged from 250 to 4500 hectares (M = 1443 
ha, SD = 880 ha). All participants had finished high school, with the majority (76%) having a 
university or college degree. A plurality (39%) of participants had completed one- or two-year 
technical degrees, while one-third (33%) held Bachelor’s degrees and a small fraction (3%) held 
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Master’s degrees. Though most spoke Afrikaans as their first language, all were conversant in 
English. None were given any material incentive to participate. 
 
The interviews were conducted over a period of two months in late 2013, prior to the start of the 
grain harvest. Participants were recruited with the help of the four local co-operatives and 
agribusinesses that store and market the grain produced in the province. Within each 
organization’s operational area, a liaison recruited a randomized sample of willing participants 
by phone, in proportion to the number of farmers assigned to each grain depot. All interviews 
were conducted in English. Approximately 20% of those contacted declined to participate, most 
frequently citing time constraints, but with some suggesting a discomfort with English. Fifteen 
agricultural experts from the co-operatives/agribusinesses, universities and the provincial 
Department of Agriculture were also interviewed to provide contextual data. 
 
3.3.2! Mental models elicitation 
Participants’ behaviours and cognitive logic were elicited using a mental modeling protocol, an 
approach that attempts to depict the internal representations of reality that participants use to 
perceive, interpret and respond to environmental stimuli (Jones et al., 2011; Morgan et al., 2002) 
– in this case, weather and climate change risks. The approach can either be direct or indirect 
(Jones et al., 2011), where the direct method involves the explicit co-construction of an influence 
diagram by the interviewer and participant, showing concepts interconnected by causal 
relationships (e.g., drought causes low soil moisture, which causes low crop yields, which cause 
financial insecurity). The interviewer prescribes the model boundaries, and the participant is 
encouraged to identify and resolve inconsistencies. By contrast, using the indirect technique, the 
participant is not made aware that the interviewer seeks their mental model. The interview script 
follows a ‘broad-to-narrow’ question structure (e.g., beginning with the form, “What comes to 
mind when you hear the term….”), and standardized prompts encourage participants to 
elaborate on causal relationships. The participant determines the boundaries of the discussion 
and is less likely to identify and resolve inconsistencies than with direct elicitation. 
 
In this study, the interview script was indirect both with respect to the technique (i.e., mental 
modeling) and the topic (i.e., weather and climate change risks). The interview began with an 
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open-ended elicitation of the risks that participants perceived as being important in their farming 
enterprises. This allowed each participant to frame the conversation in their own terms, which 
enabled the subsequent analysis of the linguistic framing of weather and climate change risks. 
Because of the time-intensive nature of the indirect mental modeling analysis and the diminishing 
marginal benefit of each additional model, only 30 of the 90 participants were selected for 
modeling – ten from each CA index group, split evenly at each CA index level between the two 
study regions. To ensure that these structured mental models captured the complexity and 
nuance of participants’ understanding of cause and effect, interviews were selected for modeling 
based on the participants’ English language proficiency and the extent to which they had 
elaborated on simple answers when prompted. The language criterion may have led to some bias 
in the modelled subset, since English proficiency among Afrikaans-speaking farmers likely 
depends in part on their social integration. However, the inference of causal relationships during 
the analysis was expected to be more precise where participants were more comfortable 
expressing nuance in English. 
 
3.3.3! Data analysis 
As briefly introduced above, we conducted a multi-stage analysis to assess the relationship 
between participants’ climate-adaptive behaviours (as represented by CA adoption) and their 
linguistic expression of weather risks: 
 
1.! Quantifying Conservation Agriculture adoption: We first provided an aggregate score of 
each of the 90 participants’ CA practices by developing an CA index based on scoring 
criteria for each of its three components – advanced crop rotations, minimum soil 
disturbance, and permanent soil cover (results in Section 3.4.1). These criteria (listed in 
Table E.1 in Appendix E) were created in collaboration with local agricultural experts on 
the basis of the FAO guidelines and relevant peer-reviewed scientific literature. The CA 
index score was then calculated as the un-weighted sum of the three component scores. 
To allow for the clear comparison of different levels of CA implementation, the 
participants were separated into three groups corresponding to low, moderate and high 
scores. The grouping thresholds were established independently for each of the two study 
regions to control for broad differences in local climate, as well as differential access to 
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public and private agricultural extension services. Multiplying, rather than adding, the 
component scores resulted in no change in group membership. These CA index groups 
were later used to analyze variability in the linguistic framing of weather risks (in the final 
stage below) across different behavioural outcomes (as indicated by group membership). 
2.! Assessing the drivers and barriers of CA adoption: We conducted a qualitative analysis of 
the stated and inferred drivers and barriers to CA adoption across all 90 participants 
(results in Section 3.4.2). To that end, the interview script contained ‘broad-to-narrow’ 
sections specific to each of the three CA principles (advanced crop rotations, minimum 
soil disturbance and permanent soil cover). These sections sought to elicit participants’ 
logic of adoption or non-adoption of CA without alerting them explicitly to the 
overarching CA theme, though many inferred this. 
3.! Coding for statements of cause and effect: The full transcripts of 30 interviews were coded 
for causal statements (i.e., those that implied cause and effect) related to weather and 
climate change risks. For example, a participant might have made the following 
statements (whether sequentially or at various points in the interview) linking back to 
rainfall variability: climate cycles cause rainfall variability (problem); rainfall variability 
often leads to low soil moisture (effect); soil moisture can be improved by increasing soil 
cover using crop residues (response); and the use of crop residues for soil cover is 
mediated (or in this case inhibited) by the competing need to use them as livestock feed.  
4.! Re-constructing participants’ mental models of weather and climate change risks: For 
each participant, these causal statements were visualized as an influence diagram with 
nodes (concepts) connected by directional edges (causal relationships). They were then 
structured left-to-right from causes to problems, effects, risk-mitigating responses and 
mediators of response (see Figure 2.1 for a simplified example and Figure C.1 in 
Appendix C for a full-scale example). Participants’ mental models, as re-constructed in 
this manner, ranged in size from 26 to 87 nodes (M = 52.48, SD = 12.96), and in 
interconnectedness from 2.05 to 3.61 edges per node (M = 2.81, SD = .34). To preserve 
nuance in the mental models, we did not limit the set of possible nodes or aggregate them 
across participants at this stage; each participant’s mental model was re-constructed from 
their interview transcript in isolation of the others. 
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5.! Developing codes for linguistic framing: We used a clustering algorithm to identify groups 
of nodes within each participant’s mental model that were structurally related, forming 
natural “communities”. Beginning with these clusters, we then iteratively categorized the 
nodes until we had identified an exhaustive and mutually exclusive set of “languages” that 
represented distinct linguistic framings of weather and climate change risks. The 
clustering was conducted using an automated algorithm embedded in the yEd network 
graphing software – “natural clustering” based on edge “betweenness”, proposed by 
Girvan and Newman (2002) (see Figure C.2 in Appendix C for an example of a clustered 
model).  
6.! Coding the mental models for language: We coded each node in each participant’s 
mental model into one of the six languages. The edges originating from each node were 
coded into the same language as that node. For example, periodic droughts (problem) 
might lead to multi-year crop failures (agricultural effect), creating serious financial harm 
(economic effect), which can be mitigated through better planning processes (cognitive 
response) mediated by a lack of access to reliable information about crop markets 
(cognitive mediator). In this case, the edge between crop failure and financial harm was 
coded as “agricultural”, while the edge between financial harm and better planning was 
coded as “economic”. Care was taken to ensure consistent coding for nodes that fell at the 
boundary between two or more languages (e.g., access to reliable information (cognitive) 
about markets (economic) was coded as cognitive). Such decisions were made in 
consideration of the original context of the statement. 
7.! Quantifying participants’ linguistic framing of weather risks: Within each participant’s 
mental model of weather risks,12 we counted the number of nodes of each language and 
the number of edges originating from those nodes.  
8.! Quantitatively analyzing patterns of language and behaviour: Lastly, we quantitatively 
analyzed these language counts (both in absolute terms and in proportion to mental 
model size) with respect to the three CA adoption groups established in the first stage 
above. In analyzing node counts for each language across participants and groups, we 
referred to them as language “frequencies” (Section 3.4.3.1). Similarly, in analyzing the 
                                                
12 Though climate change risks were included in the identification of the six languages, they are analyzed 
separately in Chapter 5. 
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number of edges linking different mental model sections (i.e., effects, responses, 
mediators), we referred to them as language “flows” (Section 3.4.3.2). We then used the 
results from the qualitative second stage (barriers and drivers of CA adoption) to 
contextualize these quantitative findings. 
 
3.4! Results 
Overall, we found strong relationships between agricultural practice and the linguistic framing of 
weather risks. Specifically, we identified six languages that participants used to frame the effects, 
responses and mediators of response stemming from problems of weather and climate variability: 
agricultural, cognitive, economic, emotional, political and survival. We found statistically 
significant and meaningful relationships between the presence of particular languages in 
participants’ mental models and their performance towards CA best practices. In particular, 
emotional and survival languages were strongly and negatively correlated with CA adoption. 
 
3.4.1! Conservation Agriculture performance (N = 90) 
We found significant differences in the adoption of all CA practices in the two study regions, 
driven by climate variability, soil type and access to extension services. The mean CA index score 
for participants in the south (M = 3.53, SD = .89) was significantly higher than for those in the 
west (M = 2.50, SD = .94), t(88) = 5.356, p < .001 (Table 3.1). Differences in soil type and climate 
encouraged the earlier adoption of advanced crop rotations in the southern region and have 
deterred certain CA-related techniques in parts of the western region. For instance, southern 
farmers predominantly use five- to seven-year periods of lucerne (alfalfa) pasture to incorporate 
nitrogen-fixing legumes into their crop rotations, while western farmers rely on the alternate-year 
growth of biennial medics (clover) because lucerne performs poorly due in part to the region’s 
hotter and drier summers. The unique characteristics of each rotation system imply differential 
grades when scored on the same definitions of practice. As described in the methods (Section 
3.3.3), different grouping thresholds were therefore applied in each region when designating 
participants as low, moderate or high adopters. 
 
The CA scores were approximately normally distributed (Figure 3.2), overall and within each 
region, as indicated by the Shapiro-Wilk test. On average, southern participants scored higher on 
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each component than their western counterparts. Their crop rotation scores showed the greatest 
mean difference, t(85.416) = 7.784, p < .001, but the difference in soil cover was also significant, 
t(88) = 2.890, p = .005. No statistically significant correlations were found between CA index 
group and age or farm size. Regardless of their CA scores, participants commonly expressed their 
intent to improve their CA practices in the upcoming season. Many of those who owned the 
necessary equipment for CA continued to intersperse older methods with newer CA techniques 
(e.g., using a precision planter but still ripping or ploughing every few years). Participants’ self-
perception of their CA practice therefore often differed markedly from their CA index scores; 
low-scoring participants often provided optimistic assessments when asked to broadly evaluate 
their own CA practices, while high-scoring participants qualified their successes. 
 
Table 3.1: Mean Conservation Agriculture (CA) scores for each study region. Mean scores are shown 
for the composite CA index and each of its components, as well as the author-defined CA index ranges for low, 
medium and high adopters in each region. Other than for minimum soil disturbance, all mean scores were 
















Figure 3.2: Distribution of participants’ CA index scores in each region (N = 90). The full index range 
was 0 to 6 at intervals of 0.5. No participants scored less than 0.5 or greater than 5.0. The Shapiro-Wilk test 




3.4.2! Qualitative drivers and barriers of CA adoption (N = 90) 
 
“ Farmers may seem to be very conservative, but I think we're very adaptable to changes in our environment. ”  
–  SA094 
 
The reported drivers of CA adoption were diverse, spanning many domains of risk (e.g., 
agronomic, economic, climatic). These included lower risks of farm failure because of reduced 
crop yield variability; lower economic risks due better income diversification and reduced inputs 
of seeds, fuel and fertilizer; lower labour risks due to mechanization; lower weather risks because 
of better soil moisture conservation; lower risk of pests because of improved soil biota 
communities; lower technological risks (i.e., weed resistance to chemicals) because of the capacity 
to cycle through a variety of herbicides; lower societal risks due to improved food security; and 
lower political risks because of potential improvements in farmers’ reputations as responsible 
stewards of their land. Recent technological advances have also accelerated CA adoption. The 
advent of locally-built or locally-customized minimum-till tine planters, with their simultaneous 
and precise application of seeds, fertilizer and herbicide, has reportedly improved performance 




















optimism in the ongoing trials of locally customized no-till disc planters that are more commonly 
used in South America. Canola was cited for many benefits in crop rotations, including weed and 
disease control, improved soil structure through natural tillage, and access to new markets. 
However, previous efforts to promote canola in the Western Cape were hampered by the poor 
performance of older varieties. The development of better cultivars has been crucial to its 
adoption and therefore to the improvement of crop rotations. 
 
In contrast, the major barriers to adoption were centred on the large and risky investments in 
knowledge, technology and land necessary for CA’s comprehensive implementation. These 
included the need to invest in costly equipment (e.g., minimum-till planters, larger tractors), and 
the need for large farm sizes to achieve economies of scale and to enable incremental 
experimentation without jeopardizing farm survival. While localized minimum-till planters have 
been integral to CA adoption, they tended to clog when crop residues became too thick. Many 
participants said that they therefore needed to modify their combine harvesters by purchasing 
equipment to shred crop residues. Others reported that their harvesting equipment was 
inadequate in handling canola’s small seeds, with substantial proportions scattered and lost. Low-
scoring participants expressed a greater sense of isolation and a mistrust of the lessons learned by 
others, making them skeptical of evidence from other farms or experiments. They largely 
understood and believed in the benefits of CA, but felt that they had constraints that high-scoring 
participants did not: unique local climates, soil types, personal conditions, risk aversion, 
unwillingness to take on debt, small farm sizes and difficulty controlling weeds by non-
mechanical means. Since participants with small arable land areas needed to set aside a larger 
proportion of their land or capital to experiment with new technologies, they reported that such 
experimentation posed greater risks for them. 
 
The vast majority of participants – even those in the low-scoring CA group – perceived CA to be 
an appropriate way to mitigate the risks of weather, climate variability and climate change. Of 
the 90 participants, only one argued that CA adoption was generally a bad idea, though others 
had misgivings specific to their own farms. When asked what measures they might take in 
response to future climate change, even those who expressed skepticism in the science of climate 
change suggested that CA would be a likely method by which to adapt if it were to occur. Many 
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participants cited droughts in 2003, 2004 and 2005 as crucial in driving farm failures, subsequent 
farm consolidations, and broad changes in agricultural practices. 
 
Participants reported many available options in responding to weather risks. Their choice of risk-
mitigating responses was contingent on the myriad non-weather variables that mediated their 
agricultural practices, as well as on competition between responses. As previously described in 
Chapter 2, CA most directly competes with animal husbandry as an alternative response to 
weather risks. At the time of the interviews, all participants practiced mixed farming with both 
grain and livestock, though many suggested a preference for one or the other. The participants 
and experts alike agreed that livestock made it more difficult to maintain permanent soil cover 
(because of competition for crop residues as feed) and to practice minimum soil disturbance 
(because of soil surface compaction). Participants perceived livestock as necessary to protect 
against severe droughts that would otherwise threaten the immediate survival of the farm. In 
contrast, CA was perceived improve crop yields during more moderate droughts and to improve 
long-term economic sustainability. 
 
Though participants strongly recognized the weather and climate change risk-mitigating benefits 
of CA, many of the proximate drivers of CA adoption were unrelated to weather – 
mechanization to reduce labour risks, precision and natural fertilization to reduce input costs, 
and crop rotations to increase economic diversification and to ease the management of pests, 
weeds and crop diseases. CA has therefore encouraged the conscious integration of risk 
management processes that were previously only loosely coordinated through farm budgeting. 
For example, SA077 described the need to change his mindset: “I must talk to myself when I hear it. 
It’s self-discipline that you must try every day. It’s a total mind-shift away from conventional tillage to a minimum 
tillage system, where as much stubble as possible is kept on the soil, with a good rotation crop in which grass weeds 
are being destroyed.” 
 
It represents a paradigm shift in the way that farmers approach risk, requiring systems thinking, 
long-term planning, continual learning, and the integration of risk management across domains. 
For instance, in describing his adoption of CA, SA085 argued for a steady, long-term perspective: 
“You must change your perception of farming…. [You] must start with Conservation Agriculture…. It’s [all] 
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unpredictable, so you must stick to your original plan. You will make more money than if you’re just responding to 
short-term market [fluctuations].” SA100 similarly emphasized the long-term implications of his 
present CA practices: “The decisions that I make in the next 10 years will determine the future for the people 
who cultivate the land after me.” SA141 emphasized the role of each component within the CA 
system: “I work this [system] like a bicycle wheel with these spokes. You can say that the ring forms the unit, but 
if you touch one spoke, the whole thing must not fall apart. The wheel must still turn. If you remove one spoke, the 
thing must still keep going until you have time to put in the next spoke.” CA’s largely autonomous adoption 
in South Africa therefore demonstrates that farmers are willing and able to adapt proactively to 
uncertain long-term risks. 
 
3.4.3! Six languages of weather and climate change risks (n = 30) 
Using automated clustering and iterative coding (described in the methods), we identified six 
major languages that participants used to frame weather and climate change risks: agricultural, 
cognitive, economic, emotional, political and survival (Table 3.2). For instance, periodic droughts 
(problem) might lead to multi-year crop failures (agricultural effect), creating serious financial 
harm (economic effect), which can be mitigated through better planning processes (cognitive 
response) mediated by a lack of access to reliable information about crop markets (cognitive 
mediator). In what follows, we show that there were clear patterns between participants’ CA 
scores and the prevalence of these six languages in their mental models of weather risk. 
 
3.4.3.1! Nodes: Language frequencies 
The frequencies of these six languages within participants’ mental models varied widely, but 
broad patterns within and between groups were nonetheless evident. Table 3.2 lists definitions 
for each language, with key examples of an effect, a risk-mitigating response, and a mediator of 
response. It also shows important intersections between languages, which are elaborated below. 
Agricultural language dominated the mental models across all three CA index groups, both 
because farming is an agricultural activity and because the interview protocol prompted extensive 
discussion of agricultural practices as they related to major risks at the farm level. Economic 
language was secondary to agricultural language, reflecting the nature of the commercial farm as 
a small business. Cognitive, emotional and survival languages varied the most between groups. 
Cognitive language was used to describe challenges in cognition, decision-making, uncertainty 
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and access to information. Emotional language was used to describe challenges in motivation and 
morality. Survival language occurred at the intersection of economic and emotional languages, 
describing the fear of farm failure. It was indicative of economic anxiety expressed in terms of the 
farm’s survival. For instance, it was often used to describe the threat of long-term debt, though 
not necessarily because the participant presently carried such debt. Participants instead cited 
their fathers’ or their own past errors in overcapitalization or borrowing that threatened 
bankruptcy, or examples of acquaintances who were forced to leave farming during historical 
droughts. Political language was the least used in these mental models of weather risk, most often 
in reference to the role of land reform in mediating farm expansion as a response, or in 
describing the absence of political support for agricultural programs that might improve 
agricultural innovation. 
 
Table 3.2: Six languages of weather and climate risks, as evident in participants’ mental models. 
No mediators were expressed in survival language, and thus no example of such is listed. 
 
 
There was a clear inverse relationship between CA practice and the presence of survival 
language in the mental models of weather risk. Among low-scoring participants, nine of ten had 
survival nodes, whereas only one of ten high-scoring participants had such a node. For those with 































statistically significant correlation between CA index group and the presence of survival language 
(Spearman's rank-order correlation: rs(28) = -.570, p = .001). The relationship between CA group 
and the number of survival nodes per participant was nearly as strong (rs(28) = -.545, p = .002). 
The same held for the relationships between the more variable CA index score and the presence 
of survival language (rs(28) = -.575, p = .001), and between CA index score and survival node 
count (rs(28) = -.526, p = .002). 
 
As an alternative approach, independent-samples t-tests were conducted to compare the CA 
index scores of participants with and without survival and emotional nodes (Figure 3.3). There 
was a significant difference in the scores of participants with survival nodes (M = 2.00, SD = 1.08) 
and those without (M = 3.53, SD = 1.10), t(28) = 3.84, p < .001. Levene's test indicated equal 
variances (F = .24, p = .627). For those with (M = 2.62, SD = 1.26) and without (M = 3.08, SD = 
1.36) emotional nodes, the difference was not found to be significant, t(28) = .97, p = .339. 
However, in the following section, we show that emotional nodes nonetheless had a broader, 
statistically significant effect in their interconnections with other languages. No statistically 
significant differences were found between CA groups for the frequencies of the other languages 
(see Appendix F for supplementary figures). 
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Figure 3.3: Boxplots of CA index score by presence/absence of survival and emotional nodes. These 
were derived from participants’ mental models of weather and climate variability risk (N = 30), and do not include 
climate change risks. The single point in the Survival figure represents a statistical outlier. 
 
 
3.4.3.2! Edges: Language flows 
The CA index groups also exhibited meaningful differences in the broader influence of each 
language within participants’ mental models, as evidenced by the number of edges (causal 
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relationships) originating from the nodes of each language. Using modified Sankey diagrams, 
Figure 3.4, Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 illustrate the flows of the six languages through the 
aggregate mental models of the low, moderate and high CA groups, respectively. These figures 
show the number of edges connecting different model sections (i.e., causes, problems, effects, 
responses, and mediators of response), and the transitions between language that occurred in 
logical sequences of cause and effect. For instance, in the low-CA group (Figure 3.4), survival 
effects in red (e.g., potential farm failure) are connected to agricultural (green), economic (blue), 
survival (red) and cognitive (yellow) responses. The width of each connection is proportionate to 
the number of edges it represents. Though most nodes were connected to others of the same 
language, connections between languages were important in showing participants’ logic. For 
instance SA061 (low CA) indicated that rainfall variability (weather problem) created a risk of 
crop failure (agricultural effect) and unstable income (economic effect), which could be mitigated 
through off-farm diversification (economic response), further encouraged by his children’s 
disinterest in farming (emotional mediator of response). These figures thereby show how the 
different linguistic framings of weather risk were related to one another. 
 
All CA groups had predominantly agricultural, economic and cognitive edges. However, taking 
emotional, survival and political edges in aggregate, participants in the low-scoring CA group 
had significantly more such edges as a proportion of total edges in their mental models (M = 
.084, SD = .054) than did those in the high-scoring CA group (M = .024, SD = .024), t(12.493) = 
3.190, p = .007. The moderate CA group had correspondingly moderate contributions from 
these languages. In absolute terms, high-scoring participants had significantly more agricultural 
edges (M = 88.70, SD = 23.61) than low-scoring participants (M = 69.90, SD = 14.57), t(18) = -
2.143, p = .046, which corresponded to a significant positive correlation between CA score and 
the number of agricultural edges (rs(28) = .434, p = .015). This implies that high-CA participants 
spoke of more causal relationships stemming from agricultural effects, responses and mediators of 
response than did low-CA participants. 
 
The emotional and survival languages each clearly exhibited more influence in the low-CA 
group. Figure 3.7 shows the differences between CA groups in the number of edges stemming 
from survival and emotional nodes as a proportion of total edges in participants’ mental models. 
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The low-CA group had significantly larger proportions of their edges coded as survival (M = 
.041, SD = .051; t(9.524) = 2.330, p = .043) and emotional (M = .029, SD = .029; t(11.602) = 
2.457, p = .031) than did the high-CA group: survival (M = .003, SD = .009) and emotional (M = 
.005, SD = .011). There were correspondingly strong and significant negative correlations 
between CA score and the number of survival (rs(28) = -.466, p = .008) and emotional (rs(28) = -
.433, p = .015) connections. 
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Figure 3.4: Flows of language through farmers’ causal mental models of weather risk for those with low CA scores (n = 10). The figure 
shows the aggregate number of edges (causal relationships) of each language that connect different mental model sections (i.e., problems, effects, responses, 
mediators of response), as well as transitions between these languages in the logical sequences of cause and effect. The width of each connection is proportionate 
to the number of connections it represents. This shows the interconnectedness of each language as evidenced by the number of nodes (concepts) that it influences. 
For example, though agricultural language was predominant (e.g., crop yield effects or soil cover responses), economic mediators were more prevalent (e.g., access 
to credit, cost of machinery) than agricultural mediators (e.g., increased burden from pests or weeds). 
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Figure 3.5: Flows of language through farmers’ causal mental models of weather risk for those with moderate CA scores (n = 10). The 
figure shows the aggregate number of edges (causal relationships) of each language that connect different mental model sections (i.e., problems, effects, responses, 
mediators of response), as well as transitions between these languages in the logical sequences of cause and effect. The width of each connection is proportionate 
to the number of connections it represents. This shows the interconnectedness of each language as evidenced by the number of nodes (concepts) that it influences. 
For example, though agricultural language was predominant (e.g., crop yield effects or soil cover responses), economic mediators were more prevalent (e.g., access 
to credit, cost of machinery) than agricultural mediators (e.g., increased burden from pests or weeds). 
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Figure 3.6: Flows of language through farmers’ causal mental models of weather risk for those with high CA scores (n = 10). The figure 
shows the aggregate number of edges (causal relationships) of each language that connect different mental model sections (i.e., problems, effects, responses, 
mediators of response), as well as transitions between these languages in the logical sequences of cause and effect. The width of each connection is proportionate 
to the number of connections it represents. This shows the interconnectedness of each language as evidenced by the number of nodes (concepts) that it influences. 
For example, though agricultural language was predominant (e.g., crop yield effects or soil cover responses), economic mediators were more prevalent (e.g., access 
to credit, cost of machinery) than agricultural mediators (e.g., increased burden from pests or weeds). 
 78 
Figure 3.7: Boxplots of survival and emotional edges for each CA index group (n = 30). These are 
indicated as a proportion of the total number of edges within each participant’s mental model. 
 
 
3.5! Discussion and conclusions 
We have contributed to the improved understanding of climate-adaptive behaviours by analyzing 
farmers’ mental models of weather and climate variability in situ, finding evidence of the role of 
alternate cognitive frames on behavioural outcomes. Participants’ linguistic framing of weather 
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risks was predictive of CA adoption – as a measure of climate-resilient farming practice – 
implying the use of different cognitive frames in decision-making. Farmers used six languages to 
describe the effects, responses and mediators of response stemming from problems of weather 
and climate: agricultural, cognitive, economic, emotional, political and survival. The frequencies 
of these languages in farmers’ mental models of weather risks, as indicative of the underlying 
contexts and processes of decision-making, predicted the extent to which they had adopted CA. 
Though the vast majority of grain farmers in the Western Cape are committed to improving 
their CA practices, uptake has occurred differentially, both within and between study regions. 
This is not a direct consequence of broad differences in aversion to weather and climate change 
risks, but of divergent sensitivity to particular consequences of such risks. 
 
CA competes with other responses that mitigate weather and non-weather risks. Livestock, 
widely used for agricultural risk management throughout the world, compete for crop residues as 
feed and contribute to soil compaction that must be alleviated through soil disturbance. The 
weather risk-mitigating benefits of CA are also a by-product of strategies that are undertaken 
primarily to manage rising input costs and labour challenges. Minimum-till reduces labour risks, 
along with seed and fuel costs, while advanced crop rotations reduce fertilizer and spraying costs. 
Permanent soil cover is often forgone precisely because it does not directly address any of these 
proximate concerns. However, most farmers intend to improve soil cover as a weather risk 
management strategy, because they recognize CA’s weather and climate benefits. Those for 
whom the maintenance of soil cover incurs fewer trade-offs have improved it by managing other 
objectives by other means – whether foregoing livestock or seeking alternative sources of feed – 
so that they can direct financial and land resources towards the comprehensive implementation 
of CA. 
 
The use of different cognitive frames implies the use of different logics that result in different 
decisions, and therefore different behaviours. CA is an agronomic response, and in this analytical 
framework its component practices were coded as agricultural language, yet the extent to which 
farmers had adopted CA was predicted not predominantly by the use of agricultural language, 
which was pervasive, but by the use of the languages of emotion and survival. High-scoring CA 
adopters used “rational” agricultural, economic and cognitive languages when characterizing 
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weather problems, effects, responses and mediators of response. Low-scoring CA adopters 
additionally described weather stimuli using “irrational” survival and emotional languages, while 
moderate adopters were fittingly positioned in the middle. All groups had similarly low levels of 
political language. These patterns suggest that anxiety about the survival of the farm is an 
overriding factor that may render large investments in improved practice moot, regardless of 
their perceived benefits. Concern for long-term climate change risks, concurrent with the 
recognition of CA benefits, may not be enough to overcome this barrier and may instead result in 
a stronger reliance on livestock to mitigate climate change risks. 
 
Farmer behaviours are not always economically rational; such a singular economic focus would 
underestimate the crucial role of survival risks. Farmers who appear to be financially secure may 
be unexpectedly averse to survival risks because of their own past experiences or those of other 
farmers that they trust. Farmers who characterize weather and climate variability in survival and 
emotional terms are far less likely to have undertaken CA. This suggests that anxiety about the 
survival of the farm is an overriding factor that inhibits the large investments in equipment and 
land necessary to achieve adequate economies of scale. Short- to medium-term anxiety about the 
survival of the farm can therefore impede adaptation to weather risks and changes in climate that 
may threaten that very survival in the long term. To promote CA adoption, policy-makers might 
encourage measures that reduce the heavy upfront investment in equipment and land necessary 
to achieve economies of scale, such as equipment sharing and the use of external contractors for 
planting and harvesting. 
 
While these farmers are capable of proactive climate change adaptation, their decisions are 
strongly shaped by the personal, environmental and socioeconomic contexts in which they 
operate. We can better predict how they will respond to climate change, as just one of many 
risks, by understanding their use of alternate cognitive frames in perceiving and responding to 
weather and climate change risks. In the study area, CA is widely understood to be an 
appropriate method by which to mitigate risks stemming from weather, climate variability and 
climate change. It is recognized as protecting against these risks both by those who practice it and 
by those who do not. While its autonomous adoption is driven largely by non-weather risks (e.g., 
rising input costs, labour challenges), it suggests that farmers are willing and able to adapt 
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proactively to other uncertain long-term risks. Climate change adaptation will not be a 
straightforward translation of environmental stimuli into agricultural responses, but rather the 
result of many incremental changes towards more efficient and effective agricultural practices in 
response to varied stimuli across competing domains of risk. 
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Chapter 4:!Conservation Agriculture adoption: Underestimating the 
extension challenge and overestimating its results 
4.1! Synopsis 
Conservation Agriculture (CA) has been widely promoted as a framework to guide productive 
and climate-resilient grain farming. For example, it has been strongly emphasized by the Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations in their Climate-Smart Agriculture 
(CSA) and Sustainable Intensification (SI) foci, and has been affirmed by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as simultaneously contributing to food security and climate 
resilience. Meta-analyses of CA’s benefits have suggested that comprehensive CA adoption 
produces crop yield gains in dry climates, but that these are curtailed or even reversed when its 
principles are applied piecemeal. This implies that the extent of CA’s complete – and therefore 
beneficial – adoption has been broadly overestimated, because researchers typically use narrow 
proxies (e.g., the use of minimum-till machinery) to monitor its spread, rather than by assessing 
the implementation of its three principles. A possible case in point is the ongoing and differential 
adoption of CA and its attendant practices by South African commercial grain farmers, who 
have the demonstrated incentive, capacity and willingness to mitigate long-term risks through 
changes in farming practice. To evaluate the utility of the CA concept in promoting and 
monitoring the adoption of sustainable agricultural practices in this group, we use data from a 
national survey to investigate their patterns of CA adoption, and to compare their shared 
definition of “conservation” farming to experts’ definition of CA. We find that farmers are not 
adopting CA as a comprehensive package; instead they decide whether and how to adopt its 
three principles using different rationales, while demonstrating some difficulty in estimating CA 
outcomes directly. Farmers’ definition of “conservation” farming is strongly influenced by older 
concepts; though related, these are mismatched with the terms used by experts in promoting CA 
adoption. The results suggest that beneficial CA adoption is best promoted, monitored and 
evaluated using specific bundles of locally tailored practices that contribute to each of its 
overarching principles. Otherwise, the mismatched definitions of experts and farmers and the 
piecemeal adoption of CA principles will likely lead both to the underestimation of the 




The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, among others, has 
marketed Conservation Agriculture (CA) as a coherent set of principles to guide the global 
adoption of climate-resilient grain-farming practices (Jat et al., 2014). Climate change is projected 
to increase climate variability in most areas, and to reduce mean rainfall in some (IPCC, 2013). 
When adopted as a package of complementary practices, CA is expected to reduce the negative 
effects of these environmental changes on average crop yields, and in some cases to increase 
yields. The Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
affirms with “high confidence” that CA has the potential to simultaneously increase food 
production and reduce climate change risks in Africa (Niang et al., 2014). More broadly, CA is a 
foundational element of the FAO’s Climate-Smart Agriculture (CSA) and Sustainable 
Intensification (SI) foci. CSA is an overarching framework to guide optimal agricultural responses 
to climate change towards both mitigation and adaptation, and includes a variety of practical 
recommendations for various agricultural sectors (FAO 2013a). Concurrently, the SI framework 
seeks to encourage crop yield growth for improved food security, through the application of less 
environmentally detrimental forms of industrialized commercial agriculture (FAO, 2013b). For 
commercial grain farming, the focus of this work, CA is the major feature of both the CSA and 
SI frameworks. 
 
Adherence to CA involves the application of multiple underlying practices that contribute to its 
three principles: (1) the maintenance of permanent soil cover to conserve soil moisture and to 
reduce soil surface temperature extremes; (2) the minimization of soil disturbance to improve soil 
structure, infiltration and water-holding capacity; and (3) the careful design of advanced crop 
rotations for natural fertilization and to control pests, weeds and diseases (Hobbs et al., 2008; 
Kassam et al., 2011). When adopted comprehensively, CA may improve average crop yields, 
reduce costs, and curb the risk of farm failure (Derpsch et al., 2014). However, there is mounting 
evidence that CA is often incompletely applied, leading to lower yields and higher costs than 
expected (Giller et al., 2015). In dry climates like that of South Africa, meta-analyses have shown 
improvements in average yield when the three pillars are adopted simultaneously, but yield losses 
when they are implemented separately (Pittelkow et al., 2015; Rusinamhodzi et al., 2011; Van 
den Putte, 2010). In particular, Pittelkow et al. (2015) find that minimum-till or no-till techniques 
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tend to reduce average yields when implemented alone. For example, without advanced crop 
rotations and new chemical inputs, minimum-till is likely lead to lower crop yields, because 
mechanical tillage had previously helped to control weeds, pests and diseases. Furthermore, each 
of the three CA principles enables the implementation of the others. For instance, permanent soil 
cover cannot be properly maintained without minimum-till, because tillage incorporates crop 
residues into the soil. Similarly, advanced crop rotations allow farmers to actively improve soil 
health by growing cover crops, like nitrogen-fixing legumes for natural fertilization, instead of 
having to fallow their fields (i.e., leaving them tilled and unseeded) to passively restore soil fertility 
and to control plant diseases. Livestock husbandry, another common weather risk management 
strategy, can also impede complete CA adoption. Even when farmers intend to adopt CA 
comprehensively, competition for crop residues in mixed grain/livestock farming systems curtails 
CA’s benefits (Chapter 2; Pittelkow et al., 2015). 
 
The widespread monitoring of CA adoption has proven unreliable, in part because its 
manifestation is not universal and in part because the mechanisms of its adoption are not well 
understood (Giller et al., 2015). In monitoring and evaluation programs, CA uptake is often 
narrowly defined using a single binary proxy variable for which data is readily available. The 
most common CA proxy is the use of minimum tillage machinery (also historically known as 
conservation tillage), though some studies have alternatively tracked the implementation of soil 
erosion control measures more broadly, the intensity of chemical inputs, the use of cover crops, 
or the application of compost or mulch (Knowler & Bradshaw, 2007). Our recent qualitative 
study of CA adoption by South Africa’s Western Cape wheat farmers suggests that they are not 
adopting CA wholesale, but are rather piecing together various related practices for largely non-
weather reasons (Chapter 3). The above meta-analyses of CA’s benefits imply that if it is not 
being adopted as a package, monitoring and evaluation programs that use single proxies will 
seriously overestimate the extent of beneficial CA adoption. 
 
To better understand CA as an enabling concept in the spread of sustainable and climate-
resilient practices in South African grain farming, we quantitatively investigate how farmers are 
adopting CA and how they define “conservation” farming. We first examine the assumption 
most crucial to its benefits for both farm-level financial security and societal food security, and 
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therefore to its promotion, monitoring and evaluation: that CA is adopted as a package, with a 
consistent logic underlying its implementation. We then further investigate an important requisite 
assumption: that farmers’ definition of “conservation” farming is aligned with experts’ definition 
of CA. 
 
4.3! Case and methodology 
To investigate patterns of CA adoption, we conducted a national survey of South Africa’s 
commercial grain farmers. The survey data were first used in binary and ordinal regression 
models to identify significant drivers of CA adoption and to evaluate the extent to which it was 
being adopted as a package. A further binary regression was used to contrast respondents who 
self-identified as “conservation” farmers with those who self-identified as “conventional” farmers. 
This revealed an implicit definition of conservation farming, which we then compared with the 
CA guidelines used by the FAO, IPCC and local experts. The survey was designed and piloted in 
consultation with Grain SA, the national commodity organization representing commercial grain 
farmers in South Africa. Grain SA disseminated the final online survey link to their membership 
by email. 
 
Our sample frame was comprised of South African grain farmers who were dues-paying 
members of Grain SA. This frame captured more than half of the country’s commercial grain 
farmers, both by internal (Grain SA) estimates and those provided during expert interviews in 
advance of the survey design. These members were thought to be broadly representative of the 
larger population, but with fewer very large and very small farms. Grain SA’s marketing 
department forwarded the survey link to their member contact list. The survey was open for 
eleven weeks, from March 13th to May 31st 2015, during which time three reminders were sent 
by email. Of the 4757 entries on the contact list, 441 farmers (9%) completed the survey. Twelve 
additional duplicates were excluded from the analysis, on the basis that they were likely to have 
been the same farm or farmer judging from identical geographic, demographic and farm-level 
information. On the advice of local experts with experience surveying commercial farmers, few 
questions were made mandatory. The sample size therefore varied from 244 to 388 depending 
on the variables included in the analysis, and is indicated below for each of the results. The 
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survey was offered in both English and Afrikaans, with the vast majority of respondents (92%) 
selecting the Afrikaans version. 
 
South Africa’s commercial grain farmers operate in a highly variable and semi-arid 
Mediterranean climate (RSA, 2011). As many are white and therefore historical beneficiaries of 
South Africa’s apartheid system, they are also generally well educated, with relatively large farms 
and good access to financial, informational and institutional resources (Bernstein, 2012; Wilk et 
al., 2013). Their production methods are broadly similar to those of commercial grain farmers in 
higher-income countries – input intensive and highly mechanized, using the same types of 
implements and farming practices – but with few public subsidies. They are therefore closely 
representative of the autonomous private actor foundational to the climate change adaptation 
literature. Within South Africa, two major rainfall regions correspond to the cultivation of 
different crops. Wheat is the most valuable cash crop in the western winter rainfall region, while 
maize (corn) is most valuable in the eastern summer rainfall region and in the country as a whole 
(RSA, 2013a). Anthropogenic climate change is expected to exacerbate climate variability in 
South Africa, and to reduce mean rainfall in the winter rainfall region (RSA, 2011). During 
preliminary interviews, local experts described the adoption of CA as the most important current 
trend in the sector, because of its potential benefits for farm-level sustainability and regional food 
security, and because they perceived that farmers were undertaking this progressive 
transformation of their own initiative. However, these early interviews also suggested that 
farmers’ definitions of “conservation farming” were imperfectly aligned with experts’ definitions 
of “Conservation Agriculture”, leading to some degree of confusion and miscommunication in its 
promotion, monitoring and evaluation. 
 
CA adoption as a package: To assess the extent to which farmers were adopting CA as a 
package, we compared and contrasted the drivers of CA adoption. First, respondents were asked 
to report on outcomes aligned with each of CA’s three principles (i.e., amount of soil cover, 
amount of soil disturbance, and number of crops in rotation). Second, to corroborate these 
measures of performance, they were asked about their use of a variety of specific farming 
practices, including two components that are integral to CA implementation (the use of low-
tillage implements and the avoidance of crop residue burning). A low-tillage score was 
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constructed based on their reported use of mechanical soil disturbance across four questions (i.e., 
for primary tillage, secondary tillage, weed control and seeding/planting). The frequency of crop 
residue burning was converted from a five-point scale to a binary variable (i.e., never burn / 
sometimes or always burn). Lastly, to assess overall CA adoption as a package, the three CA 
outcomes were combined into a composite CA Index – the sum of the normalized scores for each 
outcome. These six measures (the three CA outcomes, the two additional practices, and the CA 
Index) were used as dependent variables in separate regressions with an identical set of farm and 
farmer characteristics as independent variables. Depending on their nature, the dependent 
variables were analyzed using binary logistic regression or ordinal (cumulative logit) regression 
through the generalized linear modeling interface in SPSS. The signs and significance of these 
independent variables were compared and contrasted among the six dependents. 
 
Farmers’ definition of “conservation” farming: To reveal whether a common definition 
of conservation farming existed in the population, respondents to the survey were asked to select 
their overarching system of grain farming from six typical options (conventional, conservation, 
precision, progressive, biological, and organic).13 “Conservation” and “conventional” farmers 
were coded as “1” and “0”, respectively, and contrasted using binary logistic regression to 
determine the significant demographics, farm characteristics and farming practices that led 
respondents to self-identify as “conservation” farmers. These significant predictors revealed an 
implicit definition of conservation farming in this group of farmers. This was then compared and 
contrasted with the common expert definition of CA and historical concepts of conservation 
farming. An alternative multinomial regression analysis, using all six farming identities, yielded 
similar results but failed to satisfy important regression assumptions because of the higher 
number of categories and low number of respondents in some of them. 
 
While most of the independent variables (e.g., demographics and farming practices) stem directly 
from individual survey questions, the categorical “crop cluster” variable requires further 
explanation. It was derived from a cluster analysis of the different types of crops grown by each 
farmer, whether irrigated or non-irrigated. For instance, dry wheat farmers primarily grew 
rainfed wheat in rotation with other rainfed crops (e.g., barley, canola, oats, lucerne). The 
                                                
13 These were determined from earlier interviews documented in Chapters 2, 3 and 5. 
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clusters used here broadly match known grain-farming patterns in South Africa with one 
exception: the “mixed” cluster captures farmers whose major crops did not clearly fall into one of 
the three larger clusters (irrigation, dry wheat and dry maize). Farmers in the “no grain” cluster, 
who reported not growing any grain in the past year, were excluded from this analysis. Because 
we were primarily interested in the variety of significant drivers across different dependent 
variables, we have not included nested regression models for each dependent variable in the 
results below. 
 
4.4! Results and discussion 
 
Finding 1: CA is not adopted as a package; its three principles are each adopted according to a different logic. 
 
The regression analyses of farming practices suggest that, in South Africa, the three CA 
principles are not adopted systematically and simultaneously. If CA were adopted as a package, 
its components would be well correlated with each other, and farmers’ performance on these 
measures would be broadly driven by the same significant factors. In reality, the three variables 
representing CA outcomes were not significantly correlated with each other (Table 4.1), and they 
were driven by different significant independent variables (Table 4.2). These differences were 
masked when CA adoption was assessed as a package (i.e., the composite CA Index). These 
farmers are therefore adopting CA principles piecemeal, contrary to the simultaneous and 
systematic mode of adoption promoted by the FAO and implicitly assumed in the most common 
methods of monitoring and evaluation. This validates a similar qualitative finding from our 
previous study of South African wheat farmers (Chapter 3). 
 
These findings suggest that the extent of beneficial CA adoption will be seriously overestimated if 
it is monitored using a single proxy associated with minimum soil disturbance, because of the 
complementary nature of CA practices as described by Pittelkow et al. (2015). Though the use of 
low-tillage implements was significantly correlated with all three CA outcomes – and minimum 
soil disturbance most strongly – correlations among the CA outcomes and associated practices 
were much lower than expected (Table 4.1). Further, though the avoidance of crop residue 
burning is a prerequisite for the maintenance of permanent soil cover, the two were not 
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correlated with each other. Moreover, our previous findings (Chapter 3) suggest that farmers 
have difficulty estimating soil cover and soil disturbance, because these are not intuitive measures 
relevant to their daily farming practice. In the regression analyses, soil cover and soil disturbance 
were more weakly predicted than other dependent variables, and were significantly driven by 
farmer demographics (i.e., age, education and political identity). In contrast, more easily specified 
responses relating to crop rotation, tillage implements and residue burning were strongly 
predicted by farm characteristics, including crop cluster, farm size and climate. CA adoption may 
thus not easily be measured by surveying farmers about their direct performance towards its 
principles. 
 
Table 4.1: Non-parametric correlation matrix for Conservation Agriculture (CA) outcomes and 
related practices. Using Spearman’s rho, the table shows the strength of relationships among the six dependent 
variables used in the regression analyses, representing outcomes and practices associated with CA adoption. 
 
 
While the composite CA Index was significantly predicted by education, political identity, crop 
cluster, farm size and the proportion of farm profits derived from grain, its three component 
indicators were each significantly driven by a different subset of these variables. This implies that 
each CA principle has different constraints on its adoption. Older farmers with more education 
tended to report less soil cover, but middle-aged farmers with more education tended to report 
more soil cover. This suggests that farmers’ understanding of soil cover as a farming practice may 
differ generationally – i.e., it has become more common knowledge than it used to be. Self-
identified Liberals showed no effect of education on CA-related outcomes or practices, but 
Conservatives and Moderates with more education tended to report less soil disturbance. 











Min.#soil#disturbance *****.604**** *****.090*† ***1.000
Rotation#crops *****.425**** *****.096 ****D.047 ***1.000
Low;tillage#implements *****.467**** *****.276**** *****.353**** *****.168*** ***1.000





requires further study to disentangle the effects that political worldview and farmers’ values may 
have on their adoption of progressive farming practices. For example, the results in Chapter 3 
suggest that farmers who speak of their relationship to their land in terms of “stewardship” may 
be more likely to adopt progressive farming practices. 
 
Dry wheat farmers tended to report more soil cover, more rotation crops, the use of fewer tillage 
implements, and more crop residue burning than dry maize farmers. Strong correlations between 
province and crop cluster made it impossible to disentangle the effect that differences in 
governance between provinces may have had on CA implementation. However, prior expert 
interviews suggested that more effective government extension services in the Western Cape – 
and their specific focus on CA – may have facilitated the higher adoption rates reported by wheat 
farmers, who are primarily limited to that province (Chapter 3). Irrigation farmers similarly 
reported more rotation crops, the use of fewer tillage implements, and more crop residue burning 
than maize farmers, though with the exception of residue burning, the effect sizes were much 
smaller than for wheat farmers. Farmers in districts with higher rainfall variability tended to 
report the use of more tillage implements, but this effect was neutralized for dry wheat farmers 
and requires further study to understand its cause. Farmers with small farms tended to report 
fewer rotation crops and the use of more tillage implements. The results in Chapter 3 suggest 
that farmers with smaller farms must use a larger proportion of their limited land for cash crops 
in order to be economically viable, and tend to have less capital to invest in new low-tillage 
implements. Farmers who reported earning a greater proportion of their income from grain 
farming tended to report more soil cover. This may be because their focus on grain production 
encourages them to make long-term improvements in grain farming practices. Corroborating our 
previous finding that CA is being adopted for largely non-climatic reasons (Chapter 3), no 
statistically significant relationships were found between CA adoption and belief in climate 
change or concern for its likely future impacts.14 
 
                                                
14 Respondents’ climate change risk perceptions, and their implications, are further explored in Chapter 6. 
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Table 4.2: Odds ratio estimates for binary and ordinal regression analyses of CA adoption. 













Independent'variable Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B) Exp(B)
Age+a
Younger +++1.339 ++++.864 +++++.805 +++1.478 +++++.987 +++++.951
MiddleIaged +++++.718 ++++.666 +++++.791 +++++.897 +++++.930 +++1.303
Older ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref
Education+b +++++.291+* +++++.362+* +++++.465 +++++.914 +++++.829 +++++.845
Age+x+Education
Younger+x+Education +++1.408 +++1.289 +++++.887 +++2.028 +++++.480 +++++.405
MiddleIaged+x+Education +++1.400 +++2.476+* +++++.447+† +++2.728+† +++++.525 +++++.406
Older+x+Education ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref
Political+identity+c
Conservative +++++.769 +++++.703 +++++.874 +++1.550 +++++.934 +++++.818
Moderate +++++.878 +++1.351 +++++.730 +++1.157 +++++.906 +++++.562
Liberal ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref
Political+identity+x+Education
Conservative+x+Education +++3.735+** +++1.993 +++4.831+** +++++.779 +++2.050 +++1.278
Moderate+x+Education +++2.852+* +++1.331 +++5.419+*** +++++.632 +++2.934+* +++3.347
Liberal+x+Education ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref
Crop+cluster+d
Mixed +++3.388+† +++3.496+† +++++.757 +++9.271+* +++++.636 +++++.158+*
Irrigation +++2.713+* +++2.129+† +++++.851 +++6.003+*** +++2.549+* +++++.084+***
Dry+wheat +++7.089+*** +++3.520+** +++++.609 +32.938+*** +12.752+*** +++++.112+***
Dry+maize ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref
Rainfall+variability+e +++++.991 +++1.049 +++1.090 +++++.786 +++++.395+** +++++.504
Crop+cluster+x+Rainfall+variability
Mixed+x+Rainfall+var. +++2.533 +++1.968 +++++.773 +++9.601+* +++++.391 +++++.230
Irrigation+x+Rainfall+var. +++2.029 +++1.421 +++1.116 +++2.652+† +++2.232 +++1.033
Dry+wheat+x+Rainfall+var. +++++.647 +++++.896 +++++.999 +++++.595 +++3.134+** +++1.284
Dry+maize+x+Rainfall+var. ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref
Farm+size+f
Annual+crops+<+500+ha +++++.524+* +++++.774 +++++.792 +++++.212+*** +++++.567+* +++1.168
Annual+crops+>+500+ha ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref ++++++Ref
Percentage+of+profit+from+grain+g +++1.628+*** +++1.481+** +++1.282+† +++1.217 +++1.211 ++++.764
Model#Summaries
Regression'type Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Binary Ordinal Binary
82'log8likelihood'(82LL) 300.252 309.652 310.649 161.236 271.047 112.804
Likelihood'ratio'chi8square 64.436 42.408 33.878 90.756 90.951 85.485
Degrees'of'freedom 18 18 18 18 18 18
Model'significance'(p) 0.000 0.001 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sample'size'(N) 305 308 307 306 297 309
+†+p+<+.10,+*+p+<+.05,+**+p+<+.01,+***+p+<+.001 Odds+Ratio
Note.+The+coefficients+(B)+are+not+directly+comparable++ Exp(B)+<+1 p+<+.10 p+<+.05




a Age is an ordinal variable with three levels (recoded from six). Because its relationship with the dependent variables was 
non-linear, it was entered as a categorical variable, with “Older” as the reference category. 
b Education is an ordinal variable with three levels (recoded from five), with values of -1 (no post-secondary), 0 (short post-
secondary) and +1 (long post-secondary). It was entered as a continuous variable. 
c Political identity is an ordinal variable with three levels (recoded from five), with values of -1 (conservative), 0 (moderate) 
and +1 (liberal). Because its relationship with the dependent variables was non-linear, it was entered as a categorical 
variable, with “Liberal” as the reference category. 
d Crop cluster is a categorical variable with four categories, derived from a cluster analysis of major crops grown with and 
without irrigation. “Dry maize farming” is the reference category. 
e Rainfall variability (coefficient of variation (CV)) is a continuous, standardized variable. 
f Farm size is a binary variable, indicating that arable land area is less than 500 hectares. “Annual crops > 500 ha” is the 
reference category. 
g Percentage of farm profit from grain is a continuous variable, ranging from 0 to 100%. It was standardized and entered 
as a continuous variable. 
 
Finding 2: Farmers’ definition of “conservation” farming is misaligned with experts’ definition of CA. 
 
To reveal farmers’ implicit definition of conservation farming and to compare it to experts’ 
definition of CA, we conducted a binary logistic regression that contrasted self-defined 
“conventional” and “conservation” farmers, coded as “0” and “1”, respectively. “Conservation” 
identity was correlated with some but not all CA-related measures, and was not strongly 
delineated by performance towards the three CA principles (Table 4.3). Self-identification by 
respondents as conservation farmers was driven primarily by the tillage implements that they 
used, and to a lesser extent by the diversity of their crop rotations and by their aversion to the 
burning of crop residues. The use of fewer tillage implements was by far the strongest predictor 
of “conservation” identity, while reported soil disturbance had no significant effect  – this despite 
the fact that the two predictors were significantly correlated with each other (as shown in Table 
4.1), and are strongly related in practice. Reported soil cover was not a significant predictor of 
“conservation” identity; however, a specific behaviour necessary to maintain such soil cover (i.e., 
the avoidance of crop residue burning) was significant. Together, these findings suggests that 
farmers are relying on older and narrower definitions of “conservation” farming as no-tillage or 
minimum-tillage – behaviours that have been promoted as methods of soil erosion control since 
the 1930s “dust bowl” in the United States (Hobbs et al., 2008). These rules of thumb for 
“conservation” practice are related to CA, but are not sufficient to ensure its benefits. For 
instance, by avoiding crop residue burning, farmers enable the maintenance of permanent soil 
cover, but the soil cover will be insufficient unless they also plan for their rotation crops to 
produce enough residues, avoid incorporating the residues through tillage, and forego the baling 
of residues, the grazing of livestock and the fallowing of their fields. 
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Intriguingly, small farm size remained a significant predictor of farming identity even after 
controlling for farming practice (Table 4.3). All practices being equal, those respondents with less 
than 500 hectares of arable land were less likely to self-identify as conservation farmers – an effect 
that was second in size only to the use of tillage implements. Previous interviews suggest that this 
effect may stem in part from farmers’ self-perception of their capacity to adopt further CA 
practices, rather than from a dispassionate assessment of their current practice. In Chapter 3, 
farmers with less than 500 hectares of arable land felt constrained in their flexibility to include 
non-cash crops in rotation (which contribute to natural fertilization and weed control, but reduce 
cash flow), to set land aside for experimentation and incremental changes in farming practice (the 
most common method of adoption), and to forego the risk-mitigating benefits of livestock 
husbandry in favour of continuous cropping with permanent soil cover. Economies of scale also 
allowed larger farmers to invest more readily in the costly equipment necessary for minimum 
tillage. Because of these perceived limits to further adoption, farmers in that study who had 
smaller farms were more likely to underestimate their present level of CA adoption. 
 
Preliminary expert interviews suggested that farmers producing different crops, generally grown 
in different regions, might have different definitions of conservation farming as it applied to their 
own practices. Different crops imply distinct practical challenges in water and temperature 
sensitivity, agricultural inputs, planting, emergence, weed control, etc., which may lead to 
understandable differences in established best practices. However, our results show that after 
controlling for farming practices, the crop cluster variable (i.e., mixed, irrigation, dry wheat, dry 
maize) did not significantly predict “conservation” identity. All else being equal, respondents in 
all crop clusters were therefore similarly likely to identify themselves as conservation farmers. 
This suggests that that there is a single implicit definition of conservation farming shared by all 
South African commercial grain farmers.  
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Table 4.3: Odds ratio estimates for drivers of “conservation” farming identity in binary logistic 
regression. To reveal the implicit definition of conservation farming in contrast with conventional farming, 
respondents to the survey were asked to select their overarching system of grain farming from six typical options 
(conventional, conservation, precision, progressive, biological, and organic). Those who broadly identified their 
farming practices as "conservation" were coded as “1”, and those who identified themselves as "conventional" 
farmers were coded as “0”. Odds ratios above 1 indicate a greater likelihood of identifying as a “conservation” 







































Note: Descriptions for variables “a” through “f” accompany Table 4.2. 
h More soil cover is an ordinal variable with three levels (recoded from four). It was entered as a continuous variable. 
i Less soil disturbance is an ordinal variable with three levels. It was entered as a continuous variable. 
j Number of crops in rotation is an ordinal variable with three levels (recoded from four). It was entered as a continuous 
variable. 
k Low-tillage score is an ordinal variable with three levels (recoded from five). It was entered as a continuous variable. 
l Never burn crop residues is a binary variable. “Sometimes or always burn crop residues” is the reference category. 
 
Overall, farmers’ implicit definition of conservation farming broadly captures CA-related 
practices, but not the outcomes aligned with two key CA principles (i.e., soil cover and minimum 
soil disturbance). It is instead heavily weighted towards the use of fewer tillage implements and 
the avoidance of crop residue burning, both associated with older concepts of “conservation” 
farming. The limiting effect of small farm size on “conservation” identity, after controlling for 
farming practices, suggests that self-perceived constraints on farmers’ capacity to adopt more 
progressive practices in the future leads them to underestimate their own progressiveness in the 
present. Combined with our previous qualitative findings, these results suggest that the 
commonly held definition of conservation farming substantially differs from the expert definition 
of CA. This may lead to confusion and miscommunication if CA’s proponents fail to recognize 
and adjust for this disagreement. 
 
Finding 3: The mismatched definitions of experts and farmers and the piecemeal adoption of CA principles will 
lead to both an underestimation of the communication challenge and an overestimation of its results. 
 
CA is a combination of practices that provides maximum benefits only when adopted 
comprehensively, yet the survey data suggest that it is not generally adopted this way. Evaluating 
CA as a coherent package masks important differences in the factors that influence adherence to 
each of its principles, and unique challenges in their implementation. Its principles are commonly 
pursued piecemeal, each driven by a distinct rationale. Furthermore, farmers’ self-perception of 
“conservation” farming practice is strongly rooted in concepts that predate CA. The 
misunderstanding created by the confluence of “conservation farming”, “conservation tillage” 
and “Conservation Agriculture” presents persistent barriers to the communication of the crucial 
need for comprehensive CA adoption. The self-reporting of “conservation” and CA outcomes is 
therefore inconsistent; soil cover, in particular, is challenging to measure and does not 




The results here strongly imply that farmers are not attending to CA as a coherent package. 
They are also much better at monitoring and reporting specific elements tailored to existing 
norms and common metrics than they are at reporting broader outcomes that are more directly 
aligned with CA’s three principles. This corroborates other findings within and beyond South 
Africa: reports of fractured adoption, hints of inaccurate adoption estimates, and varied 
definitions of CA. Since the drivers of adoption are different for each CA principle, they are 
taken up differentially; farmers’ performances on the three principles were far less correlated than 
expected. Any single proxy will therefore necessarily misconstrue the extent of comprehensive – 
and thus beneficial – CA adoption. This overestimation may be compounded by the 
misalignment of farmer and expert definitions of “conservation” practice, which may lead 
farmers to believe that they have adopted CA, as recommended by local experts, when they have 
only implemented minimum (or conservation) tillage. CA adoption may therefore be a mirage, 
both for those who promote it and for those who attempt to practice it: apparent at a glance, but 
fading under scrutiny. 
 
In South Africa, despite farmers’ explicit sensitivity to climate change risks, CA’s relationship to 
CSA has little current relevance since farmers are adopting CA principles for largely non-climatic 
reasons. Highlighting climate change risks is likely to be a poor way for experts to motivate 
adoption. More accurate, more contextually meaningful and therefore more useful estimates of 
CA adoption may be obtained by measuring CA performance using a basket of simple, locally-
tailored everyday factors or practices that are necessary to achieve each principle. The most 
appropriate measures by which to promote and monitor its adoption in South Africa require 
further investigation, but may include crop rotation diversity (enabling the use of selective 
herbicides and including legumes), the use of tillage implements (including rippers), livestock 
grazing density, and crop residue burning and baling. This will in turn enable better 
understanding of the processes of adoption, the agricultural extension challenge, and ultimately 
the assurance of CA’s climate-resilience and food security benefits. 
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Chapter 5:!Integration anxiety: The cognitive isolation of climate 
change risk 
5.1! Synopsis 
The harmonization of climate-adaptive behaviours with pre-existing decision-making processes 
will be vital to the realization of climate-resilient futures. Prevailing wisdom holds that decision-
makers should ‘mainstream’ their management of climate change risks by integrating them with 
weather and other risks (e.g., economic, ecological) when planning risk-mitigating responses in 
vulnerable sectors. Yet the mechanisms by which individuals might do so are poorly understood. 
To better appreciate the mainstreaming task, this paper applies mental modeling techniques to 
evaluate the integration of climate change with the management of weather and other ‘normal’ 
risks among commercial grain farmers in South Africa. We argue that this group closely 
resembles the autonomous private actor from the climate change adaptation literature; they are 
well educated, with good access to informational, financial and institutional resources. They 
practice large-scale, mechanized, rainfed farming in a highly variable climate, and broadly 
recognize that climate change is an important threat. They thus appear to have the incentive, 
capacity and willingness to adapt. As a group, they should be early adopters of climate-adaptive 
behaviours, and have indeed been shifting towards Conservation Agriculture – a set of farming 
practices widely understood to be climate-resilient by farmers and experts alike. We evaluate the 
extent to which these farmers have integrated climate change risks into the mental models that 
they use to manage weather risks and to make decisions around farming practices. We find that 
participants’ causal mental models of climate change risks are distinct from their mental models 
of weather and other ‘normal’ risks – that is, their stated and implied logic of climate change risk 
management is linguistically and structurally isolated from that of weather. They frame climate 
change in different terms, and their proposed responses to climate change are largely novel. 
Their climate change logic contains more intuitive leaps, where they suggest adaptive responses 
without describing the intermediate problems and/or effects that these responses are intended to 
mitigate. We argue that this linguistic and structural isolation is indicative of farmers’ use of 
mismatched cognitive frames in understanding and responding to climate change and weather 





The concept of climate change adaptation as a conscious and planned adjustment implies that 
climate-adaptive decision-making occurs as a distinct process independent of other risks (Bassett 
& Fogelman, 2013). Researchers have, however, widely recognized that climate change is only 
one of many stressors that shape multi- and cross-scalar decisions towards varied and competing 
objectives (Bassett & Fogelman, 2013; Chapter 2; Eakin et al., 2016). The integration of climate 
change adaptation into pre-existing decision-making processes across policy domains and scales 
has thus become an important pre-occupation of the adaptation literature (Dovers & Hezri, 
2010; Howden et al., 2007). In developing countries, in particular, development goals may 
compete with adaptation for scarce resources, necessitating the integration of climate and 
development planning (Huq et al., 2004; Klein et al., 2007). However, such ‘mainstreaming’ of 
climate-adaptive behaviours by individuals is understudied and under-theorized (Clayton et al., 
2015; Grothmann & Patt, 2005). The processes of judgment and decision-making involved in 
harmonizing the management of weather, climate variability and climate change risks are 
therefore poorly understood, and the literature is fraught with untested or disproven assumptions. 
 
The mainstreaming of climate change adaptation in institutional decision-making is widely 
perceived to be challenging, because the nature of climate change impacts is mismatched with 
that of other risks (Kunreuther et al., 2013). In this vein, there are two important hurdles to 
mainstreaming. First, predictions of some climatic variables at the local scale are uncertain in 
both sign and magnitude; this makes ‘perceive-predict-act’ approaches hard to design and harder 
to implement. Second, climate change risks are often mismatched temporally and spatially with 
concurrent objectives (Hallegatte, 2009). Allied literatures have consequently taken various 
approaches to the integration of climate change with other priorities, from the explicit integration 
of climate change risks through structured and robust decision-making protocols (e.g., 
Kunreuther et al., 2013) to their more implicit integration through broader resilience, 
transformation and development agendas (e.g., O’Brien, 2012). 
 
Despite this broad recognition that climate change presents unique challenges, the climate-
adaptive behaviours of individuals have received little empirical treatment in ‘real world’ situations 
(Dilling et al., 2015; Grothmann & Patt, 2005). This has led to a general failure to understand 
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whether and how individuals will mainstream, and so adapt to, climate change risks. One fruitful 
area of work has been in the study of cognitive frames and risk perceptions (Spence & Pidgeon, 
2010) – such frames comprise the specific perceptions, preferences, memories and mental models 
that individuals use to understand and respond to specific problems. For objectively similar tasks, 
the use of different cognitive frames can result in different decision-making strategies (Thaler, 
1999). These ‘framing effects’ stem in part from the application of decision-making heuristics, or 
rules of thumb, that people use to rapidly evaluate the information provided and choices 
available (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).15 The precise nature of 
individuals’ cognitive frames is in turn shaped by their psychological and demographic profiles 
(Levin et al., 2002). In the case of climate change, the hope is that such research will help us to 
understand how climate-sensitive decisions are made in practice, with an appreciation for the 
characteristics of both the individual and their context. 
 
In theory, such framing effects should be less evident in commercial farmers’ decisions around 
weather and climate change risks. In particular, commercial farmers epitomize the individual 
private actor foundational to the adaptation literature, and are typified as autonomous and 
largely rational decision-makers who are sensitive to both weather and climate change in similar 
ways. They have deep technical and experiential knowledge and are thus each expert in their 
micro-environment. In Chapter 2, we showed that their decisions about weather risks are deeply 
enmeshed with decisions around other ‘normal’ risks (e.g., economic, agricultural). They are 
therefore expected to perceive and mainstream climate change risks more readily than other 
groups of decision-makers (Grothmann & Patt, 2005; Eakin et al., 2016). Rainfed crop 
production, in particular, is among the sectors anticipated to be most vulnerable to climate 
change impacts (Lobell et al., 2008). Given their large personal and financial investments in 
climate, we might expect such farmers to have sought to understand the implications of climate 
change at the farm level, to hold consistent and stable beliefs about climate change risks, and 
therefore to readily integrate climate change risks into their mental models of weather and other 
‘normal’ risks, as an analogous risk on a longer timeframe. Yet, few studies have examined this 
                                                
15 Many scholars posit that such heuristics are cognitive short-cuts that lead to suboptimal choices 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Shah and Oppenheimer, 2008), though some have suggested that they 
may actually lead to better choices in circumstances characterized by high uncertainty (Goldstein and 
Gigerenzer, 2002). 
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kind of climate-sensitive decision-making in situ – that is, within the multi-faceted and uncertain 
environments in which farmers actually make decisions towards risk management. 
 
The commercial grain farmers of South Africa’s Western Cape province are, ostensibly, a case in 
point. They practice large-scale, mechanized, rainfed grain production (RSA, 2013a) in a semi-
arid environment with highly variable rainfall (RSA, 2011). They are relatively well educated, 
with good access to financial, informational and institutional resources (Wilk et al., 2013). 
However, as many are white beneficiaries of South Africa’s apartheid legacy, they generally 
receive little explicit support from government (e.g., few of the subsidies enjoyed by commercial 
farmers in higher-income countries) (Bernstein, 2012). They have, however, been targeted for 
more than a decade by risk communication experts from the local and international agricultural 
and climate science communities (Findlater, 2013). A singular focus of these communications has 
been the promise of grain-farming practices known as Conservation Agriculture (CA) (RSA, 
2013c) – a set of climate-resilient techniques that may contribute to both mitigation and 
adaptation if implemented comprehensively (Derpsch et al., 2014). 
 
However, climate change is locally recognized as a novel challenge, with unique characteristics 
that may impede adaptive responses. In our preliminary interviews, local experts conveyed 
widely held skepticism that commercial grain farmers, who routinely deal with weather variation, 
were thinking about climate change or were prepared to respond to it. The concern is that while 
these farmers recognize CA’s climate-resilience, they are adopting it primarily to manage other, 
more immediate, risks (Chapter 2). Consequently, they may fall well short of the comprehensive 
adoption necessary to ensure its climate-adaptive benefits (Giller et al., 2015). They are thus 
understood to perceive and respond to climate change in different ways than they do to ‘normal’ 
weather and climate variability. 
 
In this study, we therefore make a distinction between weather-sensitive and climate-sensitive 
decision-making: these farmers are widely understood to react readily to perceived weather risks 
(i.e., they are weather-sensitive), but not to perceived climate change risks (i.e., they are not 
climate-sensitive). This is consistent with Eakin et al. (2016), who contend that there are inherent 
barriers to climate change adaptation that are outsized relative to their role in weather risk 
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management, and are thus underestimated in the adaptation literature. These barriers may 
include (1) psychological “buffering”, i.e., that the salience of long-term climate change risks has 
been muted by institutional or farm-level measures (e.g., irrigation) that mitigate short- to 
medium-term risks from weather and climate variability; (2) education and experience, i.e., that 
farmers have deep experiential knowledge of weather risks, but little or none of climate change 
risks; (3) access to finance, knowledge and technology; and critically, (4) self-perceived agency, 
i.e., that farmers perceive themselves as less capable of understanding and responding to climate 
change risks. 
 
Using a mental models protocol, this paper attempts to disentangle this apparent contradiction 
for a group of commercial grain farmers in South Africa’s Western Cape province (N = 90): Why 
do farmers who are sensitive to weather risks, and who are progressively adopting more climate-
resilient practices partly as a result of this sensitivity, seem to be unprepared to adapt to climate 
change? For this weather-sensitive, climate-exposed, resourceful and adaptive group, we 
therefore seek to understand whether and how they are sensitive to climate change risks, among 
the myriad other ‘normal’ risks that present day-to-day challenges in commercial farming. To do 
so, we test a hypothesis that follows from local experts’ skepticism of farmers’ readiness to adapt: 
that climate change risks are not mainstreamed in farmers’ decision-making processes towards 
the management of weather and other ‘normal’ risks (i.e., they are not climate-sensitive). As a 
prerequisite, we first ask whether these farmers are explicitly sensitive to climate change, as they 
are to weather: Do they express concern about climate change risks, along with the willingness to 
respond to them? We then ask whether their decision-making processes are implicitly sensitive to 
climate change risks: Are their mental models of climate change well-integrated with those of 
weather and other ‘normal’ risks, and thereby actionable? 
 
5.3! Methods 
To evaluate farmers’ explicit sensitivity to climate change risks, and to evaluate their integration 
of climate change with weather and other ‘normal’ risks, we interviewed grain farmers (N = 90) 
in South Africa’s Western Cape province. In doing so, we used a mental models protocol (Section 
5.3.1) to elicit their climate change risk perceptions, alongside the cognitive logic that they use to 
perceive, predict and manage weather and climate change risks among myriad others at the farm 
 102 
level. As elaborated below, we first tested whether and to what extent all participants (N = 90) 
were explicitly sensitive to climate change risks, using a coding scheme to quantify and then 
analyze the risk perceptions that they each expressed during their interviews (Section 5.3.2). For 
a subset of participants (n = 30), we then analyzed their mental models to determine whether and 
how their climate change risk perceptions and climate-adaptive behaviours were integrated (i.e., 
mainstreamed) with those of weather and other ‘normal’ risks (Section 5.3.3). Figure 5.1 shows a 
flow chart of the analytical steps taken in this paper, as a guide to understanding the methods 
elaborated below. The study protocols were designed, piloted and implemented in consultation 
with partners at the University of Cape Town, Stellenbosch University and the Western Cape 
Department of Agriculture. 
 
The data collection comprised 90 structured interviews conducted during two months prior to 
the grain harvest in late 2013. This corresponded to the end of a three-year period of above-
average rainfall, with record wheat yields (RSA, 2013a), so farmers were likely less sensitive to 
weather and climate change problems than might otherwise have been the case. Willing 
participants were recruited by phone and email through geographically stratified random 
sampling. Recruitment was facilitated by representatives from the four major co-operatives and 
agribusinesses that market and distribute grain produced in the region. All interviews were 
conducted in English. Approximately 20% of those contacted declined to participate, most 
frequently citing time constraints, but with some suggesting a discomfort with English. None 
were given any material incentive to participate. 
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Figure 5.1: Flow chart of the analytical steps taken in Chapter 5. This figure illustrates the parallel 
evaluation of participants' explicit and implicit climate-sensitivity. 
 
 
These farmers generally practiced mixed grain and livestock farming centred on rainfed wheat 
production. Their ongoing adoption of CA is among the most important changes in practice 
currently underway in South African commercial agriculture (RSA, 2013c) – nearly all have 
adopted at least some aspect of CA practice. As part of our previous analysis, participants were 
scored on their adherence to CA best practices as a measure of climate-resilient adaptation 
(Chapter 3). These scores were incorporated as an independent variable in the statistical analyses 
described below. In keeping with demographic trends in the local farming population, all of the 
participants were male, ranging in age from 25 to 62 years (M = 43.9, SD = 9.3). Their available 
arable farmland ranged from 250 to 4500 hectares (M = 1443, SD = 880). All participants had 
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finished high school, with the majority (76%) having a university or college degree. A plurality 
(39%) of participants had completed one- or two-year technical degrees, while one-third (33%) 
held Bachelor’s degrees and a small fraction (3%) held Master’s degrees. Though most spoke 
Afrikaans as their first language, all were conversant in English. 
 
5.3.1! Mental models protocol 
To elicit the internal representations of reality that participants accessed in managing weather 
and climate change risks, the interview script was designed in accordance with established mental 
modelling methods (Jones et al., 2011; Morgan et al., 2002), and followed a ‘broad-to-narrow’ 
structure. The mental model elicitation method was indirect rather than direct – in the indirect 
method participants are unaware that the interviewer seeks their mental models of weather and 
climate change risks, whereas in the direct method, participants are explicitly tasked with the 
elaboration of causal relationships stemming from a given problem. Thus, the procedure elicited 
perceived causal relationships between weather/climate change stressors and farming practices 
for each participant, with as little introduction of any leading content by the interviewer as 
possible. Whereas the direct elicitation method may encourage participants to identify and 
resolve inconsistencies and competing logics in their mental models, the indirect method 
preserved these patterns of in situ thinking. 
 
The elicitation of causal relationships was performed in two stages within each interview. First, 
participants were tasked with listing and elaborating important risks that they faced in their 
farming businesses. These were documented by the interviewer on sticky notes pasted to an 
erasable white board. The boundaries of the risk landscape were therefore participant-defined, 
with the interviewer providing only standard prompts related to broad categories (e.g., on the 
farm, beyond the farm, short term, long term, the economy, the environment). The interviewer 
then used vague questions (i.e., “What comes to mind when you hear the term….”) and 
standardized follow-ups (e.g., “What is the effect of….”) to prompt participants to elaborate on 
causal relationships relevant to specific domains of interest – particularly weather and climate 
change risks, and agricultural practices. 
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The script culminated in a final section introducing climate change, if the participant had not 
already done so, and exploring its on-farm implications in depth. Climate change-related 
language was purposefully excluded from the rest of the interview script, in an attempt to avoid 
triggering the most overt forms of motivated cognition found in other studies of climate change 
perceptions (e.g., stereotype threat (Lewandowsky et al., 2015)) or cultural cognition (Kahan, 
2015)). The interview script therefore explicitly explored risks in farming, while implicitly 
examining how weather and climate change are enmeshed in broader processes of farm-level risk 
management. Using this interview data, we conducted two complementary analyses: (1) we 
assessed participants’ explicit climate-sensitivity across all interviews (N = 90) as indicated by their 
expressed climate change risk perceptions; and (2) we assessed their implicit climate-sensitivity by 
measuring the integration of participants’ mental models of weather and climate change risks (n 
= 30) (Section 5.3.3), using both linguistic (Section 5.3.3.1) and structural (Section 5.3.3.2) 
analyses. 
 
5.3.2! Analysis of explicit climate change risk perceptions 
To assess participants’ explicit sensitivity to climate change risks, each of the 90 interviews was 
comprehensively searched for references to climate change. First, to measure the extent to which 
participants had to be prompted to speak of climate change, each participant was assigned a 
score corresponding to the section of the interview script in which they first raised the topic (from 
9 for those who raised it prior to the first question about risks, to 0 for those who did not speak of 
it until the interviewer introduced it in the final section of the script). Their statements about 
climate change were then coded to create a set of ordinal variables representing different 
measures of risk perception: (1) belief that climate change is occurring or will occur (i.e., none, 
partial, full); (2) observed climatic changes, past or ongoing, attributable to climate change (i.e., 
no, maybe, yes); (3) the sign of its likely overall effect on their farm (i.e., negative, neutral, 
positive); (4) expressed levels of concern for these impacts (i.e., none, low, medium, high); and (5) 
the perceived manageability of the impacts (i.e., unmanageable, partially manageable, fully 
manageable). For each participant, their statements about belief in climate change and concern 
for its impacts were then analyzed for changes in tone over the course of the interview (i.e., no 
observable change, expressed weaker/stronger belief, became less/more concerned). Finally, 
each participant’s proposed adaptations to climate change were compiled and compared. 
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These variables were quantitatively analyzed to elucidate possible relationships and 
inconsistencies among the expressed climate change risk perceptions, demographic variables, 
farm characteristics and farming practices. For example, we hypothesized that the different 
measures of climate change risk perception (i.e., belief, observed change, overall effect, concern 
and manageability) would be well-correlated with each other, and that participants who raised 
climate change earlier and unprompted would be more likely to believe in climate change and to 
be concerned about its likely impacts. We also hypothesized that participants who believed in 
climate change would be more likely to have adopted CA practices, given their climate-resilient 
benefits, but that these participants would also be less concerned about climate change’s likely 
impacts than those who had not adopted CA practices. Non-parametric, rank-based Spearman’s 
rho was chosen as the primary statistical measure of correlation in this paper, since most 
variables were ordinal with few levels (two to five). SPSS automatically adjusted the results for 
tied ranks. Kendall’s tau-b was considered as an alternative, but the results appeared broadly 
similar to those of Spearman’s rho for the findings reported in this paper. Participants’ explicit 
climate-sensitivity, as measured here, was then compared and contrasted with their implicit 
climate-sensitivity, as evaluated below. 
 
5.3.3! Analysis of participants’ mental models 
To derive their mental models of weather and climate change risks, the interview transcripts of a 
subset of participants (n = 30) were comprehensively coded for causal statements related to 
weather and climate change. Only 30 interviews were selected for modeling, because of the time-
consuming nature of the process and the diminishing utility of additional mental models; 
generally, 30 are considered sufficient to capture the breadth of thinking in a homogeneous 
group (Morgan et al., 2002). The candidates for modeling were selected on the basis of their 
farming practices (to capture their breadth), their language proficiency, and the extent to which 
they had elaborated on simple answers (whether unprompted or prompted) as a measure of 
interview quality. The language criterion may have led to some bias in the modelled subset, since 
the English language proficiency of Afrikaans-speaking farmers likely depends in part on their 
social integration; however, the inference of causal relationships during analysis was expected to 
be more precise where participants were comfortable expressing nuance in English. 
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The coded causal relationships were then visualized as influence diagrams consisting of nodes 
(concepts) connected by directional edges (causal relationships between concepts). For instance, 
SA050 said, “When you really go the minimum [tillage] way, you get more pests like snails that live underneath 
that material.” Therefore, his mental model showed that minimum tillage causes an increased risk 
of pests (and specifically snails). The influence diagrams were structured left-to-right, stemming 
from problems of weather, climate variability and climate change, producing negative effects that 
evoked specific responses mediated by non-climatic factors. Figure 2.1 shows the simplified 
concept of the causal mental model, while Figure C.1 in Appendix C shows a full-scale example 
of one participant’s mental model. For instance, the participant may have stated (whether 
sequentially or at various points in the interview) that climate cycles cause interannual rainfall 
variability (a problem), leading to low soil moisture (an effect), which can be mitigated by 
increasing soil cover using crop residues – a response which is mediated (or in this case inhibited) 
by the competing need to use crop residues as livestock feed. 
 
Each node (or concept) was classified as either ‘normal’ or ‘climate change’ depending on the 
cause that the participant stated or implied within the context of the interview (i.e., 
weather/climate variability versus climate change).16 Within each participant’s mental model, 
there were therefore two major branches stemming from ‘normal’ and ‘climate change’ causes, 
respectively. The ‘normal branch’ comprised causal relationships originating from problems of 
weather and climate variability attributed to climatic processes consistent with historical 
conditions. In contrast, the ‘climate change branch’ consisted of causal relationships originating 
from weather and climate problems attributed to present or future global climate change, 
whether or not such change was explicitly referred to as anthropogenic. Where specific concepts 
(i.e., problems, effects, responses and mediators) were referenced under both conditions, they 
were categorized as ‘normal’ nodes, and created connections between the ‘normal’ and ‘climate 
change’ branches. The two branches were therefore more interconnected for participants who 
spoke of weather and climate change in similar terms. 
 
                                                
16 The ‘normal’ weather and climate variability sections of participants’ mental models has been treated in 
more depth in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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Having derived 30 participants’ mental models of weather and climate change risks, we used two 
approaches (described below) to assess the extent to which these two branches were integrated 
(i.e., how well climate change risks and climate-adaptive behaviours were mainstreamed): (1) the 
language that participants used to frame weather and climate change risks; and (2) the structure 
and interconnectedness of the weather and climate change branches of each participant’s mental 
model. 
 
5.3.3.1! Analysis of linguistic framing 
The analysis of linguistic framing followed from that conceived in Chapter 3. As we found in that 
study, participants described weather and climate change risks using six exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive ‘languages’ indicative of different cognitive framings (Table 3.2). Following the 
identification of these categories, each node in each participant’s mental model was coded into 
one of the six languages (see Figure 5.2 for a partial mental model coded for language). 
Participants’ linguistic framings of the ‘normal’ and climate change branches, as indicative of 
their underlying decision-making processes, were then quantitatively compared and contrasted. 
Specifically, using paired-samples t-tests, we analyzed the difference between branches in the 
number of nodes coded into each language, as a proportion of the total number of nodes in each 
branch. 
 
5.3.3.2! Analysis of structure and interconnectedness 
To evaluate the causal relationships between weather and climate change in participants’ mental 
models, we analyzed the structure of each branch and their interconnectedness. We initially 
compared and contrasted the overall structure and size of each branch, including the frequency 
of intuitive leaps (e.g., where participants neglected to identify the specific problems or effects 
that they were targeting with proposed risk-mitigating responses). For instance, in Figure 5.2, 
there are three ‘normal’ responses (fallow land, increase soil cover and minimum soil disturbance) 
stemming directly from the ‘climate change’ cause with no identification of the intervening 
problems or effects. The interconnectedness of the ‘normal’ and climate change branches was 
then assessed using two simple measures: (1) the number of connections between the two 
branches; and (2) the amount of overlap between the two branches when each mental model was 
algorithmically clustered to illuminate natural “communities” of nodes (concepts). We finally 
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analyzed the variation in these two measures of interconnectedness with respect to participants’ 
explicit climate change risk perceptions and CA practices, as previously assessed. 
 
For the first measure of interconnectedness, we simply counted the number of edges (causal 
relationships) connecting ‘normal’ and climate change nodes within each participant’s mental 
model. For example, Figure 5.2 shows a mental model with ten connections between the two 
branches, which was towards the upper end of the range, while Figure 5.3 shows a climate 
change branch with no connections to the ‘normal’ branch. This provided a rough measure of 
the extent to which the two branches were integrated. For the second measure of 
interconnectedness, we corroborated the first finding using a simple form of network analysis to 
compare the importance of connections within each branch to those between them. The Girvan-
Newman edge betweenness clustering algorithm (Girvan & Newman, 2002),17 as implemented in 
the yEd network graphing software, was used to identify natural “communities” of nodes (Figure 
C.2 in Appendix C shows an example of such a clustered mental model). We counted the 
number of climate change nodes appearing in clusters other than that containing the ‘climate 
change’ cause, as well as the number of ‘normal’ nodes appearing in the climate change cluster. 
The extent of this combined overlap between the ‘normal’ and climate change branches thus 
provided an independent measure of their integration – that is, it revealed the extent to which 
participants’ climate change branches were distinct and cohesive clusters, separate from the 
‘normal’ branches. 
 
                                                
17 The Girvan-Newman algorithm defined communities of structural groups by iteratively removing edges 
from the original network. The ‘betweenness’ of a particular edge was the number of unique pairs of 
nodes between which that edge was the shortest distance. Betweenness was first calculated for every edge 
in the graph. The edge with the highest value was then removed, and the process was repeated until the 
maximum proportion of edges (“modularity”) occurred within defined communities or groups. Though 
more efficient clustering methods have been developed for computationally intensive networks, the 
Girvan-Newman method is easily implemented for small networks and provides a general understanding 
of community structure (Lancichinetti & Fortunato, 2009). 
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Figure 5.2: Partial mental model showing close integration of the climate change and ‘normal’ 
branches. This farmer had the second highest number of inter-branch connections of any participant. The full 
climate change branch is shown, along with each point of initial connection to the ‘normal’ branch. For clarity, the 
remainder of the ‘normal’ branch is omitted from the figure. The colour of each node indicates its language 
classification (i.e., green for agricultural, yellow for cognitive, and blue for economic). 
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Figure 5.3: Partial mental model with no integration between the ‘normal’ and climate change 
branches. This farmer was one of four participants with no inter-branch connections. Only the climate change 





To assess participants’ explicit sensitivity to climate change risks, we first analyzed their expressed 
climate change risk perceptions and proposed climate-adaptive responses (N = 90) (Section 5.4.1). 
We then investigated the extent to which they were implicitly climate-sensitive by evaluating the 
integration (i.e., mainstreaming) of climate change into their mental models of weather and other 
‘normal’ risks (n = 30) (Section 5.4.2). 
 
5.4.1! Expressed perceptions of climate change (N = 90) 
To assess participants’ explicit sensitivity to climate change risks, we analyzed every statement 
referencing climate change across all 90 interviews. Many participants raised the topic of climate 
change with little prompting. During the initial risk elicitation exercise, 17% of participants spoke 
of climate change when asked broadly about “risks or concerns that you face as a farmer.” A 
further 49% of participants referred to climate change in response to standard prompts about 
risks related to “weather” or “environment”. Overall, two-thirds (66%) of participants raised the 
topic before it was formally introduced at the end of the interview script. As described in the 
methods and as applied below, “promptedness” is thus a quantitative measure of the extent to 
which participants had to be prompted by the interviewer before they spoke of climate change – 
i.e., the higher the “promptedness” value, the later in the interview the participant mentioned the 
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topic. In making unprompted references to climate change, participants used terms like 
“changing weather patterns”, “global warming”, “global heating”, “climate control”, and most 
often “climate change” itself. 
 
5.4.1.1! Measures of climate change risk perception 
Most participants believed in present or future climate change, expressed concern for its likely 
impacts, and reported having already observed changes in climate. Specifically, the vast majority 
of participants (84%) expressed at least partial belief in present or future climate change. When 
asked directly, nearly two thirds (62%) expressed strong belief and a further quarter (22%) 
expressed partial belief. Only a small minority (16%) of participants expressed explicit disbelief. 
An even greater share (91%) expressed some concern for climate change’s potential impacts, with 
a minority (20%) highly concerned. Many participants reported ongoing changes to their local 
climate, commonly including increasingly intense rainfall events, more variable rainfall, hotter 
summers, colder winters, and shifts in the seasonality of rainfall (i.e., starting and ending later). 
Nearly two thirds (60%) reported having observed environmental changes that they explicitly 
attributed to climate change. A further 14% reported changes that they thought might be 
attributable to climate change, but with a high level of uncertainty. Only one quarter (26%) of 
participants reported having observed no environmental changes that they might attribute to 
climate change. 
 
As an example of an explicit statement about climate change, SA087 was firm in expressing his 
belief: “It's already busy changing, definitely…. Adapt or die.” In contrast, SA114 adamantly disbelieved 
in the idea: “That’s bullshit man, totally. That’s a buzz word.” Such expressions of belief, concern and 
observed climatic changes were not necessarily consistent with each other. For example, SA113 
initially scoffed at the idea of climate change: “Climate? Change? Hah. Many people talk about it, but I 
don’t think it’s so.” However, when asked whether or not he was concerned about its potential 
effects, he said, “I think so, yes. We will get less rain, they said, we will get less rain. And when you get less 
rain, you must change your farming.” 
 
There were statistically significant relationships among these measures of climate change risk 
perception (Table 5.1). Strong correlations were found between belief in present or future climate 
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change, concern for its likely future impacts, and observed climatic changes. Earlier and 
unprompted references to climate change were also strongly correlated with those three 
measures, suggesting a relationship between the extent to which climate change risks were top-of-
mind and their perceived severity. No significant correlations were found between these 
expressed climate change risk perceptions and region, education, age or farm size. Overall, we 
found that by all measures, most participants were explicitly sensitive to climate change risks. 
Even those who disbelieved in climate change nonetheless usually expressed some concern for its 
impacts. 
 
Table 5.1: Non-parametric correlation matrix for climate change risk perceptions. Using Spearman’s 
rho, the table shows the strength of relationships among the various measures of climate change (CC) risk perception 
(N = 90). These ordinal variables were derived from the systematic coding of participants’ statements about climate 
change throughout their interviews. Promptedness is an indication of how much prompting, by the interviewer, was 
needed before the participant raised the topic of climate change. 
 
 
5.4.1.2! The malleability of climate change risk perceptions 
The climate change risk perceptions of many participants appeared to be malleable; qualitative 
changes in the tone of their expressed perceptions were evident in 41% of interviews. More than 
a third of participants (38%) appeared to become more concerned or to express more belief the 
longer they spoke of climate change, while a small minority (3%) became less concerned and 
expressed less belief. For the remainder of participants (59%), there were no such qualitative 
changes in the level of their concern or belief, though their expressed perceptions predictably 
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skeptical of climate change at the beginning of the interview (unprompted), but expressed belief 
in both ongoing and future climate change at the end of the interview (prompted): 
 
Unprompted: “[People] talk a lot about global warming, but if you say that to the old people, they say, 
‘No, that year, 1922, it was also dry and rained like that.’ So I don’t really know.” – SA109 
 
Prompted: “I think it [the climate] will change…. It is storming more. I remember, when I was a little 
boy it rained softly, not these storms we have now. Before, it would rain 12 or 15 millimetres [at a time]. 
Now it’s about 50 or 60 millimetres, then a long dry period and then a lot of rain. It is changing…. I 
think about it a lot.” – SA109 
 
Earlier unprompted references to climate change provided better opportunities to observe such 
malleability. Of those who raised the topic of climate change unprompted (66%), more than half 
(54%) exhibited qualitative changes over the remainder of the interview. There was 
correspondingly a strong and significant correlation between the point at which the concept of 
climate change was first raised (either unprompted or prompted) and the malleability of 
expressed perceptions (rs(28) = .334, p = .001). Such malleability was evident prior to the climate 
change section of the interview script, but became more pronounced when participants were 
questioned directly about climate change. For instance, when asked at the end of the interview to 
predict how climate change would interact with other existing risks, SA128 spoke in apocalyptic 
terms: “I think it will affect all of us, if the climate changes. It will be the end. Nobody will survive in this land, 
in the whole world. I can’t see how anybody will survive. Maybe it won’t be in our time, but in our children’s time, 
in the future.” 
 
For the subset of participants who spoke of climate change only when prompted (34% of all 
participants), no qualitative malleability was observed for the vast majority (84%). This lack of 
malleability may have been a result of the short time left in the interview; participants were not 
prompted about climate change until the final section of the script. No significant difference in 
malleability was found between believers and disbelievers – both were prone to changes in their 
expressed perceptions. No significant correlations were found between malleability and other 
measures of climate change risk perception. 
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5.4.1.3! The explicit manageability of climate change risks 
Participants generally predicted that the overall effect of climate change on their farm would be 
negative – i.e., that it would make farming more difficult, for example, by increasing water stress 
or reducing average crop yields. However, most thought that they could sufficiently manage its 
impacts through changes in agricultural practice and better planning. Specifically, more than two 
thirds of participants (71%) perceived that climate change would have broadly negative impacts 
at the farm level, while one quarter (23%) thought that the impacts would be neutral or mixed, 
and a small minority (6%) believed that climate change would have broadly positive effects (e.g., 
that it would increase mean rainfall and thus improve crop yields). However, more than two-
thirds of participants (71%) thought that they could manage climate change impacts at the farm 
level through adaptation, and a further 20% thought that the impacts would be somewhat 
manageable. A small minority (9%) predicted that negative climate change impacts would be 
unmanageable. There was a significant correlation between the predicted overall effect of climate 
change and concern for its likely impacts (rs(88) = -.349, p = .001), but the predicted overall effect 
was not significantly correlated with belief or observed climatic change. 
 
In keeping with its widely perceived manageability, most participants readily listed possible ways 
of adapting to climate change, both unprompted and prompted. Many indicated that the 
ongoing adoption of CA, or its component practices, was climate-adaptive. This recognition of 
CA as an adaptation was positively correlated with agriculture-specific education (rs(88) = .270, p 
= .010). The perceived manageability of climate change risks was then understandably correlated 
with participants’ CA practices. Specifically, perceived manageability was significantly correlated 
with the uptake of advanced crop rotations (rs(88) = .216, p = .040) and permanent soil cover 
(rs(88) = .213, p = .044), though not with minimum soil disturbance (rs(88) = -.002, p = .988). 
There were no significant correlations between the perceived manageability of climate change 
impacts and other measures of climate change risk perception, age, education or farm size. 
 
Each participant proposed between zero and six specific adaptations (M = 2.2, SD = 1.3), though 
most such adaptations were offered by only a small number of participants (Figure 5.4). Apart 
from CA and its components, which were explored at length within the interview script, the only 
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adaptations that were proposed by more than 10% of participants were the adoption of new crop 
cultivars (33%) and the increased reliance on livestock for income stability (13%). The number of 
specific adaptations proposed by each participant was positively correlated with education (rs(88) 
= .355, p = .001), the perceived manageability of climate change risks (rs(88) = .242, p = .022) 
and earlier unprompted references to climate change (rs(88) = .243, p = .021). The number of 
adaptations was negatively correlated with small farm size (less than 500 hectares) (rs(88) = -.218, 
p = .039). No significant correlations were found between the number of proposed adaptations 
and region, age, or other measures of climate change risk perception. 
 
All of the proposed adaptations were also collectively described as effective responses to the risks 
created by weather and climate variability, though often by participants other than those who 
had characterized them as adaptations to climate change. For instance, SA128 described two 
such adaptations, which other participants had mentioned as possible responses to weather and 
climate variability, but which he had not: “[If] our summers get hotter, I can put up more shade for my 
animals. And if our summers get drier, I can build more dams so that they have enough water during the dry 
periods.” Overall, participants readily proposed adaptations to climate change that were similar to 
responses to ‘normal’ weather and climate variability risks. 
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Figure 5.4: Frequencies with which participants (N = 90) proposed each climate change adaptation. 
* Components of Conservation Agriculture that were specifically prompted by the interviewer, though not in 
reference to climate change. 
 
 
5.4.2! The isolation of climate change from weather (n = 30) 
Having established that most participants were explicitly climate-sensitive (i.e., they were 
concerned about its likely impacts and readily proposed climate-adaptive responses), we assessed 
their implicit climate-sensitivity by evaluating their mainstreaming of climate change risks into 
‘normal’ decision-making processes. To this end, we analyzed the relationship between weather 
and climate change risks in their causal mental models, both in terms of the linguistic framing of 
each branch and in terms of their structures and interconnections. Below, we demonstrate that 
the climate change branches of participants’ mental models were clearly different from the 

























‘normal’ branches, linguistically and structurally. Participants framed climate change risks in 
different terms from those of weather and climate variability, and largely proposed responses that 
were novel to each farmer individually. Participants’ logic stemming from climate change 
contained far more frequent intuitive leaps than that stemming from ‘normal’ weather and 
climate variability – e.g., they described risk-mitigating responses without indicating the specific 
problems or negative effects that these responses were intended to address. There was little 
structural integration of participants’ mental models of ‘normal’ and climate change risks, both as 
measured naïvely by the number of connections between these branches, and as measured by the 
amount of overlap when clustered algorithmically. Figure 5.5 illustrates the broad distinction 
between the ‘normal’ and climate change branches of participants’ mental models. 
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Figure 5.5: Participants’ aggregate mental models (n = 30), showing the ‘normal’ and climate change branches. This figure demonstrates the 
relative isolation of climate change logic from that of weather and other ‘normal’ risks. Within these mental models, nodes (concepts) are connected by edges 
(causal relationships). Thus, the ‘normal’ and climate change branches are connected where participants spoke of weather and climate problems, effects, 
responses and mediators of response in similar terms. Participants’ climate change logic exhibits a greater frequency of intuitive leaps – for example, they more 
often described climate-adaptive responses without specifying the problem or negative effect that they were intended to mitigate. 
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5.4.2.1! Linguistic isolation 
To assess the extent to which climate change risks were framed similarly to weather and climate 
variability, we extended the analysis of linguistic framing performed in Chapter 3. In that study, 
we found that participants spoke of weather and climate change risks using six “languages” 
indicative of distinct cognitive framings: agricultural, cognitive, economic, emotional, political 
and survival.18 In the present analysis, we found clear differences in the linguistic framing of the 
‘normal’ and climate change branches of participants’ mental models.19 Overall, participants 
spoke of climate change in different terms than they did weather and climate variability, with 
important differences in the prevalence of cognitive language (i.e., describing challenges in 
cognition, decision-making, uncertainty and access to information). The proportions of each 
language within participants’ climate change branches were far more variable than those of their 
‘normal’ branches (Figure 5.5), in part because the climate change branches tended to contain far 
fewer nodes (concepts). Nonetheless, the statistical analyses revealed significant and meaningful 
patterns. 
 
Participants’ logics related to climate change contained more cognitive language and less 
agricultural and economic language than those related to weather (Figure 5.6). These differences 
were confirmed through paired-samples t-tests for each language, which compared the number 
of nodes coded into that language as a proportion of the total within each farmer’s ‘normal’ and 
climate change branches, respectively.20 For instance, we found that there were significantly 
higher proportions of cognitive nodes (concepts) in the climate change branches of farmers’ 
mental models (M = .21, SD = .28) than in their ‘normal’ branches (M = .08, SD = .06) (t(28) = -
2.405, p = .023). In contrast, there were lower proportions of economic nodes for climate change 
(M = .07, SD = .14) than ‘normal’ (M = .16, SD = .08) (t(28) = 2.900, p = .007). There were also 
lower proportions of agricultural nodes in the climate change branches (M = .58, SD = .33) than 
                                                
18 Definitions for each of these languages may be found in Table 3.2. 
19 As detailed in the methods section, the ‘normal’ branches in each mental model consisted of causal 
relationships stemming from weather and climate variability attributed to climatic processes consistent 
with historical conditions. The ‘climate change’ branches comprised causal relationships stemming from 
problems attributed to present or future changes in climate that were attributed to climate change, 
whether or not it was characterized as anthropogenic. 
20 We excluded mediators of response from this analysis because of their very infrequent occurrence in the 
climate change branches – only three participants described any such mediators. 
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‘normal’ (M = .71, SD = .11), though the test statistic was not quite significant (t(28) = 2.040, p = 
.050). 
 
Such differences in language were also evident within the narrower “effects” and “responses” 
sections of participants’ mental models.21 Agricultural language was more often used to describe 
‘normal’ effects (t(25) = 2.070, p = .049) and economic language to describe ‘normal’ responses 
(t(27) = 6.691, p < .001), when compared with climate change effects and responses, respectively. 
Cognitive (t(27) = -2.077, p = .047) and emotional (t(27) = -2.063, p = .049) languages were more 
often used to describe climate change responses than ‘normal’ responses, though most 
participants had no emotional response nodes in either branch. Within the climate change 
branch, emotional and survival nodes were well correlated (r(28) = .401, p = .025). 
 
Participants who expressed stronger belief in climate change tended to use less survival language 
in their climate change branches (rs(28) = -.426, p = .017), while those who thought that the 
overall effect of climate change would be more positive tended to use more agricultural language 
(rs(28) = .371, p = .040). No other significant correlations were found between linguistic framing 
and explicit climate change risk perceptions. 
 
                                                
21 The set of relevant boxplots may be found in Appendix F. 
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Figure 5.6: Boxplot of the number of nodes (concepts) in participants’ mental models (n = 30) that 
were coded into each ‘language’. These are shown as a proportion of all nodes in each mental model branch 
(i.e., ‘normal’ versus climate change). This figure excludes mediators of response, because of their very low frequency 
in participants’ climate change branches. 
 
 
Participants who used cognitive language tended to frame climate change as a novel problem, 
but also as an intensification of existing processes: “Everything’s just going to be more intense, more 
crucial.” [SA059]. Uncertainty in both the sign and magnitude of predicted changes was 
perceived to inhibit proactive adaptation. For example, SA123 highlighted the challenge created 
by predictions of mean rainfall, without having more information about its future variability: “An 
average can be a very dangerous thing….  You can’t make proper decisions on that [basis].” On a similar 
theme, SA050 described the fraught relationship between the process of adaptation envisioned 
by experts and his usual method of experiential learning and adjustment: 
 
“Half the people with degrees tell us that we are going to have… global warming. And the other half say 
we’re going to have an ice age…. It is getting hotter. You can’t say it isn’t so. It is getting hotter. So what 
do you now do? Do you listen? Do you go the path you are now going? And 20 years from now you are 
gone. Or do you change now? And to what do you change? ... So you go [based] on what you see and what 
you hear. And then you are always five years behind the trend. And what is a trend?” – SA050 
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The relative dearth of economic and agricultural language in participants’ climate change 
branches also reflected the perceived scarcity of practical approaches to adaptation. For example, 
SA073 described his lack of agency in managing the impacts of climate change, despite having 
specified some possible adaptations: “In a way, it's manageable [using] cover crops and stuff…. On the 
other hand, you can do nothing. If it doesn't rain, it doesn't rain. If it gets hotter, you can do nothing about it.” In 
contrast, SA130 was confident that he would readily adapt: “I’m not really scared about it [climate 
change], because if we keep doing what we’re doing now – with Conservation Agriculture and adapting the whole 
time – it can come and go. We’ll manage.” 
 
5.4.2.2! Structural isolation 
To further evaluate the integration of participants’ climate change mental models with those of 
weather and climate variability, we analyzed their structure and interconnectedness. Overall, we 
found that the ‘normal’ and climate change branches were structurally distinct, with few 
interconnections and little overlap when clustered algorithmically. The ‘normal’ branches (i.e., 
weather and climate variability) were large and well developed, with many connections between 
nodes, overlapping and competing responses, and myriad mediators of response (Figure 5.5). In 
contrast, the climate change branches were small, with short causal chains, rarely including many 
responses or any mediators. For instance, there were far more responses and mediators in the 
‘normal’ branches than there were problems and effects, whereas the opposite was true for 
climate change (Figure 5.7). 
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Figure 5.7: Boxplot comparing the size of the ‘normal’ and climate change branches for each 
section of participants’ causal mental models (n = 30). 
 
 
The climate change branches contained more intuitive leaps, where participants described 
responses to climate change without describing the intermediate problems and/or effects. Figure 
5.5 illustrates the prominence of intuitive leaps in the climate change branches, with many effects 
and responses stemming directly from the climate change cause. The proportion of such intuitive 
leaps, relative to the size of the branch, was much higher in the climate change branches (17% of 
edges, excluding mediators) than in the ‘normal’ branches (3% of edges, excluding mediators). 
Many participants thus described adaptations to climate change without providing a clear 
rationale for their choice (i.e., the negative impact that the specific adaptation would lessen). For 
instance, SA123 suggested that he could mitigate the risk of climate change by “farming with 
nature,” without specifying any of the problems that would be caused by climate change and 
would therefore be attenuated by this response. 
 
The distinction that participants made between weather and climate change was reflected in the 
small number of connections between the climate change and ‘normal’ branches of their mental 
models. Figure 5.5 shows that there were few connections between the two branches compared 
with the number of connections within each branch. Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3, in the methods 
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section, show specific examples of well connected and disconnected climate change branches, 
respectively.  The two branches were connected where participants described similar problems, 
effects, responses or mediators of response stemming from the two causes. For instance, both 
climate change and weather might cause droughts leading to low soil moisture. Climate change 
might also cause heavy rainfall and subsequent soil erosion, which could be mitigated by 
improving soil cover – a response that also mitigates the negative impact of high soil surface 
temperatures in ‘normal’ summers. The number of interconnections between the two models 
ranged from zero to thirteen (M = 3.7, SD = 3.1), with 16% of participants describing no such 
connections at all. The distribution was right-skewed – that is, most participants drew few 
connections, with only 13% describing more than six. The number of connections was positively 
correlated with earlier and unprompted introductions of the topic of climate change by the 
participant (rs(28) = .472, p = .007), and with participants’ expressed level of belief in present or 
future climate change (rs(28) = .502, p = .004) and their concern for its likely impacts (rs(28) = 
.455, p = .010). It was not significantly correlated with the other measures of explicit climate 
change risk perception. 
 
The scarcity of connections between the branches showed that there was little expressed overlap 
in the problematic effects and proposed responses stemming from ‘normal’ and climate change 
risks within each participant’s mental model. The small number of climate change-specific 
responses was only slightly augmented by connections from negative climate change effects to 
‘normal’ responses. On average, each climate change effect was connected to less than half as 
many ‘normal’ responses (M = 0.31, SD = .52) (t(62.2) = 3.375, p < .001) as climate change-
specific responses (M = 0.88, SD = .97). This suggests that most proposed responses to climate 
change were novel within each farmer’s mental model. Moreover, responses to climate change 
effects were scarce overall compared with those to the ‘normal’ effects of weather and climate 
variability. On average, participants described nearly twice as many possible responses to each 
‘normal’ effect (M = 2.01, SD = 1.55) as to each climate change effect (M = 1.19, SD = .97) 
(t(85.591) = 4.509, p < .001). Many connections from climate change effects to ‘normal’ 
responses were related to the three CA practices – CA nodes were present in every mental model 
because of their prominence in the interview script and were commonly recognized as being 
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climate-adaptive. However, there were no significant correlations between the number of 
connections and participants’ CA practices. 
 
For participants who had no connections between the two branches, there was a clear lack of 
integration, but for those whose branches were somewhat connected, algorithmic clustering 
further illuminated the extent of their integration. Since problems, effects and responses 
stemming from climate change were often poorly connected to the ‘normal’ branch, the 
algorithm naturally grouped climate change nodes separately from ‘normal’ nodes. The extent to 
which the ‘climate change’ cluster included ‘normal’ nodes (and vice versa) thus provided 
another simple measure of integration. By this measure, one third (33%) of participants exhibited 
no integration between the two models. Predictably, models with fewer interconnections tended 
to have less overlap (rs(28) = .710, p = .000). No significant relationship was found between the 
size of the climate change model and the amount of overlap, though the two participants with 
complete overlap had the smallest climate change models (four nodes each). The amount of 
overlap was positively correlated with the participants’ earlier and unprompted introductions of 
the climate change topic (rs(28) = .406, p = .023), but not with any other measures of explicit 
climate change risk perception. 
 
5.5! Discussion 
In preliminary interviews, local experts were skeptical that this group of farmers were thinking 
about climate change and were prepared to respond to its effects. Why then do farmers who 
appear to be weather-sensitive and are progressively adopting more climate-resilient practices not 
seem to be prepared to adapt to climate change? We have attempted to answer this conundrum 
in this work. In so doing, we make a distinction between weather-sensitive and climate-sensitive 
decision-making: these farmers are widely understood to react readily to perceived weather risks 
(i.e., they are weather-sensitive), but not to perceived climate change risks (i.e., they are not 
climate-sensitive). As a prerequisite, we confirmed that these farmers are indeed explicitly 
sensitive to climate change risks. We then evaluated their implicit climate-sensitivity by analyzing 
the integration (i.e., mainstreaming) of climate change risks in their mental models of weather 
and other ‘normal’ risks. We first found that most believe in present or future climate change, 
and many that say they do not are nonetheless somewhat concerned about its possible effects. 
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Though broadly concerned with the potential impacts of climate change, they are generally 
confident in their ability to adapt to it and readily describe possible adaptations. 
 
However, climate change’s physical uncertainty is mirrored by farmers’ perceptual uncertainty. 
Farmers’ climate change risk perceptions are malleable and internally inconsistent. Their 
expressed perceptions shift, both in tone and nuance. Their responses to direct questions about 
climate change are often different from those offered unprompted. However, such direct 
questions also produce deeper and more nuanced answers, with farmers recognizing the potential 
for climate change to produce cascading effects at both local and global scales. The unique 
cognitive challenges created by climate change are also reflected in the higher proportions of 
cognitive language and the lower proportions of agricultural and economic language in farmers’ 
climate change mental models. It may be that they access different mental models depending on 
the context and method of elicitation (as suggested by Brügger et al. (2015)), or that they actively 
construct their preferences, and therefore their mental models of climate change, during 
elicitation (as implied by Lichtenstein and Slovic (2006)). 
 
Climate change is therefore isolated from farmers’ mental models of everyday risks, both 
rhetorically and structurally, despite the recognition that many relatively ‘normal’ agricultural 
responses would likely help to lessen the impacts of climate change. The causal relationships that 
farmers perceive as stemming from climate change are rarely developed well enough to include 
many responses or any mediators of response. Most farmers speak of climate change in largely 
abstract terms, recognizing systemic impacts, but drawing few connections to existing farm-level 
processes. Only where climate change’s effects are explicitly recognized as similar or identical to 
existing weather and climate variability risks do farmers conceive of these linkages. Farmers’ 
climate change logics are thus largely disconnected from those of ‘normal’ stressors and risk-
mitigating responses. Though largely rational, they are isolated from other behaviours; climate 
change risks are managed in parallel, rather than in concert, with weather and climate 
variability. 
 
Having little experiential knowledge of climate change, farmers seek novel responses to a novel 
problem. Though many proposed adaptations are unique to climate change within individuals’ 
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mental models, even those that may seem most extreme (e.g., crop-switching, emigration) are 
offered by other farmers as responses to weather and climate variability, either directly or in 
combination with other stressors. Therefore, despite the cognitive isolation of climate change, 
farmers’ proposed adaptations are implicitly reasonable responses to ‘normal’ environmental, 
economic, social and political risks. It seems that the ‘normal’ and climate change branches are 
not disconnected because climate change is a severe threat that requires radical solutions, but 
rather because its perceived novelty prompts farmers to seek responses that are new within their 
own range of experience. 
 
The cognitive frames that farmers use to perceive, interpret and respond to climate change risks 
are thus mismatched with those that they use for weather and climate variability. In managing 
other risks, farmers depend on social and experiential learning combined with incremental 
experimentation to arrive at appropriate responses (Chapter 2). Our present findings suggest that 
climate change creates cognitive challenges by disrupting this learning model. Farmers have no 
previous experience with climate change. Their understanding of it is therefore strongly 
influenced by agricultural and climate risk communication from experts, which is incongruent 
with the learning processes that normally shape farmer decision-making. Having to rely so much 
on imparted expert knowledge, which is incorporated uneasily and abstractly into their mental 
models of environmental risks, creates a mismatch between the cognitive frames that they use for 
‘normal’ risk management and those that they use to think about climate change. As found in 
Chapter 2, farmers tend to distrust expert knowledge that is not well-situated within the specific 
context of their farms. Despite their frequent recognition of changes similar to those that experts 
predict, they remain uncertain and skeptical; outreach that emphasizes the consensus among 
experts, as opposed to farmers’ lived experiences, may thus unintentionally drive these frames 
further apart (as implied by Moser (2010)). 
 
In general, farmers’ mental models of climate change do not appear to be actionable. Those who 
isolate climate change from their ‘normal’ multi-faceted, multi-causal decision-making processes 
seem less likely to respond to it. They may recognize that climate change requires proactive 
adaptation; most even recognize that their ongoing adoption of CA is a climate-resilient 
adjustment that requires years of advanced planning and action. However, they are unlikely to 
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respond to climate change as rationally as they presently respond to other risks, because their 
climate-adaptive responses are not connected to processes of ‘normal’ risk management. Some 
are already poorly adapted to present climate; farmers do not always choose to mitigate weather 
risks when given the opportunity, because environmental risk management competes with other 
risks and other objectives. For climate change, foregone adaptive opportunities are likely to 
become more frequent. Rather than framing the mainstreaming of climate change adaptation as 
the integration of novel climate change risks into existing processes of risk management for weather 
and other ‘normal’ risks, it might be more effective to catalyze farmers’ sensitivity to weather risks 
as a means of sharpening their focus on all of the environmental risks that they experience 
directly, including climate change. 
 
5.6! Conclusions 
South African commercial farmers have long been targeted by specific campaigns stressing the 
importance of climate change impacts and adaptation within the country’s highly variable and 
semi-arid climate. However, their mainstreaming of climate change adaptation will be difficult if 
they think about climate change risks in isolation of weather and climate variability. They need 
not be convinced that climate is dynamic; they do not conceive of ‘normal’ weather and climate 
variability as stable and predictable. They experience and respond to daily fluctuations in 
weather, and multiple overlapping climate cycles on various timescales, some of which may only 
recur once or twice during their working lives. They therefore generally perceive themselves as 
capable of adapting to climate change. They also perceive themselves as highly adaptive to 
myriad other uncertain long-term risks related to agronomics, economics and politics, and they 
largely understand the climate-resilient benefits and shortcomings of their current practices. They 
are self-critical and pragmatic in dealing with varied farming risks. The perceived manageability 
of climate change is determined in part by actual farming practice; however, their level of 
expressed concern for climate change’s likely impacts is not. The divergence of perceived 
manageability and expressed concern reflects a disconnection between rhetoric and reality. Their 
risk perceptions are often malleable and internally inconsistent. Climate change’s physical 
uncertainty is thus mirrored by farmers’ perceptual uncertainty. 
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Overall, these farmers appear explicitly climate-sensitive in their expressed risk perceptions, but 
they are implicitly insensitive to climate change risks in the isolation of climate change from their 
mental models of weather and other ‘normal’ risks. Farm-level risk management is not a singular 
decision-making process. It is rather comprised of many overlapping and intersecting processes 
towards diverse objectives. In this messy web of linked stressors, responses and mediators, climate 
change is unique. The cognitive frames that farmers use to perceive, interpret and respond to 
climate change are thus mismatched with those they use for weather and climate variability. 
Having little experiential knowledge of climate change, they seek novel solutions to a novel 
problem. They rely heavily on imparted expert knowledge of climate change in place of the 
social and experiential learning that drives ‘normal’ risk management. Their mental models of 
climate change therefore appear poorly developed and less actionable. The mainstreaming of 
climate change will be difficult if it is perpetually framed as distinct from ‘normal’ climate. These 
farmers need help in understanding the ways in which climate change is similar to and 
compatible with the myriad risks that they otherwise routinely manage. If they are unable to 
integrate climate change with their pre-existing risk management frameworks, they are unlikely 
to respond to climate change risks proactively, even when they recognize this strategy as 
preferable. The climate risk communication challenge is thus much larger for this group of 
commercial farmers than broadly recognized in the climate change adaptation literature. 
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Chapter 6:!The unquestioned assumption of equivalence in farmer 
perceptions of weather and climate change risks 
6.1! Synopsis 
The climate change literature increasingly emphasizes that adaptation planning should be 
mainstreamed into existing decision-making processes as a matter of risk management best 
practice. However, commercial farmers are often assumed to have already done so, intuitively 
treating climate change risks as an equivalent, long-term extension of risks stemming from 
weather and climate variability. In fact, there is only tangential evidence that farmers perceive 
and respond to the two categories of risk similarly. A small but growing number of in-depth case 
studies suggest that they do not – that this assumption of equivalence masks important differences 
in their perceptions of weather and climate change. This paper seeks to quantitatively test the 
proposition that farmers treat the two risks as equivalent. Using a risk ranking exercise in a 
national survey of South African commercial grain farmers – a group with the demonstrated 
incentive, capacity and willingness to adapt to climate change – we found that weather and 
climate change risks were not perceived similarly. Individual farmers tended to prioritize one 
over the other, but the risk that they prioritized varied; nearly identical proportions of farmers 
selected each risk as a high priority and not the other. Further, farmers who selected one were no 
more or less likely to select the other. In ordinal regression, the ranks of the two risks were driven 
by different demographic variables, farm characteristics and farming practices. Further, all of the 
independent variables that were significantly associated with both weather and climate change 
ranks had effects on the two that were of opposite sign to each other. These differences persisted 
and were often amplified when we analyzed the distance between the weather and climate 
change ranks using multivariate linear regression. The findings suggest that the assumption of 
equivalence between climate change and weather risks is inaccurate, at best; these farmers do not 
generally think about climate change risks in the same way that they do weather risks. This 
suggests a major, unrecognized risk communication challenge for climate scientists and 
policymakers. Farmers will have difficulty mainstreaming climate change adaptation under risk 
communication regimes that presently assume the integration of weather and climate change in 
their decision-making. They are therefore less likely than previously thought to respond to 




The climate change literature has increasingly emphasized the need to mainstream adaptation 
into existing decision-making processes to facilitate integrated, proactive and planned adaptations 
(Porter et al., 2015). The pervasive view of agriculture holds that farmers do so intuitively, 
because they perceive climate change risks as equivalent, long-term extensions of weather risks 
(Smit & Skinner 2002). Farmers manage myriad risks across a variety of domains and towards 
complementary and competing objectives (Chapter 2). They recognize that they must integrate 
climate change risks into their existing risk management processes to ensure that they undertake 
efficient and effective adaptations that are in keeping with their existing objectives. Farmers are 
thus generally expected to adapt autonomously to climate change as they anticipate (proactively) 
or experience (reactively) its impacts through changes in weather and climate variability (e.g., 
Thomas et al., 2007). Within this paradigm, perceptions of and responses to weather, climate 
variability and climate change risks should therefore be more or less aligned, and should even be 
proxies for each other in some cases (Reidsma et al., 2010). The foremost difference between 
these stressors is timeframe: weather is uncertain in the short term, climate variability in the 
medium term, and climate change in the long term. Consequently, commercial farmers represent 
an important archetype in the adaptation literature as a highly adaptable, autonomous private 
actor. 
 
The literature thus holds both that farmers ought to integrate weather and climate change risks 
(i.e., mainstreaming adaptation) (e.g., Howden et al., 2007), and that they are likely to do so 
intuitively and autonomously (e.g., Mertz et al., 2009). However, there has been little empirical 
investigation of the novel challenges that farmers may face in perceiving, interpreting and 
integrating responses to weather and climate change stimuli (Clayton et al., 2015). This paper 
seeks to quantitatively test the claim that farmers treat weather and climate change risks as 
equivalent. We use a national survey of South African commercial grain farmers, which includes 
a risk ranking exercise, to establish whether they perceive climate change and weather risks as 
being similar, and whether these risk perceptions are driven by similar factors. 
 
In what follows, we summarize the existing literature on the mainstreaming of adaptation by 
institutions, publics and individual actors (Section 6.3). We then detail the small but growing 
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number of in-depth, qualitative case studies that appear to weaken the assumption of equivalence 
in farmer perceptions of weather and climate change risks. This review is then used to specify the 
objectives and hypothesis motivating this study: that farmers do not prioritize weather and 
climate change risks similarly. The case and survey methodology (a national survey of South 
Africa’s commercial grain farmers) are presented in Section 6.4, whereas Section 6.5 explains our 
significant challenge to the assumption of equivalence between climate change and weather risks, 
as evident in differences in the farm and farmer characteristics that significantly drive the risk 
rankings. We conclude in Section 6.6, with the implications of this study for communication 
challenges in the mainstreaming of climate change risks in agriculture. 
 
6.3! Mainstreaming climate change risks into farming 
In contrast with the intuitive mainstreaming assumed of farmers, there is plenty of evidence that 
institutional decision-makers have difficulty integrating climate change risks into existing decision-
making and risk management processes (Kunreuther et al., 2013). Scholars have widely 
recognized that uncertain, incremental and long-term climate changes create new and potentially 
intractable challenges for policy-makers (Dittrich et al., 2016). Numerous studies have identified 
and categorized potential systemic barriers to adaptation, including social limits, which might 
create unforeseen problems beyond those posed by weather and climate variability (Adger et al., 
2009). The Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), for example, highlights four main categories of barriers: institutional, 
technological, informational and economic (Porter et al., 2015). The authors emphasize the need 
for new climate risk management frameworks to guide policy-making in such a way that it 
distinguishes between ‘normal’ and climate change risks while coordinating their management. 
The novel systemic challenges of climate change adaptation are thus relatively well documented, 
and are reflected in recent policy prescriptions. 
 
In parallel, climate risk perceptions surveys among experts and broader publics have intimated 
important differences in how individuals understand and prioritize risks stemming from climate 
change and weather. Generally based on large-scale surveys, these results provide strong 
evidence of the roles of politics, culture, identity and psychological distance in perceptions of 
climate change risks that do not exist to the same extent for weather (Clayton et al., 2015; 
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Hornsey et al., 2016; Wolf & Moser, 2013). Dilling et al. (2015) argue that such differences in the 
perception of climate change and weather risks can lead to maladaptive choices if the two are 
either conflated or managed in isolation from each other. Because climate change presents 
unique challenges, they conclude that pursuing “no regret” adaptation strategies that target 
climate variability instead of climate change will therefore be insufficient. Specifically, the authors 
suggest that, in some cases, adapting to climate variability alone can even increase vulnerability 
to climate change, because of the potential for unanticipated systemic effects that may increase 
exposure and sensitivity to climate change risks, or decrease future adaptive capacity. For 
example, flood control measures can stimulate development in floodplains (i.e., the ‘levee effect’), 
leading to greater exposure during low-frequency extreme flooding events (Kates et al., 2006). 
Similarly, Eakin et al. (2016) argue that irrigation farmers experience psychological “buffering” 
with respect to climate change risks, because their use of irrigation infrastructure to reduce 
weather risks decreases the salience of all water-related risks. Hence, the two must be addressed 
in concert but clearly distinguished. 
 
However, the literature on individual climate-adaptive behaviours remains highly conceptual, 
despite periodic calls for better empirical evidence. Grothmann and Patt (2005) argue that 
climate change risk perceptions and self-perceived adaptive capacity are the strongest 
determinants of individual adaptation. However, few authors have since attempted to identify the 
similarities and differences among the weather, climate variability and climate change risk 
perceptions of individual actors. The literature on social (or psycho-social) limits to adaptation 
(Evans et al., 2016), though tangentially related, falls short. In a review of the psychology of 
climate change, Clayton et al. (2015, p. 643) offer an fittingly scant summary of our 
understanding of climate-adaptive responses: “Compared with the focus on mitigation, 
psychological researchers have given relatively little attention to climate change adaptation 
responses. The possibilities for positive adaptations, and ways to encourage them, should be 
further explored.” 
 
What we do know conceptually, at least, is that early adaptation studies showed little consensus 
about whether or not policy responses were needed to support adaptation by commercial 
farmers. Some scholars anticipated that farmers’ adaptation strategies would be largely 
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autonomous; adaptation studies were thus judged unnecessary as farmers were assumed to be 
fundamentally adaptable, both in self-perception (Bryant et al., 2000) and in objective assessment 
(Mendelsohn & Dinar, 1999). Farmers, it was argued, would continue to adapt to changing 
external conditions – in markets, weather or politics – as had always been the case.  Other 
studies, however, began to identify barriers to agricultural adaptation that were analogous to 
those theorized more broadly (Smit & Skinner, 2002). The AR5 summarizes nine types of 
barriers to adaptation in food systems: “inadequate information; inadequate extension; 
institutional inertia; cultural acceptability; financial constraints; insufficient fertile land; 
infrastructure; lack of functioning markets; and insurance systems” (Porter et al., 2015, p. 518). 
The authors emphasize that agricultural adaptation by local actors should therefore be supported 
by nuanced, contextualized, and multi-dimensional policy responses. 
 
The empirical literature on adaptation mainstreaming by farmers is thus poorly developed. In 
reviewing the state of the literature, the AR5’s brief treatment of individual actors – concluding 
that farm-level risk management is multi-faceted – is symptomatic of the wider gap in knowledge. 
In the absence of a clear alternative, most adaptation studies implicitly assume that farmers will 
adapt to climate change risks by direct extension of the decision-making and risk management 
strategies that they might use, equally, for weather (e.g., Ash et al., 2012; Jain et al., 2014; 
Meinke et al., 2009; Reidsma et al., 2009; Truelove et al., 2014; Wreford & Adger, 2011). In the 
analysis of farmer risk perceptions, in particular, researchers often make the assumption of 
equivalence between weather and climate change when anticipating future responses (e.g., van 
Duinen et al., 2015) – even in some studies that explicitly distinguish between perceptions of 
weather and climate change risks (e.g., Hamilton-Webb et al., 2016). Other authors simply 
sidestep the intricacies of decision-making altogether (e.g., Iglesias et al., 2011). 
 
More recently, a small but growing number of case studies suggest that there are important 
differences in the ways that individual farmers presently perceive and manage weather and 
climate change risks. Specifically, these cases provide qualitative empirical evidence that farmers 
are sensitive to both weather and climate change as distinct risks, that they respond separately to 
each, and that these responses are often isolated from one another (Chapter 5; Eakin et al., 2016; 
Kenny, 2011). For instance, our recent analysis found that farmers may access different mental 
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models in addressing climate change risks versus weather and climate variability (Chapter 5). 
Even where the effects and responses stemming from the two stressors were qualitatively similar 
(e.g., low soil moisture, either from normal rainfall variability or as an anticipated climate change 
impact), farmers’ mental models of climate change tended to be disconnected from those of 
“normal” risk management. Because they treated climate change risks separately, we argue that 
these farmers were less likely to adapt proactively even when they thought that this would be 
beneficial. Across the full sample of 90 farmers in Chapter 5, all of their proposed responses to 
climate change risks, in aggregate, were also reported as existing responses to weather risks. 
Crucially though, those climate-adaptive responses were usually new within each farmer’s own 
experience – novel responses for a novel risk. Consistent with this result, Eakin et al. (2016) find 
that farmers who otherwise perceive themselves as highly adaptable to a wide variety of risks may 
nonetheless express a lack of agency in responding to climate change risks. Some commercial 
farmers doubt their ability to adapt to future climate change because they perceive it to require 
greater flexibility, and better access to information, finance and technology. Thus, while the 
consensus holds that farmers ought to treat weather and climate change equivalently in 
mainstreaming climate change adaptation, these cases have begun to suggest that they presently 
do not. 
 
The findings in Chapter 5 suggest that farmers perceive and respond to climate change using 
expert-driven cognitive frames that are distinct from and mismatched with their normal processes 
of risk management. However, the qualitative analysis used in that study was necessarily limited 
to a narrow group and small sample (N = 30). This work complements those qualitative findings, 
but focuses instead on quantitatively testing the assumption of equivalence between climate 
change and weather. The results are derived from a national survey of South Africa’s commercial 
grain farmers. Specifically, we examine whether the distinction made between short-term 
variations in weather and long-term climate change holds true among a broader population of 
farmers. Our approach is similar to the recent study of drought risk perceptions among farmers 
in the Netherlands by van Duinen et al. (2015), which examined the drivers of perceived weather 
risk; however, the analysis here emphasizes the differences between weather and climate change. 
We test a hypothesis about risk perceptions stemming from the qualitative findings and opposing 
the assumption that farmers think about and respond to messages about weather, climate 
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variability and climate change equivalently: that farmers do not prioritize climate change and 
weather risks similarly. In doing so, we explore the demographic, farm-level and behavioural (i.e., 
farming practice) variables that might help explain the observed differences in weather and 
climate change risk perceptions. 
 
6.4! The case and methods 
To evaluate the relationship between farmers’ weather and climate change risk perceptions, we 
conducted a national survey of South Africa’s commercial grain farmers. We first compared the 
proportions of respondents who identified weather and climate change as high-priority risks, and 
their explicit belief in climate change and concern for its impacts. We then used ordinal 
regression to identify the demographic, farm-level and behavioural (i.e., farming practice) 
variables that explain variations in the ranks given to weather and climate change risks, 
separately. Finally, we used multivariate linear regression to explain the observed distance 
between each respondent’s weather and climate change ranks. The survey was designed and 
piloted in consultation with Grain SA, the national commodity organization representing South 
African grain farmers. Grain SA disseminated the final survey link to its members by email. 
 
South Africa’s commercial grain farmers are uniquely positioned to adapt proactively to 
uncertain, long-term risks. They operate in a Mediterranean climate vulnerable to climate 
change (RSA, 2011), and are immersed in a culture that reveres multi-generational farming 
heritage (Devarenne, 2009). They are relatively well educated, with good access to informational, 
financial and institutional resources (Wilk et al., 2013). However, as many are historically 
privileged, white beneficiaries of South Africa’s apartheid legacy, they generally receive little 
explicit support from government (e.g., few of the subsidies enjoyed by commercial farmers in 
higher-income countries) (Bernstein, 2012). They are therefore closely representative of the 
archetype of the autonomous private actor in the climate change adaptation literature. The 
ongoing, but uneven, adoption of Conservation Agriculture (CA) is among the most important 
trends in the sector (RSA, 2013c). CA is a set of three climate-resilient principles (advanced crop 
rotations, minimum soil disturbance, and permanent soil cover) advocated by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations as part of their Climate-Smart Agriculture and 
Sustainable Intensification foci (Giller et al., 2015; McCarthy et al., 2011). With a long 
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implementation period and established benefits across an array of climate and non-climate risks 
(Niang et al., 2014), CA’s adoption suggests that these farmers are willing and able to undertake 
substantial changes in practice to mitigate uncertain long-term risks (Chapter 3). 
 
To characterize the landscape of risk in commercial grain farming, broad categories of risk were 
first identified through in-depth risk elicitation in a prior study (Chapter 2). These categories were 
used in the present survey as a risk ranking exercise. Given thirteen options, survey respondents 
were asked to select the five highest-priority risks, and to rank those five from highest to lowest 
priority. The resulting ranks were reordered so that higher numbers were associated with greater 
priority (5 being highest ranked; 1 being lowest). The unselected risk categories (those not in the 
top five) were assigned a rank of zero. All complete cases were included in the analysis. 
 
Weather and climate change risk ranks were analyzed separately and then together, with a 
common set of farmer demographics, farm characteristics and farmer behaviours (i.e., farming 
practices) as predictors. The weather ranks and climate change ranks were first each analyzed as 
dependent variables using ordinal logistic regression (i.e., a generalized linear model with a 
cumulative logit link). To analyze the drivers of differences in weather and climate change risk 
perceptions, a dissimilarity measure was defined as the distance between the weather and climate 
change ranks assigned by each respondent. This was calculated by subtracting the weather rank 
(0 to 5) from the climate change rank (0 to 5). The resulting dependent variable ranged from +5 
(when climate change was ranked highest and weather was not selected) to -5 (when weather was 
ranked highest and climate change was not selected). This variable, constructed to reflect 
differences in climate change and weather risk perceptions, was used as the dependent variable in 
a multivariate linear regression model (i.e., a generalized linear model with an identity link) with 
independent variables identical to those in the above ordinal regressions. 
 
Our sample frame was comprised of South African grain farmers who were dues-paying 
members of the national commodity organization, Grain SA. This frame captured more than 
half of the country’s commercial grain farmers, both by internal (Grain SA) estimates and those 
provided during expert interviews in advance of the survey design. Grain SA members were 
thought to be broadly representative of the larger population of commercial grain farmers, 
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though with fewer very large and very small farms. Grain SA’s public relations department 
forwarded an introductory email containing the survey link to their membership list. The survey 
was open for eleven weeks, from March 13th to May 31st 2015, during which time three 
reminders were sent by email. From a contact list containing 4757 entries, 441 farmers (9%) 
responded to the survey; this response rate matches that reported by van Duinen et al. (2015) in 
the Netherlands. Twelve additional responses were found to be duplicates (i.e., likely to be the 
same farmer responding twice, based on geographic, demographic and farm-level information) 
and are excluded from this total. For each pair of duplicates, the most complete case was 
retained, or the first case if equally complete. Of the remainder, 246 farmers entered complete 
information for all questions relevant to the regression analyses. For other analyses, the sample 
size is noted in the results. On the advice of local experts who had previously surveyed 
commercial farmers in South Africa, only a small number of survey questions were made 
mandatory, resulting in a higher frequency of missing data. The survey was offered in both 




Overall, we found that the assumption of equivalency between climate change and weather is not 
consistent with the evidence gathered in this study. Specifically, respondents to the survey ranked 
weather and climate change risks differently, and the rankings of the two risks were driven by 
different independent variables. Section 6.5.1 first demonstrates clear differences in the patterns 
of selection of weather and climate change as high priority risks. In Section 6.5.2, we then use 
ordinal logistic regression on the weather and climate change ranks, separately, to show that the 
significant drivers of rank were different for the two categories of risk. In Section 6.5.3, we further 
investigate the reasons for these differences in ranks by applying a multivariate linear regression 
model to predict the distance between the weather and climate change ranks assigned by each 
farmer. We show that weather and climate change ranks were significantly related to different 
demographic variables, farm characteristics and farming practices, which often had effects on the 
two risks that were of opposite sign to each other (i.e., a positive effect on one risk’s rank, and a 
negative effect on the other’s). 
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6.5.1! Selection of weather and climate change as high-priority risks 
To assess the level of priority that farmers give to weather and climate change, respondents were 
asked to select five factors that posed the “greatest threats to the future success” of their farming 
businesses from thirteen options (Figure 6.1). Weather and climate change were among the six 
categories of risk that were selected by at least half of respondents. Similar proportions of farmers 
selected weather (63%) and climate change (60%); however, only a plurality of respondents (37%) 
selected both (Table 6.1). Roughly equal proportions selected only weather (26%) or only climate 
change (23%), and a small minority (14%) selected neither weather nor climate change. Half of 
respondents (49%) therefore selected one of the two risks – weather or climate change – as a 
high-priority threat, while excluding the other. Thus, simply based on their initial selection of five 
high-priority risks, half of individual farmers prioritized weather and climate change differently. 
 
No significant statistical relationships were found between the selection of weather and the 
selection of climate change, nor between the ranks assigned by each farmer to the two risks. A 
chi-square test showed no relationship between the selection of weather and the selection of 
climate change, X2 (1, N = 378) = .320, p = .572). Therefore, farmers who selected one were no 
more or less likely to select the other. Similarly, Spearman’s rho showed no correlation between 
the ranks assigned to weather and to climate change (rs(376) = .011, p = .830). While weather and 
climate change were selected as high-priority risks at about the same rate, a Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test showed that individual farmers tended to rank weather (M = 1.88, SD = 1.837) slightly 
higher than climate change (M = 1.58, SD = 1.58) (Z = -2.333, p = .020). 
 
To determine their overall belief in anthropogenic climate change and broad concern for its 
impacts, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement (on a Likert scale) with five 
statements about climate change. The lowest rate of agreement was 59% with the statement that 
human action is the primary cause of climate change. All other statements received more than 
70% agreement (Figure 6.2), suggesting that most farmers were explicitly sensitive to the threat of 
climate change even when they were uncertain of its cause. Three quarters (75%) of respondents 
agreed or strongly agreed that they would need to consider the effects of climate change on their 
farms in planning for the next five or ten years. As would be expected, the prior selection of 
climate change as a high-priority risk was well correlated with agreement with the climate change 
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statements. For instance, the respondents’ level of agreement with the final statement (consider 
climate change in planning) was well correlated with their selection of climate change as a high 
priority risk (rs(376) = .390, p < .001 ), as well as the rank that they assigned to it (rs(374) = .370, p 
< .001). Overall, these Likert-scale questions confirmed that the risk ranking data were broadly 
consistent with other expressions of concern for climate change risks. 
 
Figure 6.1: Percentage of survey respondents who selected each category of risk as one of the five 
“greatest threats to the future success” of their farming businesses. 
 
 
Table 6.1: Participants’ selection of weather and climate change as high-priority risks. Percentage of 
survey respondents who selected weather and/or climate change as among the five “greatest threats to the future 
success” of their farming businesses. 
 
 





















Figure 6.2: Likert-scale climate change risk perceptions. Survey responses to direct questions about 
respondents’ belief in climate change and concern for its impacts. 
 
 
6.5.2! Drivers of weather and climate change ranks, separately 
To determine the drivers of weather and climate change risk perceptions, the weather and 
climate change ranks were each analyzed as dependent variables in ordinal logistic regression 
using the same set of independent drivers. The results below show that the weather and climate 
change ranks were generally driven by different independent variables (i.e., the farm and farmer 
characteristics that were significantly associated with weather were generally different from those 
significantly associated with climate change) (Figure 6.3).22 Furthermore, all variables that were 
significantly associated with both risks had effects on the two that were of opposite sign to each 
other. No independent variables had significant effects of the same sign on both dependents. 
 
                                                
22 Since we are primarily interested in demonstrating that there are important differences between 
weather and climate change risk perceptions, we do not herein show the nested regression models (e.g., 
including only crop cluster or only farming practices as independent variables). These may be found in 
Appendix G. Further, we do not intend that the odds ratios be compared among independent variables – 
only that their signs and significance be compared between the two dependents. 



















Both ordinal regressions provided significant results overall, as indicated by the likelihood ratio 
test (for weather rank, X2(19) = 44.101, p < .001; for climate change rank, X2(19) = 53.622, p < 
.001). With respect to specific drivers, the weather ranks were significantly associated with main 
or interaction effects of age, education, crop cluster23, rainfall variability and crop residue 
burning. Most conspicuously, farmers who primarily grew irrigated crops were far less likely to 
prioritize weather (Figure 6.4). Maize farmers were more likely to prioritize weather in 
municipalities with more variable rainfall. Wheat farmers displayed the opposite tendency, but 
they only appeared in the upper two quartiles of rainfall variability and the effect was small. 
More educated farmers were more likely to prioritize weather, but there was a significant 
interaction between age and education (Figure 6.5):24 middle-aged farmers were equally likely to 
prioritize weather regardless of education. Farmers who reported never burning their crop 
residues were much less likely to prioritize weather. 
 
In contrast, the ranks assigned to climate change risk were significantly related to political 
identity, education and crop residue burning (Figure 6.3). Respondents who self-identified as 
politically liberal were more likely to prioritize climate change, overall, but this pattern was 
complicated by the interaction of political identity with education (Figure 6.6). Education did not 
have a significant main effect, but its interaction with political identity was significant: among 
conservative farmers, those who were more educated were significantly more likely to prioritize 
climate change, whereas the opposite was true for liberal farmers. Farmers who reported never 
burning their crop residues were far more likely to prioritize climate change. Farmers in the 
“mixed” crop cluster were significantly more likely to prioritize climate change, but the number 
of farmers in this category was too small to produce a significant effect for the crop cluster 
variable overall. 
 
                                                
23 While most of the independent variables stem directly from individual survey questions, the categorical 
“crop cluster” variable requires further explanation. It was derived from a cluster analysis of the different 
types of crops grown by each farmer, whether irrigated or non-irrigated. For instance, dry wheat farmers 
primarily grew rainfed wheat in rotation with other rainfed crops (e.g., barley, canola, oats, lucerne). 
These clusters broadly match known grain-farming patterns in South Africa, though the “mixed” cluster 
captures farmers whose major crops did not clearly fall into one of the three larger clusters (irrigation, dry 
wheat and dry maize). Farmers in the “no grain” cluster, who reported not growing any grain in the past 
year, were excluded from this analysis. 
24 For comparative purposes, figures showing other interaction effects may be found in Appendix G. 
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Figure 6.3: Odds ratio estimates for independent predictors of climate change rank (red) and 
weather rank (blue). These were obtained using ordinal regression (i.e., a generalized linear model with 
cumulative logit link) (n = 246). The dark lines show the mean estimates, while the shaded bars show the 95% 
confidence intervals. When the shaded bar does not cross the dashed line (Exp(B) = 1), the associated effect is 




a Age is an ordinal variable with three levels (recoded from six). Because its relationship with the dependent variables was 
non-linear, it was entered as a categorical variable, with “Older” as the reference category. 
b Education is an ordinal variable with three levels (recoded from five), with values of -1 (no post-secondary), 0 (short post-
secondary) and +1 (long post-secondary). It was entered as a continuous variable. 
c Political identity is an ordinal variable with three levels (recoded from five), with values of -1 (conservative), 0 (moderate) 
and +1 (liberal). It was entered as a continuous variable. 
d Crop cluster is a categorical variable with four categories, derived from a cluster analysis of major crops grown with and 
without irrigation. “Dry maize farming” is the reference category. 
e Rainfall variability (coefficient of variation (CV)) is a continuous, standardized variable. 
f Smaller farm is a binary variable, indicating that arable land area is less than 500 hectares. “Larger farm” is the 
reference category. 
g Total farm profit is an ordinal variable with eight levels. It was standardized and entered as a continuous variable. 
h Number of crops in rotation is an ordinal variable with four levels. It was standardized and entered as a continuous 
variable. 
i Low-tillage score is an ordinal variable with five levels. It was standardized and entered as a continuous variable. 
j Never burn crop residues is a binary variable. “Sometimes or always burn crop residues” is the reference category. 
 





Figure 6.5: The interaction effect of age and education on the rank assigned to weather. 
 
 





6.5.3! Drivers of the distance between weather and climate change ranks 
To explore possible reasons for the observed differences in the prioritization of weather and 
climate change, the distance between their ranks was modeled using multivariate linear 
regression. The regression model was significant overall, as indicated by the likelihood ratio test 
(X2(19) = 43.110, p = .001). Most of the independent variables that were significant in predicting 
the ranks assigned to weather and climate change, separately, were also significant in predicting 
the distance between their ranks (Figure 6.7). For instance, irrigation farmers were more likely to 
rank climate change risks as having a higher priority than weather risks. Higher education was 
again significantly associated with a higher rank for weather risks over climate change risks 
among younger and older farmers, and not among middle-aged farmers (Figure 6.8). However, 
political identity was not significant in predicting the distance between ranks, despite being 
significant in the separate analysis of climate change. Similarly, rainfall variability and its 
interaction with crop cluster were not significant in predicting the distance between weather and 
climate change ranks, though they were significant in the separate analysis of weather. 
 
Overall, differences that were observed in the drivers of weather rank and climate change rank, 
when analyzed separately, persisted and were often amplified when they were analyzed together. 
The effects of individual predictor variables on climate change rank were often opposite to the 
effects of the same variables on weather rank – of the 19 main and interaction effects, only five 
were of the same sign for both dependent variables. For variables whose coefficients had opposite 
signs, the net effect was greater when predicting the distance between the weather and climate 
change ranks. For instance, the effect of farm size was not quite significant in the separate 
regressions (B = -.56, p = .09 for climate change; B = .54, p = .09 for weather); however, it had 
opposite effects on weather and climate change, and it was therefore significant in predicting the 
distance between their ranks (B = -.94, p = .01). Farmers with smaller arable land areas (less than 
500 ha) were more likely to prioritize weather and less likely to prioritize climate change, whereas 
the opposite was true for those with larger farms. Similarly, the effect of crop residue burning was 
amplified in the joint analysis because of its divergent effects in the separate analyses. Farmers 
who reported never burning their crop residues were far more likely to prioritize climate change 




Figure 6.7: Parameter estimates for independent predictors of the distance between the ranks 
assigned to climate change and weather. These were obtained using multivariate linear regression (i.e., a 
generalized linear model with identity link) (n = 246). The dark lines show the mean estimates, while the shaded bars 
show the 95% confidence intervals. When the shaded bar does not cross the dashed line (B = 0), the associated effect 
is statistically significant (p < .05). See above for notes on the independent variables, indicated by letters in 




Figure 6.8: The interaction effect of age and education on the distance between the ranks assigned 
to climate change and weather. 
 
 
6.6! Discussion and conclusion 
Overall, the patterns of selection of weather and climate change as high-priority risks suggest that 
many individual farmers think about weather and climate change differently. That is, rather than 
being equivalent and so substitutable, perceptions of weather and climate change risks appear to 
be distinct, and in some regards, oppositional.  Climate change and weather are not similarly 
prioritized, their risk perceptions are driven by different factors, and all of the variables that are 
significantly associated with both risk ranks have effects on the two that are of opposite sign to 
each other. These apparent differences persist and are often magnified in the linear regression 
model predicting the distance between their assigned ranks. Hence, farmers do not simply 




The significant effects of the independent variables are broadly aligned with previous qualitative 
findings: 
 
•! Notably, irrigation farmers are insulated from weather risks because their crop 
production is not restricted by short-term water shortages. However, they are as equally 
concerned about climate change as non-irrigation farmers, perhaps because they 
recognize the potential for long-term water shortages to affect their water rights or 
physical access to stored water.  
•! While higher rainfall variability makes farmers more sensitive to weather risks, it does not 
appear to affect their sensitivity to climate change. 
•! Farmers with smaller arable land areas are more likely to prioritize weather, while those 
with larger land areas are more likely to prioritize climate change. Our previous 
qualitative analysis (Chapter 3) suggests that farmers with smaller farms may prioritize 
more acute, short-term risks, because they tend to be more focussed on economic 
survival. 
•! Farmers who burn their crop residues are less likely to prioritize climate change, while 
those who do not burn their residues are less likely to prioritize weather. This is consistent 
with our previous finding (Chapter 4) that farmers who refrain from burning their crop 
residues perceive themselves as more agriculturally progressive and, by extension, forward 
thinking. 
•! Farmers who are more highly educated are more likely to prioritize weather, while those 
who have less education are more likely to prioritize climate change – except for middle-
aged farmers, for whom the effect is negligible. This effect is as yet unexplained and 
warrants further study. Our previous qualitative analysis suggests the possibility that more 
highly educated farmers perceive themselves as better able to manage the effects of 
climate change through changes in practice (Chapter 5). 
 
Overall, these quantitative results reinforce the qualitative findings of our previous study of 
farmer mental models of environmental risk, in which we found that participants may access 
different mental models of when discussing either weather or climate change (Chapter 5). 
Farmers’ objective capacities to adapt to climate change are determined by their level of 
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education, their climate-specific knowledge, and the resources at their disposal (i.e., financial, 
institutional, technological). However, their likelihood of adapting is determined by their 
perception of climate change, and its integration into the existing decision-making processes that 
they use to manage myriad overlapping risks towards competing objectives. In combination with 
our previous findings (Chapter 5), the results of this study suggest four important drivers of the 
differential perceptions of weather and climate change: short- versus long-term risk orientation; 
self-perceived adaptive capacity; tension between experiential and expert knowledge; and 
individual worldview. Policy-makers should treat smaller commercial farms differently – these 
farmers appear less likely to respond to climate change risks. Education matters, but not quite as 
expected, requiring further investigation to examine the interplay of social learning with expert 
and experiential knowledge. 
 
Across diverse adaptation studies – by economists, geographers, sociologists and climate scientists 
– there is an implicit assumption that climate change adaptation will occur as an equivalent, 
long-term extension of the processes by which farmers perceive and respond to weather and 
climate variability. The assumption of equivalency is applied both by those who argue that 
farmers need no help adapting and by those who argue that farmers need strong public support: 
given enough education, technology, resources and time, farmers will adapt to climate change as 
they have always adapted to weather. Though there is a strong literature on similarities and 
differences in the psychology of weather and climate change among broader publics, few 
adaptation studies have explicitly recognized that the psychology of weather and climate change 
may differ for individual actors.  As shown here climate change and weather are not similarly 
prioritized, and their risk perceptions are driven by different factors. Overall, the findings provide 
confirmatory evidence that farmers perceive and process climate change risks differently than 
they do those stemming from weather and climate variability. They are therefore likely to 
respond to them differently. 
 
As implied in Chapter 5 and corroborated in this paper, there is a crucial and unrecognized risk 
communication challenge for adaptation researchers and policy-makers. Experts’ understandings 
of climate change risk perceptions are misaligned with those of farmers. This is in part because 
the nature of climate change knowledge (i.e., expert-driven, long-term, deeply uncertain) triggers 
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the use of mismatched cognitive frames. These alternative frames are evident both in the 
qualitative ways in which farmers speak of weather and climate change, and in the quantitative 
ways in which they prioritize one over the other. Researchers and policy-makers should not 
assume that farmers will treat climate change risks as an equivalent, long-term extension of risks 
stemming from weather and climate variability, and that they will therefore integrate weather 
and climate change risk management with ease. The fundamental changes in farming practice 
that might be needed for climate change adaptation operate on generational timescales, 
requiring experiential and technical knowledge, advanced planning, incremental 
experimentation, and access to trusted sources of information, new technologies and capital. 
Researchers and policy-makers might better facilitate mainstreaming by communicating the 
everyday similarities of climate change impacts to normal risks, as opposed to emphasizing their 
novelty. The hope is that by overcoming climate change’s cognitive challenges now, farmers will 




7.1! Summary of key findings 
Each chapter has built on the findings of those previous to provide broader insights into farmers’ 
climate-adaptive behaviours. In the first three empirical chapters, I sought to understand climate-
as-usual behaviours: How are farmers sensitive to weather risks? In Chapter 2, this involved a 
characterization of the risk-based decision-making strategies by which farmers manage weather 
and climate variability in concert with other ‘normal’ risks. These messy and sometimes 
contradictory processes are the engine driving all of the risk perceptions and risk-mitigating 
responses described in subsequent chapters. I proposed that farmers are using two important 
heuristics to make trade-offs within and between domains of risk – hazy hedging and bounded 
trade-offs – and argued that these rough trade-offs are used to coordinate among the different 
cognitive frames that farmers use to perceive and respond to different risks, and to make progress 
towards concurrent objectives. In Chapter 3, I demonstrated that farmers apply different frames 
in the management of similar risks, evident in the language they use to describe weather and 
climate change problems, cascading effects and their own responses. I found that the use of 
particular frames inhibits longer-term risk management strategies for farmers who are acutely 
concerned with shorter- to medium-term risks to farm survival. In Chapter 4, I showed that there 
are important challenges in using CA as a concept by which to frame the promotion, adoption 
and monitoring of sustainable and climate-resilient farming practices. Farmers are not adopting 
CA as expected, and their definitions of conservation farming are at odds with experts’ 
definitions of CA. 
 
In the last two empirical chapters, I examined more closely the relationship between weather and 
climate change in farmers’ risk perceptions and risk management: How is farmers’ sensitivity to 
climate change risks different from their sensitivity to weather? In Chapter 5, I demonstrated that 
the mental models that farmers use to perceive and respond to climate change risks are isolated 
from those with which they address weather and other ‘normal’ risks. These mental models are 
linguistically and structurally distinct, with few interconnections between climate change and 
‘normal’ risk management. I argued that this was indicative of their use of expert-driven 
cognitive frames for climate change that were misaligned with those driven by social and 
experiential learning that they apply to weather and other ‘normal’ risks. Finally in Chapter 6, 
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using another method with a larger sample, I again showed that farmers do not think of climate 
change and weather in equivalent ways. I argued that climate change risk communication efforts 
will fail if experts continue to assume such equivalency, and that farmers are unlikely to respond 
effectively and efficiently if the cognitive frames that they apply to climate change continue to be 
driven primarily by imparted expert knowledge. 
 
I have thus demonstrated that misaligned frames are creating cognitive and communication 
challenges in farmers’ attempts at climate-adaptive behaviour. These misalignments create 
reciprocal and multi-faceted miscommunication that explains in part why local experts perceive 
farmers to be climate-insensitive, despite their explicit weather sensitivity and adoption of CA. In 
risk communication and agricultural extension, differences in the ways in which farmers and 
experts think and talk about weather, climate change and agricultural practices have built under-
recognized barriers. Climate change experts generally agree that farmers ought to treat climate 
change risks as an equivalent long-term extension of weather risks, but farmers do not presently 
perceive them as such. In parallel, experts in agricultural practice agree that farmers ought to 
adopt CA as a package, but farmers are not generally doing so and use different “conservation”-
related concepts that impede CA’s promotion, adoption and monitoring. In farmers’ mental 
models of ‘normal’ risks, the adoption of CA as an economically and ecologically sustainable set 
of farming practices is limited unexpectedly by farmers’ use of cognitive frames steeped in anxiety 
about the survival of the farm. Further, farmers’ climate change knowledge is largely excluded 
from the mechanisms of social and experiential learning that they use to improve their 
management of weather and other ‘normal’ risks. Climate change risk management is thus 
isolated from the processes of incremental experimentation that ultimately underlie generational 
shifts in farming practice. In combination, these findings suggest that farmers are less likely than 
previously thought to perceive and respond to climate change risks, broadly, and climate-
adaptive agricultural extension efforts, specifically. 
 
7.2! Strengths, limitations and lines of future inquiry 
These analyses powerfully demonstrate the complementary strengths and weaknesses of 
qualitative and quantitative methods. The indirect mental modelling approach allowed for the 
analysis of emergent and in situ patterns of risk perception and response that would not have 
 155 
been captured by, let alone evident in, more direct and explicit methods of data collection. 
However, the method does not allow for the direct observation and rigorous analysis of 
constrained processes, and it remains under-sensitive to emotional facets of decision-making. 
Narrower and more quantitatively-oriented exercises will be necessary to further delineate the 
decision-making heuristics proposed in Chapter 2, to explicate the framing effects described in 
Chapter 3, and to parse the isolation of climate change logics as observed in Chapter 5. In 
parallel, affective approaches will be necessary to more deeply understand the role of family and 
place in shaping risk perceptions and farming practices, evident here in the anxiety about farm 
survival described in Chapter 3, and in the greater prevalence of emotional language in farmers’ 
mental models of climate change, described in Chapter 5. The survey methods used in Chapters 
4 and 6 allowed for more rigorous statistical analyses, but were also necessarily superficial in their 
treatment of cause, effect and context. The larger sample sizes and quantitative methods enabled 
by the survey provided better opportunities to parse the findings along specific continua (e.g., the 
risk rankings), but simultaneously limited the depth of their interpretation. The discussions in the 
narrower survey-based chapters therefore relied heavily on the broader findings of the interview-
based chapters. 
 
Ultimately, my goal was to offer empirical evidence that could describe and make replicable the 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies applied herein. Researchers inevitably introduce bias 
in identifying and selecting problems, cases and methods of inquiry, alongside the more 
discernably subjective nature of the ways in which they frame the data and its implications. I 
have thus attempted to make these inquiries as transparent as possible to allow for critical 
interpretations and re-interpretations of my results. Such research, I would argue, is the 
backbone of evidence-based policy-making. Rigorous and replicable qualitative methods are 
particularly difficult and time-consuming to apply. The mental models design, implementation, 
coding, analysis and interpretation took far longer than expected, leading to repeated delays in 
the completion of this doctoral work. The more widespread application of such methods will 
absolutely require the development of computer-assisted tools to collect, parse and analyze the 
internal representations of reality that are so crucial to in situ decision-making processes that are 




Nuances in the observed climate change risk perceptions derived from contrasting methods – the 
mental models interviews and the online survey – strongly suggest the need to develop survey 
methodologies that illuminate the use of different cognitive frames. The malleability of 
participants’ mental model-derived climate change risk perceptions, the contradiction evident 
among some aspects of belief, concern and observed climatic changes, and the isolation of 
climate change logics from those of weather suggested that farmers might be accessing different 
mental models to think about climate change under different circumstances (e.g., unprompted 
versus prompted). This implies that explicit climate change risk perceptions measured using 
Likert-scale survey questions will not necessarily be those that climate-sensitive respondents apply 
in interpreting and reacting to direct stimuli. This is further evidenced in my use of both risk 
ranking and Likert-scale questions to measure climate change risk perceptions in Chapter 6. The 
risk ranking exercise had much more analytical utility; the Likert-scale answers were significantly 
correlated with the ranks assigned to climate change, but this correlation was too weak to observe 
significant drivers of risk perception (i.e., demographics, farm characteristics and farming 
practices) akin to those found in the analysis of the climate change ranks. This misalignment of 
more explicit and less explicit measures suggests that survey methodologies seeking the direct 
elicitation of climate change risk perceptions through Likert-scale or similar questions will tend to 
overestimate the relevance of this data to the in situ practice of risk-based decision-making. 
 
These results show that these farmers do not think about climate change and weather in similar 
ways, and that their perceptions of and responses to environmental stimuli are enmeshed in 
messy webs of risk management towards concurrent and competing objectives. This large group 
epitomizes the autonomous private actor and provides key insights into the climate-adaptive 
behaviours of individuals. The challenges that they face in responding to climate change risks 
strongly imply that other groups will encounter similar difficulties. For instance, subsistence 
farmers, who tend to have less education and restricted access to informational, financial and 
institutional resources, are likely to be even more constrained in their ability to recognize climate 
change and weather as distinct risks while managing them in concert. Similar cognitive barriers 
may well exist among decision-makers in institutional settings, but their symptoms are likely 
masked by the explicitly calculated and structured nature of many institutional processes. 
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However, individuals are ultimately at the heart of all climate-sensitive decisions. We would do 
well to recognize that the quirks of human judgment and decision-making will inevitably shape 
climate-adaptive responses at all scales. We must give more thought to the ways in which real-
world adaptation and resilience are impeded and enabled by these cognitive processes. 
 
7.3! Final thoughts on “adaptation” 
Just as the linguistic expression of cognitive frames shaped risk-mitigating responses in Chapter 3, 
so does the conceptual framing of climate change adaptation shape climate-adaptive responses 
more broadly. The circumscribed concept of climate change adaptation was conceived in 
dichotomous opposition to climate change mitigation. It laid bare the need to respond to climate 
threats by revealing their costs (or harms) if mitigation was delayed. Yet responses to climate 
change impacts are complex and difficult, impeded by social, institutional and cognitive barriers. 
Even in climate-exposed sectors the climate signal is diffuse, filtered through complex webs of 
perceived causation. The adaptation concept is prescriptive – it implies rational adjustments to a 
known risk that is implicitly separate from other stressors (Basset & Fogelman, 2013). It thus 
promotes a fundamental misunderstanding of the processes underlying human responses to 
climate change effects, rendering climate change risks oblique and theoretical. 
 
The “need” to adapt is nothing new. When has adaptation not been a central theme in the 
human enterprise? There is thus a growing understanding that the concept loses much of its 
meaning beyond its natal dichotomy. In their systematic review of observed adaptations captured 
by the peer-reviewed and grey literature, Ford et al. (2011) found plenty of evidence of the 
reorientation of conceptual frames towards “adaptation”, but little evidence of “adaptive” 
actions. Where they exist, they are invisible to superficial analyses that fail to recognize the multi-
faceted and multi-causal nature of real-world decision-making processes. Even the IPCC’s own 
documentation has begun to speak more of resilience-building and transformation, rather than 
adaptation (IPCC, 2014). On the other hand, academic definitions of concepts and terminology 
have often, if not always, diverged from lay (or “common”) definitions. If researchers understand 
each other and can, in collegial deliberation and through their influence on public policy, 
improve societal responses to climate change impacts, then in some circumstances it may not 
matter whether their specific meanings cohere with those held by society more broadly. 
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However, for climate change risks in particular, it is crucial that expert and lay understandings 
cohere, since risk-mitigating responses will span the full breadth of the contexts in which humans 
operate. In most such decisions, experts will have little direct influence. 
 
The tensions among expert and lay framings have been evident throughout the empirical results 
presented in this dissertation. We now know that farmers do not necessarily think of weather and 
climate change in similar ways. Climate change has generated a cognitive branch largely 
disconnected from other processes of risk management, and weather and climate change are 
explicitly prioritized in different ways. But climate change is likely to manifest primarily through 
increasingly risky weather and climate variability long before the changes in mean precipitation 
and temperature are noticeable in practice. We do not yet know how best to help farmers 
reintegrate climate change risks with those of weather and other ‘normal’ risks, though my results 
suggest that climate change learning is better treated like other risks, emphasizing experience and 
experimentation. As farmers experience specific weather events, we might help them to 
understand how these stressors may have been exacerbated by climate change, or might be so 
magnified in the future. Even if we cannot attribute specific phenomena to climate change, we 
can thereby help farmers to interpret environmental signals through a climatic lens, and enable 








My eyes open to the dusky promise of dawn, the hearth at my side  
still warm with the memory of flame. My new home is comfortable and 
familiar. I have shaped it, and it has shaped me in turn. I know well its 
nooks and crannies. I see charm in its Whims and Quirks. Yet something 
tickles at the nape of my neck, the suggestion of an itch long forgotten. My 
thoughts trace the paths along which I arrived so fortuitously at  
this tranquil moment. 
 
A smile dances at my lips as I relive my slip-turned-somersault down the 
Slopes of Self-Sabotage, my daring climb from of the Sinkhole of Simplistic 
Solutions, my gritty march through the Dunes of Dreadful Determination, 
and my bold charge across the Meadow of Misunderstood Metaphors. 
Never have I felt so alive as when leaping from the Cliffs of Collegial 
Calamity into the Pool of Principled Pragmatism, ravenous hordes 
 of the Great Scholars' disciples nipping at my heels. 
 
My head turns as Curiosity calls from the open window,  
its melody luring me back to the untraveled road.  
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Appendix A: Writing for a general audience during exploratory fieldwork 
These three fieldwork-oriented blog posts and two research backgrounders were written in 
fulfillment of the requirements of the fieldwork grant that I received from the Centre for 
International Governance Innovation (CIGI). The blog posts are no longer available online, but 
the backgrounders may still be found online at the time of this writing 
(https://www.africaportal.org/dspace/authors/findlater-kieran). They are here reproduced with 
the explicit permission of CIGI staff, obtained by email on 23 January 2017. As requested by 
CIGI, the backgrounders are unaltered and are included in their entirety. 
 
A.1! Studying Climate Adaptation in South Africa’s Dynamic Policy Landscape 
(13 July 2012) 
CAPE TOWN – South Africa is a vibrant land, boundless in spirit, buoyed by nearly two 
decades of release from repression and segregation, yet still suffering deep scars and facing 
daunting challenges that threaten its future success. In myriad facets, its striking diversity and 
bold experiments in new governance provide rich fodder for the inquisitive mind to critically 
evaluate its dynamic policy landscape. 
 
My first path to South Africa was serendipitous. Following graduation from a wide-ranging B.Sc., 
I spent months each spring applying for countless youth internships sponsored by the Canadian 
International Development Agency, hoping to get the international work experience that would 
give me a sheen of credibility in applying to internationally-focused, research-based Master’s 
programs. Undaunted by my meager Spanish, my goal was South America; Africa was not on 
the radar. 
 
It was then a bittersweet morning when I finally woke to not one, but two offers: New Caledonia 
or Pretoria. A tropical paradise of coral reefs and sandy beaches, or an unknown city high on the 
South African plains, bordering a megalopolis reputed to be one of the most dangerous in the 
world. Why not the more challenging option? Not for one moment have I regretted that decision. 
South Africa is arguably one of the most interesting policy making contexts in the world. 
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South Africa’s grand experiments in governance, rich cultural diversity, and enormous 
socioeconomic and environmental challenges provide limitless opportunities for policy-relevant 
research. Post-Apartheid South Africa may indeed be unique in the scale of its policy projects – 
where else has a country undertaken such dramatic changes in governance with such rich 
human, economic and institutional resources in such a short time? 
 
Major challenges (PDF) in health, water, land, energy, housing, education, employment, crime 
and economic disparity have prompted sweeping and innovative reforms. While some have 
yielded promising results, historical geographies and rapid urbanization continue to thwart 
policy-makers’ best intentions. Such a fundamental re-imagining of the country’s constitution 
and governance has inevitably encountered setbacks, but the government appears to remain 
committed to progressive and reformative acts. The country’s policy landscape remains highly 
dynamic, making insightful and policy-relevant research crucial to the success of current and 
future governance. 
 
Now pursuing a Ph.D., I have been inexorably drawn back to South Africa after five years away. 
My focus is on energy technologies and adaptation to climate change. In a country where water 
resources have already been over-allocated in many catchments, climate change is predicted to 
further stretch the government’s ability to manage the competing needs of consumers, farmers, 
industry and thermal power plants. Simultaneously, the country’s post-Apartheid water and land 
reform programs are providing new entrepreneurial opportunities to thousands of previously 
disadvantaged farmers. 
 
Unfortunately, these emerging agriculturalists are suffering from significantly lower productivity 
than their long-established counterparts, in part because they have less expertise and fewer 
resources at their disposal. In a country where nearly 90 percent of electricity is generated in 
coal-fired power plants and electricity tariffs are rising to pay for  long-delayed new generating 
capacity, renewable energy technologies may provide part of the solution. This would allow 
emerging farmers to affordably and reliably access the groundwater to which they have rights, 
without depending on an increasingly overextended power sector. South Africa’s water-energy 
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relationship is of acute importance, yet is just one of many pressing issues demanding innovative 
governance. 
 
Fortunately, while the vibrant optimism of the post-apartheid Mandela era has, in some quarters, 
given way to pragmatism or cynicism, South Africa retains an undercurrent of willful 
determination. It is crucial that we bear witness to this transformation and enable solutions to 
these challenges – both so that South Africans may evaluate their own governance and for the 
country to lead by example as the continent’s most powerful economy. 
 
A.2! Climate Change Adaptation: Business-as-Usual (27 August 2012) 
CAPE TOWN – When adaptation is business-as-usual, it’s very difficult to tease out the climate 
change thread. But people are always willing to talk about the weather! 
 
Climate has been both the subject of my inquiry and a nagging nuisance, tugging at my coat and 
my mind. Cape Town can be cold, rainy and windy in the winter. Having grown up in 
Saskatchewan (sometimes reaching minus forty degrees Celsius on the coldest winter nights) I feel 
a bit treacherous in saying so, but the chill of the Capetonian winter has seeped into my bones. 
Without Canadian-scale insulation and central heating, ten degrees here has far more impact on 
my lifestyle and state of mind than did ten degrees at home. 
 
Climate has proven less forthcoming in my work. Climate change will definitely have an impact 
on the operations of South Africa’s farmers, yet it is interwoven with existing risks with which 
farmers have had to deal throughout their careers. Some risks from climate change are unique, 
but many are already factored into agricultural decision-making. In the Western Cape, climate 
change is expected to reduce rainfall and surface water availability, yet farmers there have dealt 
with water scarcity and competing water user demands for centuries. These competing demands 
have not been static – total demand and relative prioritization are dynamic variables. In this 
sense, farmers have continuously adapted to changes in climate-linked risks, because those same 




Of course, these complexities are not unique to the study of climate change adaption. Research 
design necessarily accounts for such confounding factors. The difficulty in separating them is 
simply multiplied when using semi-structured interviews to characterize the system and risks. In 
each interview, it takes time, patience, and a bit of artistic flair to find an honest answer to the 
question you wish answered, without asking it directly. And each interview is unique; the same 
technique and style will not work over and over again. Instead it must be adapted– through 
sensitivity to verbal and non-verbal cues, self-reflection, experience and flexibility. 
 
Instead of approaching climate change adaptation directly, I’ve therefore opted to investigate the 
adoption of practices associated with conservation agriculture, both in terms of motivations and 
outcomes. Such adoption is happening now among a growing set of large-scale commercial 
farmers in South Africa, and will increase their resilience to the impacts of climate change. I hope 
to learn lessons that will contribute to policy development to support them in this shift and to 
provide small-scale farmers with the resources and knowledge necessary to adopt similar 
practices where suitable. 
 
Of course, with weather as wacky as it has been this winter, people aren’t shy to talk about 
increasing climate variability. Earlier this month, South Africa had snow in all nine provinces 
simultaneously for the first time in recorded history! The major national highway between 
Durban and Johannesburg was closed for days and the army was called upon to rescue stranded 
motorists. Not something that one would normally expect while working in Africa. 
 
As I write this from a coffee shop in the Southern Suburbs, another fierce storm has rolled across 
Table Mountain, rattling the windows and viciously lashing the city with sheets of rain. I’m 
thankful for the roof over my head, and I’ll put on another sweater. 
 
A.3! Rebooting Fieldwork: the Upside of Failure (31 January 2013) 
CAPE TOWN – I failed. 
 
My proposed research project evaporated almost immediately upon my arrival in South Africa, 
the unintended victim of the shifting research priorities of my local partner. I immediately 
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booked meetings with all of my local contacts. Was the project still feasible? With another 
partner? A different study site? Where and with whom? 
 
Despite the obvious and overwhelming challenges, however, failure can provide a healthy dose of 
opportunity — a crucial breath in which to boost the relevance and impact of your work. 
Fieldwork is so intensive that many benefits are easily lost in the race to gather data. It is too 
often portrayed solely as a means of data collection, when in truth it provides myriad 
opportunities for learning, self-reflection and interaction that can dramatically alter your 
perspective. It is an intensive education requiring months to fully process – a sensory 
smorgasbord replete with informal learning experiences: lectures; critical discussions; endless 
evolving presentations; and lonely angst-filled nights in which to ponder your purpose. 
 
Fieldwork is simultaneously the most stressful and most rewarding experience for graduate 
students. At no other time in a Master’s or Ph.D. program will you have an experience as rich, 
dense, exhilarating, confusing, prolific, challenging, fascinating and all-consuming. Pulled from 
the relative familiarity of coursework and proposal writing, you are thrust forth to grapple, 
largely unaided, with innumerable trials demanding determination and flexibility. 
 
Those profound research questions you so painstakingly crafted, word-by-word, during months 
of preparation? That informative and transformative methodology you lit upon half-asleep at 
3:00 am, gently nursed from brief spark to bright flame? The mutually beneficial partnerships 
that you negotiated through conscientiously structured e-mails and well-enunciated video calls? 
Throw them upon the mercy of the unsympathetic unknown — comfort and encouragement are 
now distant, electronic, impersonal shadows of their former selves. 
 
Having previously worked in South Africa, and with positive feedback from my local contacts, I 
arrived in 2012 with a measure of confidence in my proposed project. But after speaking with 
upwards of 80 experts and stakeholders, I have since concluded that my original proposal was 
neither well attuned to the needs of local decision-makers, nor would it likely have had a 
significant impact on the well-being of my participants. I would, of course, have attempted to 
adapt both the methodology and the dissemination of results to increase its relevance and impact, 
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but my awareness of the shortcomings of the study would likely have accrued much later in the 
trip, and would have been incorporated with more difficulty. 
 
Distantly-designed research has serious potential weaknesses — the most conscientious of 
scholars is shackled by the topical limitations and timeliness of the literature, the relevance and 
scope of their past experiences, and the effort committed by their local partners in helping to plan 
the project. There is no substitute for the direct input of local experts and stakeholders to ensure 
your research questions truly speak to substantive problems or priorities; they should be as 
relevant in the harsh light of day as they are in Times New Roman. 
 
Though most students will incorporate some element of local expertise in the planning of their 
study, constraints on time and funding will normally limit this to a small sample of partners prior 
to departure or to pilot interviews immediately upon arrival. Early context-specific feedback from 
local experts and stakeholders is particularly important for graduate students, since we are more 
likely than seasoned researchers to be flexible, agile and receptive to new input. Of equal 
importance, these interactions strengthen the perceived legitimacy of the work, build awareness 
of the underlying problems, engage policy-makers and create a sense of investment among 
stakeholders – all of which help to increase the impact of the study’s findings or 
recommendations. 
 
In the end, my research in South Africa had greater stakeholder involvement in planning and 
execution than expected, with a stronger sense of investment by my newest partners and more 
potential for impact on policy and practice. Fieldwork failure will never be intentional — it 
creates staggering challenges and has a devastating effect on morale — but it can enable a depth 
of immersive understanding and a breadth of local participation that are otherwise elusive. 
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A.4! The Complexities of Climate Change Adaptation in South African 
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Given its wide-ranging impact on food security, water, health and land reform, 
the strength of South Africa’s agricultural sector is of strategic importance to 
the nation (Republic of South Africa [RSA], 2011a). As a climate-dependent 
industry in a water-scarce region, however, South African farming is also 
vulnerable to the variations in weather patterns associated with changes in 
global temperatures.
Although the agricultural sector is dominated by industrial farming operations, 
small-scale and subsistence farmers are of outsized political importance — a 
reflection of national redress policies following the end of Apartheid (Atuahene, 
2012; Lahiff and Cousins, 2005).  As compared to small scale farmers, 
commercial farmers have greater resources at their disposal and tend to not 
only be more resilient to climate variability ,but also better equipped to adapt. 
(Challinor et al., 2007). Since each group has different tool adaptation sets, 
SUMMARY
Agriculture is a complex and politically contentious industry in South 
Africa, given its connection to food security, water, health and land reform, 
and the historic resource imbalances between black and white farmers.
As a large country with many fully allocated water basins, different parts of 
South Africa will face unique challenges related to climate change.
Given the varying levels of adaptive capacity between large-scale 
commercial operations and emerging smallholder farms, South Africa’s 
national policy response  must be prioritized to ensure cohesive and 
nuanced support for climate change adaptation.
NO. 50  JANUARY 2013
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however, differentiated support policies are also required to deliver effective 
programs in response (Wreford et al., 2010).
CLIMATE CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa is considered a semi-arid country, receiving an average of 
only 450mm of precipitation per year. High temporal and regional variability 
in rainfall results in scarce surface and groundwater resources, which are 
already fully allocated in many basins (RSA, 2011d). Exacerbating this 
sensitivity, Kruger and Shongwe (2004) suggest that South Africa has 
experienced measurable warming since the early 1980s, with higher mean 
temperatures that result in greater heat stress and higher rates of evapo-
transpiration — the sum of evaporation and plant transpiration from the 
Earth’s land surface to atmosphere.
Future precipitation trends are less certain, though broad patterns can be 
considered likely. In keeping with existing regional variability, South Africa is 
expected to experience regional differences in future precipitation change. 
Most of eastern South Africa, roughly coinciding with the summer rainfall 
area, is expected to experience similar or increased median precipitation, 
becoming more variable and resulting in frequent and more severe flood and 
drought events. In contrast, the country’s winter rainfall area, in the west, is 
expected to experience a significant decrease in precipitation (RSA, 2011d).
These changes in temperature and precipitation patterns are projected 
to affect South African agriculture directly through changes in rainfall, 
temperature and CO2 fertilization, and indirectly via changes in the incidence 
of pests and disease, and loss of ecosystem services such as pollination 
(Smit and Pilifosova, 2007). Both challenges will require adaptation in 
agricultural systems and cropping patterns to ensure the sector’s stability 
and the country’s food security.
ADAPTATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN AGRICULTURE
South African farmers are necessarily adaptive as they face variable 
weather. It is therefore difficult to distinguish between climate change 
adaptation and routine actions that increase resilience to climate variability. 
Unplanned adaptation is likely to occur spontaneously and privately, with 
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term forecasts (Thomas et al., 2011; Wreford et al., 2010). The nature and 
success of these private responses may have important national and 
regional implications for food, water, energy and land reform. Cohesive 
public policies are therefore needed to align private adaptation (both 
spontaneous and planned) with national priorities in these related sectors 
(Howden et al., 2007).
The scarcity of South Africa’s freshwater resources contributes to the 
country’s agricultural vulnerability. There is little capacity, for example, to 
increase the amount of water used for irrigation to help mitigate increased 
evapotranspiration and heat stress. While agricultural land accounts for 82 
percent of the South Africa’s total land area, only 1.3 percent of agricultural 
land is under irrigation, with the remainder dependent on rainfall (RSA, 
2012). Despite the small proportion of irrigated land, however, the overall 
agricultural sector accounts for 62 percent of the country’s water withdrawals 
while irrigated lands generate 30 percent of the gross value of South African 
crop production (RSA, 2011d).
The enormous diversity of South Africa’s agricultural sector makes it 
difficult to characterize typical adaptive capacity and strategies. The 
sector includes large-scale commercial producers, either under private or 
corporate ownership, and small-scale farmers, with either subsistence or 
emerging commercial aspirations (Thomas et al., 2011). Because large-
scale producers have more substantial resources, larger cash flows and 
greater diversification, they typically have much longer planning horizons 
and are able to access credit, make capital investments and respond to 
market fluctuations. Small-scale producers typically have fewer resources 
and less diversification, requiring much quicker returns on investments and 
increasing vulnerability to short-term market fluctuations (Wreford et al., 
2010).
Large and small-scale farmers therefore adapt to climate changes using 
very different strategies. The commercial sector may respond through 
technology development and adoption, crop shifting and diversification, 
insurance, and improved financial management, while small-scale farmers 
may respond through employment diversification, communal risk sharing 
and low-cost water-saving measures (Challinor et al., 2007; Wreford et al., 
2010). Adaptation also involves both short-term and long-term components. 
Near-term strategies include changes in irrigation techniques, tilling 
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practices, planting dates and crop varieties, while longer-term plans include 
technology and infrastructure investments, crop switching and diversification 
(Wreford et al., 2010).
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The South African government has competing agriculture policy objectives. 
On one hand, the government would like to promote land reform — the 
transfer of land from historically wealthy commercial farmers to previously 
disadvantaged groups. For example, South Africa’s National Development 
Plan for 2030 emphasizes the expansion of both dryland and irrigated 
agriculture, “beginning with smallholder farmers where possible” (RSA, 
2011b). On the other, the government’s National Climate Change Response 
Paper acknowledges that emerging farmers — recipients during the land 
reforms — are less resilient to climate change because they are resource 
poor and constrained in their ability to invest in longer-term planning (RSA, 
2011a).
It is critically important that South Africa’s agricultural policies are 
harmonized to clarify the relative importance of competing objectives. 
Prioritizing the transfer of ownership to small-scale farmers should be 
contextualized by the tradeoffs that it may require. Without sufficient 
extension programs, a policy-driven shift toward small-scale agriculture 
risks increasing the sector’s vulnerability to climate change, as production 
is transferred from commercial to small-scale operations.  Adaptation may 
still take place largely through spontaneous private responses to perceived 
trends, but will certainly require substantial public policy support for resource 
management, climate monitoring and forecasting, technology development 
and infrastructure investment, as well as targeted capacity building for 
farmers with low adaptive potential.
The cross-sectoral implications of climate change are also important. For 
example, increased irrigation pumping will draw more electrical power from 
the national grid, requiring the need for further generation capacity. South 
Africa’s power sector is currently dominated by thermal coal power plants 
that require water for cooling, creating further competition for water between 
the power and agricultural sectors (Smit and Pilifosova, 2007).
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CONCLUSION
Adaptation policies must be flexible and multi-targeted, with separate 
measures set out for large and small-scale farmers that account for 
differences in available resources and planning horizons. Policy makers 
should also be aware of regional differences in climate change predictions, 
with adaptation policy differentiating for needs of farmers who may 
experience increased variability versus others who will face chronic water 
shortages. It may also be useful to emphasize the co-benefits of adaptation 
measures, including cost reductions, improved resource management, 
water and energy savings, and climate change mitigation benefits (Smit 
and Pilifosova, 2007).
Policy support for climate change adaptation in agriculture will require a 
nuanced, multi-faceted approach, accounting for the diversity of operations 
and the motivations that farmers have typically exhibited in adopting new 
measures to make their operations more resilient to existing climate variability. 
The agricultural sector will undoubtedly respond to climate change, just as 
it has always reacted to changing resource availabilities, input costs and 
market fluctuations, but the overall success of the sector will depend on 
coherent policies to encourage, guide and support private adaptation. The 
various national and provincial policies affecting the agricultural sector need 
to be harmonized to prioritize and reduce competition among stated policy 
objectives. Integrated adaptation planning will help insure South Africa’s 
food security, enable politically and culturally important small-scale farmers 
to succeed, improve environmental sustainability and contribute to policy 
objectives in other sectors.
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A.5! Conservation Agriculture: South Africa’s New Green Revolution? 
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As farmers move from conventional to conservation farming, agricultural 
production becomes more resilient to climate variability, and therefore to at least 
some aspects of anticipated climate change (FAO, 2011a). The components 
comprising Conservation Agriculture (CA) (a trifecta of no-till or minimum-till 
farming, permanent soil cover and crop rotations) have existed for nearly a 
century, but uptake has generally been slow and uneven (FAO, 2011a; Knowler 
and Bradshaw, 2007). Though adoption of no-till farming has been widespread 
in South America, rates in sub-Saharan Africa (including South Africa) remain 
particularly low (McCarthy et al., 2012), necessitating government support 
through targeted and integrated policy-making.
DRIVERS
The adoption of CA has generally been driven by necessity (Huggins and 
Reganold, 2008). First arising in the aftermath of the 1930s “dust bowl” in the 
United States, no-till and minimum-till farming evolved as a way to curb soil 
erosion (Hobbs et al., 2008). Though farm-level decision-making is difficult to 
SUMMARY
• Conservation Agriculture (CA) has the potential to greatly improve the 
sustainability of South African crop production.
• Targeted and effective policy support is necessary to sustain the 
momentum behind CA, and to ensure that consistent techniques are 
properly applied, maximizing benefits and reducing the risk of poor 
outcomes.
NO. 61  AUGUST 2013
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disentangle, major drivers of no-till uptake include soil degradation, erosion 
and water scarcity, exacerbated by rising input costs, globalized markets 
and lower profit margins (Hardy et al., 2011; Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007).
In South Africa, an accelerated shift towards conservation farming began 
largely as a result of market deregulation that accompanied the end of 
apartheid. The withdrawal of protective price controls sparked a dramatic 
change in South African agriculture. Vast swaths of marginal agricultural 
land were abandoned as it became economically detrimental to continue 
its cultivation (Hardy et al., 2011). To offset diminished revenues, farmers 
were quickly forced to become more efficient, driving a technological shift 
as well as rapid consolidation within the industry. Crop switching occurred 
on a wide scale, as farmers were forced to adopt more climatically suitable, 
while also switching some cropland to pasture for livestock (Hardy et al., 
2011).
COMPONENTS
A concept developed and promoted largely by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), CA comprises three major 
practices: no-till farming, permanent soil cover, and crop rotations (FAO, 
2011b).
1 No-till farming: To the greatest extent possible, the soil should 
not be disturbed (e.g., through plowing). This allows for the soil 
ecosystem and structure to return to a more natural state.
2 Permanent soil cover: To the greatest extent possible, the soil 
surface should not be left bare – most easily achieved by leaving 
crop stubble and residues on the field after harvest. This reduces 
the soil’s exposure to environmental degradation and increases 
soil moisture retention.
3 Crop rotation: Crops should be grown in rotation, rather than in 
a monoculture. Crop rotation systems increase the diversity of 
production; intensive, nutrient-depleting crops are interspersed 
with more soil-friendly crops in short or long-term cycles. This may 
necessitate planting beneficial cover crops, rather than simply 
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wheat following a wheat harvest, but may instead rotate wheat with 
canola, grasses or nitrogen-fixing legumes.
BENEFITS
CA, when practiced in a comprehensive way, improves crop yields over time 
and reduces the required quantity of most inputs (FAO, 2011b). As the soil 
recovers from decades of tillage, and cover crops and residues add organic 
matter and nutrients, soil fertility, soil moisture, the system’s resilience to 
environmental pressures improves dramatically (Hobbs et al., 2008).
CA increases soil organic matter content, soil moisture retention, while 
sharply reducing run-off (and therefore chemical pollution of nearby 
waterways), erosion by wind and water, and soil surface temperatures 
(helping to protect soil biota from extreme heat). As the health of soil fauna 
improves, soil organisms naturally till the soil, drawing nutrients from the 
surface down into the root zone, reducing soil compaction (thereby facilitating 
root penetration and water infiltration) and breaking down organic matter to 
make nutrients readily available for crops (Hobbs et al., 2008).
CA also reduces input costs by cutting fuel consumption in mechanized 
systems (planting is done using single-pass machinery), seed costs (due 
to direct planting) and fertilizer inputs, though herbicide use may increase 
(Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007). Crop rotations also allow for the inclusion 
of crops that contribute to increased soil fertility (e.g., nitrogen-fixing 
legumes). Pesticide use may also decrease – crop rotation systems under 
no-till are particularly resistant to pests and disease, since those that are 
crop specific have no host in the intervening years, and because robust soil 
biota increase the soil’s resistance to pathogens (Hobbs et al., 2008).
The practice specifically decreases the farm system’s sensitivity to weather 
variability and extremes (e.g., improving both water-logging and drought 
performance over time) (Holland, 2004; Thierfelder and Wall, 2010). For 
example, improved soil moisture retention makes for more reliable planting 
conditions, while single-pass techniques allow for planting to be completed 
within a much shorter timeframe. Planting under the CA approach therefore 
requires less rainfall and a smaller window of good weather, improving the 
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In non-mechanized systems, CA may reduce labour inputs, though this 
finding has been variable across different studies (FAO, 2010; Giller et al., 
2009). At the very least, CA requires less animal traction and may allow 
for labour inputs to be spread over a larger timeframe, since permanent 
soil cover reduces erosion between preparation and planting, allowing for 
earlier preparation.
Aggregate or off-farm benefits include increased food security, improved 
water quality through reductions in the agricultural pollution and 
sedimentation of water bodies, more regular and predictable river flows, 
increased soil biodiversity, lower greenhouse gas emissions from diesel 
use and soil processes, increased carbon sequestration in soil organic 
matter and higher soil albedo (reducing surface temperatures) (Holland, 
2004; Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007).
COSTS AND CHALLENGES
No-till equipment is costly, making capital input an important limiting factor 
in the adoption of CA in mechanized systems. Farmers need to invest 
in single-pass planters, and despite the fact that no-till systems require 
fewer tractors because of reduced traffic, no-till planters may require more 
powerful tractors (Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007).
There may be an early reduction in yields and profit until natural soil 
fertility improves, leading to financial losses. This may necessitate the 
application of higher volumes of mineral fertilizer due to immobility of 
nutrients in the crop residue for the first few years (Giller et al., 2009).
CA may also increase the incidence of weed infestation, requiring 
more herbicide or more labour for weeding (Giller et al., 2009). Where 
conventional tillage or residue burning may have previously provided 
regular non-chemical weed control, farmers may increase their use of 
chemical herbicides under CA (Jat et al., 2012).
In mixed crop-livestock systems, there may be competition for crop 
residues between soil cover and animal feed – or fuel, where residues 
are used as an energy source. Farmers may be unwilling or unable to 
buy feed externally, and may therefore allow their animals to feed on 
residues (Giller et al., 2009). This can result in reduced soil cover late in 
the dry season, affecting soil moisture retention, temperature and erosion. 
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Animals may also compact the soil surface if they are left to roam freely, 
requiring loosening of the soil prior to planting (Hobbs et al., 2008).
There is anecdotal evidence that CA’s improved water retention may lead 
to water-logging of the soil under some conditions, though over time water 
infiltration should improve, reducing this risk. Additionally, if some measure 
of soil erosion continues to occur, drainage gullies may get deeper over 
time, since they are not fixed each season through plowing. In some 
circumstances, these factors may necessitate drainage infrastructure 
improvements under CA (Jat et al., 2012).
The benefits of CA only fully accrue through years of rigorous application 
of the underlying principles. Some farmers may not apply the techniques 
consistently and may therefore risk jeopardizing the accrued benefit. For 
example, if a farmer is not consistent in minimizing tillage, soil fertility may 
be reduced through rapid mineralization of soil nutrients after plowing (Jat 
et al., 2012). This is of greater risk where farmers lack information and 
training, or where extension officers are poorly trained, themselves. Poor 
training can result in the incomplete application of CA techniques and may 
lead to lower yields than in conventional agriculture (Hobbs et al., 2008; 
Knowlder and Bradshaw, 2007).
CLIMATE SMART AGRICULTURE
The concept of Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) builds on CA in many 
ways, and emerged in preparations for the climate negotiations at Durban, 
South Africa, in December 2011 (Beddington et al., 2012). CSA was 
promoted as a way to accrue multiple concurrent benefits by encouraging 
farmers to switch to production methods that both mitigate climate change 
and increase agricultural resilience to climate variability. With a primary 
focus on increasing soil carbon sequestration, farmers might thereby be 
able to sell carbon credits in foreign carbon markets (McCarthy et al., 
2011).
Unfortunately, the costs and uncertainty in measuring soil carbon 
sequestration would likely make it financially unfeasible for small-
scale farmers to participate in foreign carbon markets. Widespread 
implementation of CSA might therefore drive further consolidation in 
the agricultural sector by creating another revenue source that benefits 
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from economies of scale (McCarthy et al., 2011). CSA may still provide 
incentives and additional policy tools to promote the adoption of CA 
practices, but at present, the cost of carbon accounting and the volatility 
of carbon markets largely preclude the use of CSA to promote CA 
adoption in South Africa.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The factors driving adoption of conservation farming techniques in South 
Africa are dynamic, and the agricultural sector continues to evolve as a 
result. The geography of production will continue to shift – in sectors with 
substantial infrastructure, high capital costs and long lead times (e.g., wine 
grapes), the effect has been delayed, and the impact has not yet fully been 
revealed. These shifts can be expected to continue as the climate changes.
CA is generally of net benefit, both at the farm scale and regionally (Knowler 
and Bradshaw, 2008). Policy-makers should increase support for farmers 
who would like to switch from conventional agriculture, but are limited by 
access to financing for new equipment or by lack of knowledge and training. 
For non-mechanized agriculture, further research and development must 
drive technological improvement to make CA more feasible for small-scale 
farmers. Crop rotation systems must be optimized for local climatic and soil 
conditions.
As with all agricultural policy in southern Africa, extension services for 
information and training are crucial. Current levels of extension and 
resources for training are insufficient (FAO, 2011b), especially as South Africa 
undertakes land reform, increasing the number of inexperienced farmers. 
Provincial agricultural departments should also focus on developing specific 
and localized crop rotation systems, since their development is particularly 
resource-intensive and their benefits widespread.
CA may also concurrently benefit from and help to imbue a sense of 
stewardship, as farmers become more explicitly aware of the role of 
ecosystem services in the success of their operations (Kassam et al., 
2009). With facilitative policies, government may harness this emerging 
awareness to draw farmers into related conservation programs, and help 
farmers to prepare for climate change. Provincial agricultural policies need 
to be better integrated with land reform and climate change policies, to 
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ensure the success of each program and encourage approaches that will 
result in comprehensive benefits.
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Appendix B: Research Protocols 
B.1! Structured Interview Protocol 
Interviewer: Kieran Findlater, PhD Candidate from the University of British Columbia 
 
Participants: Commercial grain farmers in the Western Cape province of South Africa who 
appeared on the contact lists of the cooperatives and agribusinesses that market grain grown in 
the province. 
 
Sampling Method: Geographically stratified random sampling 
 
Interview Location: Participant’s home, office, or other normal place of work 
 
Materials:  
•! Two large white boards 
•! Sticky notes 
•! Erasable markers 
•! Two voice recorders 
 
Setup: 
•! Introduce self 
•! Confirm participant’s availability 
•! Obtain informed consent 
•! Lay out white boards and other materials 
•! Start voice recorders 
 
Preamble: 
•! I use a standard set of questions, so that they’re the same across all of my interviews. 
Some of the questions are broad, and some are specific, but I’m not looking for particular 
answers – just for your thoughts. The questionnaire should take about an hour, but that 
depends a bit on how much you talk. Some of the farmers have been quite talkative – 
farmers like to talk – so some of my interviews have gone over by (quite) a bit! But we’ll 
just see how it goes. Is that alright? Do you have any questions for me before we begin? 
 
Farming Experience: 
•! First, I’d like to talk to you about your farm and about your farming experience. 
•! How long have you farmed? Did you grow up on a/the farm? Where would you say you 
learned to farm? 
•! Did you study after matric? What did you study? Where? How long was the program? 
•! Do you own the farm? Is it in your name, in a trust, or something else? 





•! How big is your farming area? Is that the workable area or the total? Do you hire other 
farms? 
•! What are your farming activities? Which crops do you grow? How many hectares of 
each? 
•! Do you have any animals? How many head of each? How many ewes? How many cows? 
How many cows in milk? 
•! Do you have any other activities on the farm? Do you have any land under irrigation? 
•! Any other sources of income off the farm or apart from the farm?  
•! How many workers do you have on the farm? Permanent and full-time? 
 
Future orientation: 
•! What plans do you have for the future of the/your farm? Do you have any other specific 
targets for improvement or change on the farm? 
•! Do you think that you’ll continue to farm until you retire? What do you think will happen 
to the farm when you retire? 
•! Do you have any children? How old are they? Have they shown an interest in farming? 
 
Risk elicitation: 
•! Next, I’d like to talk to you about the risks or concerns that you face as a farmer. I’m 
going to use these yellow sticky notes to organize our conversation. I’ve just written down 
a few things you’ve already said, [____], [____] and [____]. Beyond these – apart from 
these – I’d like you to please just start by listing risks or concerns that you face as a 
farmer. They might be of concern this week, next month, next year, or in ten or twenty 
years. Anything will do, and we’ll just talk about them as they come up! 
[Lengthy pause.] 
•! You’ve mentioned [____] and [____], which are probably short-term risks. Can you 
think of any other short-term risks? 
•! You’ve mentioned [____] and [____], which are probably long-term risks. Can you think 
of any other long-term risks? 
•! What about any other risks to do with crop production or crop failure? Any other risks to 
do with weather? Anything else to do with politics? Anything else to do with economics? 
Anything else to do with the environment? Anything else to do with water, soil or inputs? 
•! And [____]? What makes that a problem? Why does that happen? [For risks where the 
cause was unclear.] 
 
Manageability of risks: 
•! It sounds like some of these risks are probably manageable and some of them are 
probably unmanageable. I’d just like your help in quickly sorting them into those 
categories. I’m going to label this board manageable and the other board unmanageable, 
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and you can just grab the sticky notes and move them around as you see fit. Remember, 
this is from your perspective – manageable or unmanageable from your side. 
[Lengthy pause.] 
•! What makes these risks manageable? [One by one.] 
•! What makes these risks unmanageable? [One by one.] 
•! What can you do to manage these risks? And [____]? What can you do to manage that? 
And [____]? What makes that difficult to manage? 
•! On each side, one from manageable and one from unmanageable, what do you think will 
be the most important risk in the coming year? 
•! Which do you think will be the most important risks on each side in ten or twenty years? 
 
Sources of information: 
•! In general, when you’re trying to deal with risks on the farm, where do you find 
information or who do you talk to? What about information from other farmers? What 
about information from study groups – are you a part of a study group? What about 
information from the co-operative? What about information from other agricultural 
companies? What about information from the government? What about Elsenburg?25 
What about the Internet as a source of information? 
•! Who do you trust most to give you support or help when you’re faced with a big 
challenge? What makes them trustworthy? 
 
Specific concepts: 
•! I’d like to talk to you a bit more about your crop production now. I’m going to ask you a 
few questions that may seem a bit vague or broad, but just do your best to answer. 
 
Crop Rotation: 
•! What comes to mind when you hear the term “crop rotation”? Wisselbou? [Afrikaans for 
crop rotation.] 
•! What is the effect of crop rotation? What are the benefits of crop rotation? What are the 
downsides? How does crop rotation interact with these risks on the board? Which of these 
risks does crop rotation make better or worse or more complicated?  
•! Would you say that you use crop rotations? For how many years have you done so? What 
is your current rotation? Has it changed over time? Do you have any plans to make 
(further) changes in the future? 
 
                                                
25 Elsenburg is the location of the main offices for the provincial Department of Agriculture, which 
conducts government-funded research and training. 
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Soil Disturbance: 
•! What comes to mind when you hear the term “soil disturbance”? Tilling or plowing? [If 
they misunderstood the concept.] 
•! What is the effect of soil disturbance? What are the benefits of minimum soil disturbance? 
What are the downsides of minimum soil disturbance? How does minimum soil 
disturbance interact with these risks on the board? Which of these risks does minimum 
soil disturbance make better or worse or more complicated? 
•! Would you say that you practice minimum soil disturbance? For how many years have 
you done so? What kind of implement do you use? Which model?  How many years have 
you had that implement? What did you use before that? Do you have any plans to make 




•! What comes to mind when you hear the term “permanent soil cover”? Crop residues, 
rests or stubble? [If they misunderstood the concept.] 
•! What is the effect of soil cover? What are the benefits of soil cover? What are the 
downsides? How does soil cover interact with these risks on the board? Which of these 
risks does soil cover make better or worse or more complicated? 
•! Would you say that you maintain permanent soil cover? To what extent? For how many 
years have you done so? Do you have any plans to make changes to your soil cover? Do 
you bale? When was the last time you burned a field? What proportion of your fields do 
you burn in a typical year? Do you put your animals on the crop fields in the summer? 
How much soil cover would there normally be left when you plant? After planting? 
 
Conservation Agriculture: 
•! What comes to mind when you hear the term “conservation farming” or “conservation 
agriculture”? Bewarings boerdery or bewarings landbou? [Afrikaans for conservation farming or 
conservation agriculture.] 
•! How would you define conservation agriculture? Definir? [Afrikaans for define.] How 
would you describe it? 
•! Would you say that you practice conservation agriculture? To what extent? 
 
Climate Change:  
•! We’re almost done. Just a couple more questions. 
•! What comes to mind when you hear the term “climate change”? Do you think that the 
climate will or will not change on your farm? Do the potential effects of climate change 
concern you? Would you say that the climate has or has not changed since you started 
farming? 
•! Would you say that the risk of climate change, the effects of climate change on your farm, 
is a manageable risk or an unmanageable risk? What can you do to manage it? How 
would you say that the risk of climate change, the effects of climate change, interacts with 
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these other risks on the board? (If the climate changes), which of these risks will it/climate 
change make better or worse or more complicated?  
 
Systemic Change: 
•! When you consider all of these risks together, what might cause you to make a major 
change in your farming system? What might cause you to sell your farm? 
 
Request for Records and Concluding Remarks: 
•! May I ask how old you are? 
 
•! We’re done the questionnaire. I just had one more thing I wanted to ask you before we 
wrap up. I’m told that many farmers keep pretty good records of things like crop yields 
(production per hectare) and inputs (input costs). Do you keep that kind of thing? 
•! It would help me better understand the context of your answers if I better understood that 
side, as well. Would you be willing to share that with me? You may send it to me by 
email. 
 
•! If I have any small follow-up questions or clarifications, may I contact you again? Would 
you prefer by phone or by email? Would you please just write your email address at the 
bottom of the form? Do you have a landline number as well? 
•! Would you be interested in my findings? May I send them by email? 
 
Generic follow-ups, used throughout:  
Standard form: Repeat participant’s word/statement, then ask for clarification, elaboration or 
cause-and-effect.  
•! e.g., “You mentioned [____]. What do you mean by that?” 
 
Examples of Follows-ups: 
•! What? Why? How? How much? When? Where? Who? 
•! In what sense/way? 
•! What do you mean by that? 
•! What causes that? What effect does that have? 
•! How/why does that work/happen? 
•! How/why do you do that? 
•! What helps you do that? What stops you from doing that? 
•! What makes that easier/harder/more important/less important? 
•! What can you do about that? 
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B.2! Survey Instrument 
 
Please choose a language. / Kies asseblief jou taal van voorkeur.
English
Afrikaans
Study: Improving South African Grain Farming
Preliminary Information
University of British Columbia
Study: Improving South African Grain Farming
University of British Columbia
Vancouver, Canada
With in-kind support from Grain SA
Thank you for your help with this study. This questionnaire should take approximately 10 minutes to complete. 
Your participation will help us to better understand ongoing trends in South African grain production practices. A summary of the findings
will be shared with our partners at Grain SA to better inform the products and services that they provide to their members.
Please review the following information about your consent to participate, and then click the “Next” button at the bottom of the page
to proceed to the first question. Please answer each question from memory as accurately as possible.
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Study and Consent Information
Purpose: You have been invited to participate in this study because you make management decisions in your farming business. If you
are not involved in decisions about the grain farming part of your business, please pass the survey link along to someone who helps to
make those decisions. 
This survey is being conducted as part of Kieran Findlater’s doctoral studies at the University of British Columbia, in Vancouver, Canada.
The study will examine ongoing changes in key production practices in South African grain farming, as well as the impact that these
changes will have on the future resilience of the sector. The results of the study will enable more appropriate support for farmers in
dealing with emerging challenges in the agricultural sector. There are no anticipated risks from your participation in this study.
Confidentiality: Your privacy is of the utmost importance, and no identifying information will be collected. Your answers will be
combined with those of other grain farmers from across South Africa, and will contribute to the publication of a doctoral thesis, reports,
and academic journal articles. The survey is being conducted using the ESurveyCreator.com software, operated in Austria by Enuvo.
During the open survey period, your answers will be stored and accessed on the company’s servers in Ireland, and will be subject to
European data protection laws. Your computer’s IP address will be recorded, but it will not be associated with your answers. You may
find further information at https://www.esurveycreator.com/?url=datenschutz. At the end of the survey period, the survey data will be
downloaded, encrypted and stored on a password-protected computer at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada. The
data will then be deleted from the server.
Research Team:
Investigators: Dr. Milind Kandlikar, Professor (Phone: +1.604.822.5918); and Mr. Kieran Findlater, PhD Candidate (Phone:
+1.778.987.0100, Email: k.findlater@alumni.ubc.ca). Institute for Resources, Environment & Sustainability (IRES), University of British
Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.
Co-Investigator: Dr. Mark New, Director. African Climate & Development Initiative, University of Cape Town, South Africa (Phone:
+27.21.650.5598).
Funding: This study is supported by funding from the University of British Columbia (Vancouver, Canada), the Government of Canada,
and the Centre for International Governance Innovation (Ontario, Canada).
Contact: If you have any questions or concerns about what we are asking of you, please contact Dr. Milind Kandlikar or Mr. Kieran
Findlater. Their names and telephone numbers are listed above. If you have any concerns or complaints about your rights as a research
participant and/or your experiences while participating in this study, contact the Research Participant Complaint Line in the UBC Office
of Research Ethics at +1-604-822-8598 or by e-mail at RSIL@ors.ubc.ca.
Consent: Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary and you may refuse to participate or withdraw from the study at any time.
By clicking the button labeled “Next”, you indicate your consent to participate in this study, and you will be taken to the
first question.
Farm Characteristics
These questions are about the type of farm that you manage.
In which province do you farm? *
If you farm in more than one province, select the province in which most of your grain farming takes place.
(Please choose...)





Northern Cape None. I farm in only one province
What is the total area of land on the farms that you manage? *
If the number varies by year, indicate approximately how many hectares you managed this past year.
Hectares
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Of the total area mentioned above, approximately how many hectares are there of each of the following land uses --
irrigated and not irrigated?







Plantations or permanent crops
Planted pastures (or forage)
Natural pastures (or rangeland)
Is there more than one growing season on any part of your farms? *




Which of the following grains, oilseeds and annual legumes did you grow this past year? *
Maize, for market Canola
Maize, for silage Sunflower
Wheat Groundnuts
Barley Other oilseeds
Oats, for market Soya bean
Oats, for silage Dry bean / sugar bean
Oats, for grazing Other annual legumes
Sorghum None. I did not grow any grains, oilseeds or annual legumes this past year.
Other grains
Which of the following grains, oilseeds and annual legumes did you grow this past year, during your first growing
season? *
Maize, for market Canola
Maize, for silage Sunflower
Wheat Groundnuts
Barley Other oilseeds
Oats, for market Soya bean
Oats, for silage Dry bean / sugar bean
Oats, for grazing Other annual legumes
Sorghum None. I did not grow any grains, oilseeds or annual legumes in the first growing season.
Other grains
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Which of the following grains, oilseeds and annual legumes did you grow this past year, during your second growing
season? *
Maize, for market Canola
Maize, for silage Sunflower
Wheat Groundnuts
Barley Other oilseeds
Oats, for market Soya bean
Oats, for silage Dry bean / sugar bean
Oats, for grazing Other annual legumes
Sorghum None. I did not grow any grains, oilseeds or annual legumes in the second growing season.
Other grains





None. I did not grow any other crops this past year.
Other 





None. I did not grow any other crops in the first growing season.
Other 





None. I did not grow any other crops in the second growing season.
Other 









You said that you grew the following grains, oilseeds and annual legumes this past year. On approximately how many
hectares did you grow each crop?

































None. I did not grow any grains,
oilseeds or annual legumes this
past year. {{crop_selection_no}}
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You said that you grew the following grains, oilseeds and annual legumes this past year, during your first growing
season. On approximately how many hectares did you grow each crop in the first growing season?



































None. I did not grow any grains,




You said that you grew the following grains, oilseeds and annual legumes this past year, during your second growing
season. On approximately how many hectares did you grow each crop in the second growing season?






































None. I did not grow any grains,
oilseeds or annual legumes in the
second growing season.
{{crop_selection_second}}
You said that you grew the following other crops this past year. On approximately how many hectares did you grow each
crop?














None. I did not grow any other
crops this past year.
{{other_crop_selection_no}}
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You said that you grew the following other crops this past year, during your first growing season. On approximately how
many hectares did you grow each crop in the first growing season?














None. I did not grow any other
crops in the first growing season.
{{other_crop_selection_first}}
You said that you grew the following other crops this past year, during your second growing season. On approximately
how many hectares did you grow each crop in the second growing season?














None. I did not grow any other
crops in the second growing
season.
{{other_crop_selection_second}}
You said that you grew the following perennial planted pasture (forage) types this past year. On approximately how
many hectares did you grow each type?














None. I did not grow any
perennial planted pasture
(forage) this past year.
{{forage_selection_no}}
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Approximately how many adults of each of the following livestock types did you have on your farms this past year?















These questions are about your method of grain farming.









How often do you include perennial (ley) cover crops in your grain cropping system?
Cover crops are those planted primarily to control weeds or to improve soil fertility, and not primarily for harvest or grazing.







How often do you include annual cover crops in your grain cropping system?
Cover crops are those planted primarily to control weeds or to improve soil fertility, and not primarily for harvest or grazing.






How many types of crops do you rotate in your grain cropping system, excluding cover crops?
For example, you might usually plant wheat the first year, canola the second year, and oats the third year. This rotation would then
include three crops.
One crop (no rotation)
Two crops
Three crops
More than three crops
Which of the following implements do you use for primary tillage?








None. I do not use primary tillage.
Other 
Which of the following implements do you use for secondary tillage?





None. I do not use secondary tillage.
Other 
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Which of the following implements do you use for planting?
Select one or more.
Conventional planter
No-till planter fitted with tine opener
No-till planter fitted with disc opener
Other 
Which of the following implements do you use for cultivating (weed control) during the growing season?
Select one or more.
Rigid tine cultivator
Spring loaded cultivator
None. I do not use a cultivator during the growing season.
Other 
Cropping Practices (2)
On the previous page, you said that you include perennial (ley) cover crops in your grain cropping system.
How long is your typical perennial (ley) cover crop period?
years
On the previous page, you said that you include annual cover crops in your grain cropping system.
How long is your typical annual cover crop period?
months
How many times per growing season do you usually apply pre-emergence herbicide?




How many times per growing season do you usually apply post-emergence herbicide?











Which term do you think best describes your method of grain farming?







For how long have you farmed in the above manner?
Less than 5 years
5 to 10 years
10 to 20 years
More than 20 years
Management Decisions
These questions are about the way that you make management decisions about your farm.
What portion of your farm's management decisions do you make?
None
About one quarter (25%)
About one half (50%)
About three quarters (75%)
All (100%)
What portion of the land on which you farm do you own?
None. I manage the farm, but do not own it.
None. I hire or borrow all of the land on which I farm.
About one quarter (25%)
About one half (50%)
About three quarters (75%)
All (100%)
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On average, approximately how much profit does your business earn each year?






R500,000 to R1 million
R1 million to R5 million
More than R5 million
I would prefer not to say
Of the above total, approximately what percentage of your business' profit is earned from each of the following?










Other business beyond the farm
Future Success
These questions are about how you view threats to the future success of your farming business.
From the following list, select the five (5) factors that pose the greatest threats to the future success of your farming
business. *
Availability of information Personal health or family
Availability of new technology Pests
Climate change Plant diseases
Input costs Soil quality or health
Labour Weather




You selected the following five factors as threats to the future success of your farming business. Please rank them from
highest threat (1) to lowest threat (5) by entering values between 1 and 5 beside each category.












Personal health or family
{{risk_selection}}
Land reform or claims
{{risk_selection}}
Weather {{risk_selection}}
















Climate change is already
happening
Climate change is caused
primarily by human action
Climate change is of
serious concern for South
African agriculture
Climate change is of
serious concern for my
farming business
I need to consider the
effects of climate change
on my farm as I plan for
the next 5 to 10 years
Demographic Information
This is the last section. Please make sure to click "Done" when you complete it!
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On the first page of this questionnaire, you indicated that you farm in Eastern Cape. In which of the municipalities listed
below do you farm?
If you farm in more than one municipality, please select one municipality near which most of your grain farming takes place.
(Please choose...)
On the first page of this questionnaire, you indicated that you farm in Free State. In which of the municipalities listed
below do you farm?
If you farm in more than one municipality, please select one municipality near which most of your grain farming takes place.
(Please choose...)
On the first page of this questionnaire, you indicated that you farm in Gauteng. In which of the municipalities listed
below do you farm?
If you farm in more than one municipality, please select one municipality near which most of your grain farming takes place.
(Please choose...)
On the first page of this questionnaire, you indicated that you farm in KwaZulu-Natal. In which of the municipalities
listed below do you farm?
If you farm in more than one municipality, please select one municipality near which most of your grain farming takes place.
(Please choose...)
On the first page of this questionnaire, you indicated that you farm in Limpopo. In which of the municipalities listed
below do you farm?
If you farm in more than one municipality, please select one municipality near which most of your grain farming takes place.
(Please choose...)
On the first page of this questionnaire, you indicated that you farm in Mpumalanga. In which of the municipalities listed
below do you farm?
If you farm in more than one municipality, please select one municipality near which most of your grain farming takes place.
(Please choose...)
On the first page of this questionnaire, you indicated that you farm in North West. In which of the municipalities listed
below do you farm?
If you farm in more than one municipality, please select one municipality near which most of your grain farming takes place.
(Please choose...)
On the first page of this questionnaire, you indicated that you farm in Northern Cape. In which of the municipalities
listed below do you farm?
If you farm in more than one municipality, please select one municipality near which most of your grain farming takes place.
(Please choose...)
On the first page of this questionnaire, you indicated that you farm in Western Cape. In which of the municipalities listed
below do you farm?
If you farm in more than one municipality, please select one municipality near which most of your grain farming takes place.
(Please choose...)




What is your age?
Less than 21 years
21 to 30 years
31 to 40 years
41 to 50 years
51 to 60 years
61 to 70 years
71 to 80 years
More than 80 years
For how many years have you farmed, either for yourself or for someone else?
Less than 5 years
5 to 10 years
10 to 20 years
20 to 30 years
30 to 40 years
More than 40 years
What is the highest level of education that you have completed?
I did not attend school
I attended school, but did not matriculate
I matriculated from secondary school
One or two year post-secondary certificate or degree at a college or university
Four year post-secondary degree at a college or university
Master's or Doctoral degree






I would prefer not to say
You have completed the survey. Thank you very much for your time. 
For more information about this study, or to request a copy of the study's findings upon completion, please contact Mr. Kieran Findlater
at k.findlater@alumni.ubc.ca. For more information about the University of British Columbia, please visit http://www.ubc.ca.
You may now close this window.
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Appendix C: Sample mental models 
Figure C.1: Sample mental model, demonstrating model complexity with reference to problems of weather and climate variability. Node 
shape corresponds to mental model section (cause, problem, effect, response, mediator), while edge colour corresponds to the sign of the mediator (green is 
positive, red is negative). 
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Figure C.2: Sample clustered mental model of a participant from the low-adopting CA index group. The nodes were coded for language type 
and clustered automatically using an algorithm based on edge betweenness to demonstrate the natural clustering of language types. Languages are represented by 
colour: agricultural (green), cognitive (yellow), economic (blue), emotional (orange), survival (red) and political (purple). 
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Appendix D: List of unique elicited risks 
Table D.1: Unique risks elicited during mental models interviews. These 81 unique risks were derived 
from those raised by participants in the risk elicitation exercise at the beginning of each interview. The percentage of 







































































































Appendix E: Conservation Agriculture (CA) scoring and additional CA figures 
Table E.1: Conservation Agriculture (CA) scoring criteria. These were used to code participants’ 



































Figure E.1: Boxplots of age and farm size (workable area) by CA index group (n = 30). 
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Appendix F: Additional boxplots of language frequencies 
Figure F.1: Boxplot of language proportions by mental model section and branch (i.e., normal and 





Appendix G: Detailed regression analyses 
G.1! Conservation Agriculture (CA) outcomes and related practices 
Table G.1: Test of model effects for ordinal and binary regression analyses of CA outcomes and related variables. Descriptions of each 















Age 2 4.535 0.104 1.664 0.435 0.402 0.818 1.775 0.412 0.061 0.970 0.586 0.746
Education 1 1.297 0.255 2.573 0.109 0.005 0.944 1.043 0.307 0.064 0.801 0.748 0.387
Age%x%Education 2 0.654 0.721 6.493 0.039 5.874 0.053 3.658 0.161 2.538 0.281 1.962 0.375
Political%identity 2 0.537 0.764 5.856 0.054 1.125 0.570 1.119 0.572 0.082 0.960 1.541 0.463
Political%identity%x%Education 2 8.373 0.015 2.716 0.257 14.973 0.001 0.828 0.661 6.317 0.042 4.554 0.103
Crop%cluster 3 24.220 0.000 12.287 0.006 1.682 0.641 39.529 0.000 35.282 0.000 21.634 0.000
Rainfall%variability 1 1.389 0.239 1.253 0.263 0.038 0.846 1.984 0.159 4.739 0.029 5.918 0.015
Crop%cluster%x%Rainfall%variability 3 8.222 0.042 1.719 0.633 0.175 0.981 12.147 0.007 10.066 0.018 1.604 0.659
Farm%size%(annual%crops%<%500%ha) 1 5.571 0.018 0.903 0.342 0.765 0.382 16.864 0.000 3.923 0.048 0.137 0.711
Percentage%of%profit%from%grain 1 12.708 0.000 8.690 0.003 3.683 0.055 1.358 0.244 1.968 0.161 1.823 0.177
Model1summaries
Regression'type Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Binary Ordinal Binary
22'log2likelihood'(22LL) 300.252 309.652 310.649 161.236 271.047 112.804
Likelihood'ratio'chi2square 64.436 42.408 33.878 90.756 90.951 85.485
Degrees'of'freedom 18 18 18 18 18 18
Model'significance'(p) 0.000 0.001 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000


















Table G.2: Odds ratio estimates for ordinal regression analyses of CA index and soil cover. 
Descriptions of each independent variable may be found below Table 4.2. 
 
Parameter'Estimates'(from'GZLM):'CA'Index'and'Soil'Cover
Independent'variables B Exp(B) Sig. B Exp(B) Sig.
Age
Younger 0.292 1.339 0.501 G0.146 0.864 0.734
MiddleGaged G0.331 0.718 0.375 G0.407 0.666 0.274
Older Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Education G1.236 0.291 0.020 G1.017 0.362 0.048
Age'x'Education
Younger'x'Education 0.342 1.408 0.501 0.254 1.289 0.614
MiddleGaged'x'Education 0.337 1.400 0.428 0.906 2.476 0.033
Older'x'Education Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Political'identity
Conservative G0.262 0.769 0.472 G0.352 0.703 0.328
Moderate G0.131 0.878 0.689 0.301 1.351 0.343
Liberal Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Political'identity'x'Education
Conservative'x'Education 1.318 3.735 0.004 0.690 1.993 0.125
Moderate'x'Education 1.048 2.852 0.014 0.286 1.331 0.488
Liberal'x'Education Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Crop'cluster
Mixed 1.220 3.388 0.074 1.252 3.496 0.067
Irrigation 0.998 2.713 0.015 0.755 2.129 0.061
Dry'wheat 1.958 7.089 0.000 1.259 3.520 0.001
Dry'maize Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Rainfall'variability G0.009 0.991 0.977 0.048 1.049 0.869
Crop'cluster'x'Rainfall'variability
Mixed'x'Rainfall'var. 0.929 2.533 0.292 0.677 1.968 0.441
Irrigation'x'Rainfall'var. 0.708 2.029 0.151 0.351 1.421 0.468
Dry'wheat'x'Rainfall'var. G0.435 0.647 0.247 G0.110 0.896 0.765
Dry'maize'x'Rainfall'var. Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Farm'size
Annual'crops'<'500'ha G0.646 0.524 0.018 G0.256 0.774 0.342
Annual'crops'>'500'ha Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref










Table G.3: Odds ratio estimates for ordinal regression analysis of minimum soil disturbance and 




Independent'variables B Exp(B) Sig. B Exp(B) Sig.
Age
Younger B0.217 0.805 0.617 0.391 1.478 0.462
MiddleBaged B0.234 0.791 0.527 B0.109 0.897 0.811
Older Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Education B0.766 0.465 0.144 B0.089 0.914 0.892
Age'x'Education
Younger'x'Education B0.120 0.887 0.813 0.707 2.028 0.261
MiddleBaged'x'Education B0.805 0.447 0.058 1.004 2.728 0.059
Older'x'Education Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Political'identity
Conservative B0.135 0.874 0.710 0.438 1.550 0.342
Moderate B0.315 0.730 0.335 0.146 1.157 0.728
Liberal Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Political'identity'x'Education
Conservative'x'Education 1.575 4.831 0.001 B0.250 0.779 0.664
Moderate'x'Education 1.690 5.419 0.000 B0.459 0.632 0.394
Liberal'x'Education Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Crop'cluster
Mixed B0.278 0.757 0.686 2.227 9.271 0.011
Irrigation B0.161 0.851 0.690 1.792 6.003 0.000
Dry'wheat B0.496 0.609 0.198 3.495 32.938 0.000
Dry'maize Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Rainfall'variability 0.086 1.090 0.765 B0.241 0.786 0.514
Crop'cluster'x'Rainfall'variability
Mixed'x'Rainfall'var. B0.258 0.773 0.772 2.262 9.601 0.043
Irrigation'x'Rainfall'var. 0.110 1.116 0.821 0.975 2.652 0.098
Dry'wheat'x'Rainfall'var. B0.001 0.999 0.999 B0.519 0.595 0.265
Dry'maize'x'Rainfall'var. Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Farm'size
Annual'crops'<'500'ha B0.233 0.792 0.382 ,1.550 0.212 0.000
Annual'crops'>'500'ha Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref










Table G.4: Odds ratio estimates for ordinal regression analysis of low-tillage implements and 
binary regression analysis of soil residue burning. Descriptions of each independent variable may be found 




Independent'variables B Exp(B) Sig. B Exp(B) Sig.
Age
Younger 50.013 0.987 0.978 50.050 0.951 0.937
Middle5aged 50.073 0.930 0.851 0.265 1.303 0.640
Older Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Education 50.188 0.829 0.716 50.168 0.845 0.851
Age'x'Education
Younger'x'Education 50.733 0.480 0.158 50.903 0.405 0.246
Middle5aged'x'Education 50.645 0.525 0.132 50.902 0.406 0.169
Older'x'Education Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Political'identity
Conservative 50.069 0.934 0.855 50.201 0.818 0.763
Moderate 50.098 0.906 0.776 50.576 0.562 0.305
Liberal Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Political'identity'x'Education
Conservative'x'Education 0.718 2.050 0.118 0.245 1.278 0.772
Moderate'x'Education 1.077 2.934 0.013 1.208 3.347 0.118
Liberal'x'Education Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Crop'cluster
Mixed 50.452 0.636 0.614 51.847 0.158 0.035
Irrigation 0.936 2.549 0.027 !2.480 0.084 0.000
Dry'wheat 2.546 12.752 0.000 !2.187 0.112 0.000
Dry'maize Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Rainfall'variability !0.930 0.395 0.002 50.686 0.504 0.275
Crop'cluster'x'Rainfall'variability
Mixed'x'Rainfall'var. 50.938 0.391 0.409 51.470 0.230 0.331
Irrigation'x'Rainfall'var. 0.803 2.232 0.116 0.032 1.033 0.968
Dry'wheat'x'Rainfall'var. 1.142 3.134 0.005 0.250 1.284 0.717
Dry'maize'x'Rainfall'var. Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Farm'size
Annual'crops'<'500'ha 50.568 0.567 0.048 0.155 1.168 0.711
Annual'crops'>'500'ha Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref











G.2! Farming identity: Conservation versus conventional 
Table G.5: Test of model effects for drivers of “conservation” farming identity in binary logistic 
regression. To reveal the implicit definition of conservation farming in contrast with conventional farming, those 
who broadly identified their farming practices as "conservation" were coded as “1”, and those who identified 
themselves as "conventional" farmers were coded as “0”. Descriptions of each independent variable may be found 
below Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. 
 
Tests%of%Model%Effects%(from%GZLM):%Cons.%vs.%Conv.%Farming
Independent'variables df WaldChi3Square Sig.
Wald
Chi3Square Sig.
Age 2 0.926 0.629 1.936 0.380
Education 1 0.379 0.538 0.421 0.517
Political%identity 1 0.836 0.361 0.644 0.422
Crop%cluster 3 1.470 0.689 1.165 0.761
Farm%size%(annual%crops%<%500%ha) 1 10.874 0.001 9.141 0.002
More%soil%cover 1 2.579 0.108 3.466 0.063
Less%soil%disturbance 1 2.311 0.128 2.612 0.106
More%crops%in%rotation 1 7.332 0.007 3.647 0.056
LowQtillage%implements 1 37.027 0.000 29.415 0.000
Never%burn%crop%residues 1 7.814 0.005 3.905 0.048
Age%x%Education 2 1.276 0.528
Political%x%Education 1 0.770 0.380
Rainfall%variability 1 0.083 0.773
Crop%cluster%x%Rainfall%var. 3 4.937 0.176
















Table G.6: Odds ratio estimates for drivers of “conservation” farming identity in binary logistic 
regression. To reveal the implicit definition of conservation farming in contrast with conventional farming, those 
who broadly identified their farming practices as "conservation" were coded as “1”, and those who identified 
themselves as "conventional" farmers were coded as “0”. Odds ratios above 1 indicate a greater likelihood of 
identifying as a “conservation” farmer, while odds ratios below 1 indicate a greater likelihood of identifying as a 




Independent'variable B Exp(B) Sig. B Exp(B) Sig.
Age
Younger 0.632 1.882 0.350 0.728 2.071 0.360
MiddleGaged 0.229 1.258 0.665 G0.089 0.915 0.893
Older Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Education 0.140 1.150 0.538 0.331 1.392 0.619
Political'identity G0.273 0.761 0.361 G0.272 0.762 0.422
Crop'cluster
Mixed 0.399 1.490 0.613 0.546 1.727 0.723
Irrigation 0.784 2.190 0.239 G0.229 0.795 0.802
Dry'wheat 0.359 1.432 0.628 0.897 2.453 0.419
Dry'maize Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Farm'size
Annual'crops'<'500'ha !1.469 0.230 0.001 !1.715 0.180 0.002
Annual'crops'>'500'ha Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
More'soil'cover 0.363 1.438 0.108 0.520 1.682 0.063
Less'soil'disturbance 0.390 1.477 0.128 0.485 1.624 0.106
More'crops'in'rotation 0.967 2.630 0.007 0.774 2.169 0.056
LowGtillage'implements 2.219 9.202 0.000 2.564 12.987 0.000
Crop'residue'burning
Never'burn 1.624 5.074 0.005 1.361 3.902 0.048
Sometimes'or'always'burn Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Age'x'Education
Younger'x'Education G0.588 0.556 0.517
MiddleGaged'x'Education 0.228 1.256 0.755
Older'x'Education Ref Ref Ref
Political'identity'x'Education 0.354 1.425 0.380
Rainfall'variability 0.625 1.869 0.269
Crop'cluster'x'Rainfall'variability
Mixed'by'Rainfall'var. 1.707 5.512 0.586
Irrigation'by'Rainfall'var. G1.631 0.196 0.219
Wheat'by'Rainfall'var. G1.599 0.202 0.039
Maize'by'Rainfall'var. Ref Ref Ref










G.3! Climate change and weather ranks 
Table G.7: Test of model effects for independent predictors of climate change rank. These were obtained using ordinal regression (i.e., generalized 
linear model with cumulative logit link) (n = 246). Descriptions of each independent variable may be found below Figure 6.3. 
 











Age 2 4.097 0.129 2.627 0.269 2.215 0.330
Education 1 0.448 0.503 0.874 0.350 0.893 0.345
Age8x8Education 2 0.527 0.769 0.923 0.630 1.521 0.467
Political8identity 1 1.435 0.231 4.400 0.036 3.907 0.048
Political8x8Education 1 8.337 0.004 8.368 0.004 8.309 0.004
Crop8cluster 3 12.933 0.005 6.324 0.097 6.255 0.100 5.823 0.121
Rainfall8variability 1 1.569 0.210 1.914 0.166 2.949 0.086
Crop8cluster8x8Rainfall8variability 3 6.323 0.097 7.222 0.065 7.814 0.050
Farm8size8(annual8crops8<85008ha) 1 1.728 0.189 1.476 0.224 2.974 0.085
Total8profit 1 3.450 0.063 3.697 0.054 3.307 0.069
More8rotations8crops 1 0.754 0.385 1.068 0.301
LowPtillage8implements 1 1.916 0.166 0.548 0.459
Never8burn8crop8residues 1 14.415 0.000 9.417 0.002
Model1summaries
Regression'type Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal
32'log3likelihood'(32LL) 81.711 23.187 256.464 103.635 282.310 281.002
Likelihood'ratio'chi3square 16.499 13.108 25.563 21.720 42.689 53.622
Degrees'of'freedom 7 3 9 3 16 19
Model'significance'(p) 0.021 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
















Table G.8: Test of model effects for independent predictors of weather rank. These were obtained using ordinal regression (i.e., generalized linear 
model with cumulative logit link) (n = 246). Descriptions of each independent variable may be found below Figure 6.3. 
 











Age 2 0.861 0.650 0.292 0.864 0.148 0.929
Education 1 5.268 0.022 6.304 0.012 6.254 0.012
Age7x7Education 2 4.795 0.091 5.732 0.057 5.696 0.058
Political7identity 1 0.835 0.361 1.653 0.199 2.107 0.147
Political7x7Education 1 0.659 0.417 0.253 0.615 0.164 0.685
Crop7cluster 3 12.752 0.005 14.367 0.002 16.105 0.001 22.017 0.000
Rainfall7variability 1 0.002 0.961 0.012 0.915 0.015 0.902
Crop7cluster7x7Rainfall7variability 3 6.353 0.096 7.256 0.064 11.226 0.011
Farm7size7(annual7crops7<75007ha) 1 0.774 0.379 2.195 0.138 2.883 0.090
Total7profit 1 0.075 0.784 0.233 0.630 0.361 0.548
More7rotations7crops 1 0.526 0.468 0.022 0.883
LowPtillage7implements 1 1.223 0.269 3.196 0.074
Never7burn7crop7residues 1 0.498 0.481 9.384 0.002
Model1summaries
Regression'type Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal Ordinal
32'log3likelihood'(32LL) 96.093 26.075 279.043 117.500 304.976 303.193
Likelihood'ratio'chi3square 10.510 13.879 20.472 1.957 32.217 44.101
Degrees'of'freedom 7 3 9 3 16 19
Model'significance'(p) 0.161 0.003 0.015 0.581 0.009 0.001

















Table G.9: Test of model effects for independent predictors of the distance between climate change and weather ranks. These were obtained 
using multivariate linear regression (i.e., generalized linear model with identity link) (n = 246). Descriptions of each independent variable may be found below 
Figure 6.3. 
 











Age 2 0.644 0.725 0.538 0.764 0.276 0.871
Education 1 4.964 0.026 5.668 0.017 5.535 0.019
Age8x8Education 2 5.295 0.071 6.661 0.036 7.535 0.023
Political8identity 1 0.265 0.607 0.475 0.491 0.291 0.589
Political8x8Education 1 2.357 0.125 2.766 0.096 3.156 0.076
Crop8cluster 3 6.732 0.081 8.762 0.033 10.009 0.018 19.073 0.000
Rainfall8variability 1 0.254 0.614 0.212 0.646 0.497 0.481
Crop8cluster8x8Rainfall8variability 3 1.765 0.623 1.921 0.589 4.278 0.233
Farm8size8(annual8crops8<85008ha) 1 1.624 0.203 2.639 0.104 6.191 0.013
Total8profit 1 1.724 0.189 2.172 0.140 2.099 0.147
More8rotations8crops 1 0.492 0.483 2.230 0.135
LowPtillage8implements 1 2.086 0.149 3.805 0.051
Never8burn8crop8residues 1 7.332 0.007 16.789 0.000
Model/summaries
Regression'type Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
32'log3likelihood'(32LL) 566.341 568.006 566.291 565.220 560.463 549.772
Likelihood'ratio'chi3square 9.972 6.641 10.072 12.214 21.728 43.110
Degrees'of'freedom 7 3 9 3 16 19
Model'significance'(p) 0.190 0.084 0.345 0.007 0.152 0.001

















Table G.10: Odds ratio estimates for independent predictors of climate change rank. These were obtained using ordinal regression (i.e., 
generalized linear model with cumulative logit link) (n = 246). Descriptions of each independent variable may be found below Figure 6.3. The table is continued 
on the following page. 
 
Parameter'Estimates'(from'GZLM):'Climate'Change'Ranks
Independent'variables Exp(B) Low'CI High'CI Sig. Exp(B) Low'CI High'CI Sig. Exp(B) Low'CI High'CI Sig.
Age Odds'Ratio
Younger 0.913 0.363 2.299 0.847 Exp(B)'<'1 p'<'.10 p'<'.05
MiddleOaged 1.672 0.783 3.570 0.184 Exp(B)'>'1 p'<'.10 p'<'.05
Older Ref Ref Ref Ref
Education 0.731 0.327 1.635 0.445
Age'x'Education
Younger'x'Education 1.245 0.418 3.705 0.694
MiddleOaged'x'Education 1.378 0.573 3.312 0.473
Older'x'Education Ref Ref Ref Ref
Political'identity 1.258 0.864 1.831 0.231
Political'identity'x'education 0.502 0.314 0.801 0.004
Crop'cluster
Mixed 1.367 0.506 3.694 0.537 4.466 0.975 20.464 0.054
Irrigation 0.661 0.315 1.386 0.273 0.888 0.368 2.141 0.791
Dry'wheat 0.377 0.214 0.665 0.001 0.592 0.267 1.315 0.198
Dry'maize Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Rainfall'variability 0.906 0.499 1.645 0.745
Crop'cluster'x'Rainfall'variability
Mixed'by'Rainfall'var. 10.513 1.172 94.284 0.036
Irrigation'by'Rainfall'var. 0.945 0.321 2.781 0.918
Wheat'by'Rainfall'var. 0.701 0.318 1.544 0.378
Maize'by'Rainfall'var. Ref Ref Ref Ref
Farm'size
Annual'crops'<'500'ha 0.681 0.384 1.208 0.189
Annual'crops'>'500'ha Ref Ref Ref Ref














Independent'variables Exp(B) Low'CI High'CI Sig. Exp(B) Low'CI High'CI Sig. Exp(B) Low'CI High'CI Sig.
Age Odds'Ratio
Younger 0.859 0.328 2.248 0.756 0.894 0.339 2.359 0.820 Exp(B)'<'1 p'<'.10 p'<'.05
MiddleOaged 1.459 0.658 3.234 0.353 1.448 0.650 3.226 0.366 Exp(B)'>'1 p'<'.10 p'<'.05
Older Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Education 0.702 0.312 1.579 0.392 0.621 0.273 1.412 0.256
Age'x'Education
Younger'x'Education 1.115 0.362 3.433 0.850 1.345 0.428 4.225 0.612
MiddleOaged'x'Education 1.462 0.600 3.561 0.403 1.726 0.698 4.270 0.238
Older'x'Education Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Political'identity 1.518 1.028 2.243 0.036 1.485 1.003 2.197 0.048
Political'identity'x'education 0.495 0.308 0.797 0.004 0.491 0.303 0.796 0.004
Crop'cluster
Mixed 4.524 0.987 20.732 0.052 6.272 1.288 30.551 0.023
Irrigation 0.947 0.385 2.331 0.906 1.784 0.668 4.765 0.248
Dry'wheat 0.590 0.262 1.331 0.204 1.215 0.425 3.474 0.717
Dry'maize Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Rainfall'variability 0.874 0.479 1.596 0.661 0.843 0.451 1.574 0.592
Crop'cluster'x'Rainfall'variability
Mixed'by'Rainfall'var. 11.862 1.355 103.831 0.025 15.819 1.715 145.902 0.015
Irrigation'by'Rainfall'var. 1.139 0.378 3.430 0.818 1.461 0.465 4.588 0.516
Wheat'by'Rainfall'var. 0.694 0.311 1.550 0.373 0.751 0.325 1.732 0.501
Maize'by'Rainfall'var. Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Farm'size
Annual'crops'<'500'ha 0.692 0.382 1.253 0.224 0.574 0.306 1.079 0.085
Annual'crops'>'500'ha Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Total'profit 0.769 0.588 1.005 0.054 0.779 0.594 1.020 0.069
More'rotation'crops 0.897 0.703 1.146 0.385 0.849 0.622 1.158 0.301
LowOtillage'implements 0.844 0.664 1.073 0.166 0.901 0.683 1.188 0.459
Crop'residue'burning
Never'burn 3.196 1.754 5.823 0.000 2.921 1.473 5.791 0.002









Table G.11: Odds ratio estimates for independent predictors of weather rank. These were obtained using ordinal regression (i.e., generalized linear 




Independent'variables Exp(B) Low'CI High'CI Sig. Exp(B) Low'CI High'CI Sig. Exp(B) Low'CI High'CI Sig.
Age Odds'Ratio
Younger 1.526 0.622 3.748 0.356 Exp(B)'<'1 p'<'.10 p'<'.05
MiddleNaged 1.316 0.623 2.778 0.472 Exp(B)'>'1 p'<'.10 p'<'.05
Older Ref Ref Ref Ref
Education 2.078 0.936 4.614 0.072
Age'x'Education
Younger'x'Education 0.918 0.318 2.650 0.874
MiddleNaged'x'Education 0.467 0.196 1.112 0.085
Older'x'Education Ref Ref Ref Ref
Political'identity 1.186 0.822 1.712 0.361
Political'identity'x'education 0.829 0.528 1.303 0.417
Crop'cluster
Mixed 0.881 0.327 2.374 0.802 0.716 0.168 3.050 0.651
Irrigation 0.233 0.104 0.523 0.000 0.165 0.065 0.421 0.000
Dry'wheat 0.711 0.418 1.211 0.210 0.792 0.369 1.701 0.550
Dry'maize Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Rainfall'variability 1.701 0.940 3.079 0.079
Crop'cluster'x'Rainfall'variability
Mixed'by'Rainfall'var. 0.709 0.096 5.218 0.735
Irrigation'by'Rainfall'var. 0.410 0.131 1.279 0.124
Wheat'by'Rainfall'var. 0.389 0.183 0.826 0.014
Maize'by'Rainfall'var. Ref Ref Ref Ref
Farm'size
Annual'crops'<'500'ha 1.284 0.736 2.241 0.379
Annual'crops'>'500'ha Ref Ref Ref Ref















Independent'variables Exp(B) Low'CI High'CI Sig. Exp(B) Low'CI High'CI Sig. Exp(B) Low'CI High'CI Sig.
Age Odds'Ratio
Younger 1.250 0.492 3.177 0.639 1.183 0.459 3.051 0.728 Exp(B)'<'1 p'<'.10 p'<'.05
MiddleOaged 1.058 0.484 2.310 0.888 1.052 0.479 2.314 0.899 Exp(B)'>'1 p'<'.10 p'<'.05
Older Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Education 2.407 1.062 5.454 0.035 2.434 1.066 5.554 0.035
Age'x'Education
Younger'x'Education 0.819 0.272 2.466 0.722 0.808 0.263 2.485 0.710
MiddleOaged'x'Education 0.402 0.164 0.984 0.046 0.397 0.161 0.984 0.046
Older'x'Education Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Political'identity 1.283 0.878 1.875 0.199 1.328 0.905 1.947 0.147
Political'identity'x'education 0.888 0.560 1.409 0.615 0.908 0.569 1.449 0.685
Crop'cluster
Mixed 0.633 0.147 2.724 0.539 0.684 0.155 3.029 0.617
Irrigation 0.138 0.052 0.364 0.000 0.079 0.027 0.229 0.000
Dry'wheat 0.739 0.341 1.603 0.444 0.444 0.161 1.222 0.116
Dry'maize Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Rainfall'variability 1.793 0.985 3.265 0.056 2.027 1.088 3.778 0.026
Crop'cluster'x'Rainfall'variability
Mixed'by'Rainfall'var. 0.756 0.100 5.706 0.786 0.797 0.103 6.153 0.828
Irrigation'by'Rainfall'var. 0.406 0.125 1.315 0.133 0.326 0.099 1.082 0.067
Wheat'by'Rainfall'var. 0.357 0.167 0.766 0.008 0.263 0.119 0.585 0.001
Maize'by'Rainfall'var. Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Farm'size
Annual'crops'<'500'ha 1.547 0.869 2.757 0.138 1.710 0.921 3.175 0.090
Annual'crops'>'500'ha Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Total'profit 1.067 0.820 1.389 0.630 1.086 0.831 1.419 0.548
More'rotation'crops 0.916 0.724 1.160 0.468 0.977 0.720 1.327 0.883
LowOtillage'implements 1.141 0.903 1.441 0.269 1.283 0.976 1.686 0.074
Crop'residue'burning
Never'burn 0.823 0.478 1.415 0.481 0.358 0.185 0.690 0.002









Table G.12: Parameter estimates for independent predictors of the distance between climate change and weather ranks. These were 
obtained using multivariate linear regression (i.e., generalized linear model with identity link) (n = 246). Descriptions of each independent variable may be found 
below Figure 6.3. The table is continued on the following page. 
 
Parameter'Estimates'(from'GZLM):'Distance'Between'Climate'Change'and'Weather'Ranks
Independent'variables B Low'CI High'CI Sig. B Low'CI High'CI Sig. B Low'CI High'CI Sig.
Age Par.'Est.
Younger E0.181 0.262 2.660 0.759 B'<'0 p'<'.10 p'<'.05
MiddleEaged 0.162 0.450 3.069 0.741 B'>'0 p'<'.10 p'<'.05
Older Ref Ref Ref Ref
Education E0.834 0.159 1.190 0.105
Age'x'Education
Younger'x'Education E0.105 0.231 3.517 0.880
MiddleEaged'x'Education 0.919 0.830 7.560 0.103
Older'x'Education Ref Ref Ref Ref
Political'identity 0.127 0.700 1.843 0.607
Political'identity'x'education E0.466 0.346 1.138 0.125
Crop'cluster
Mixed 0.374 E0.965 1.713 0.584 1.026 E0.919 2.971 0.301
Irrigation 1.031 0.056 2.007 0.038 1.474 0.320 2.628 0.012
Dry'wheat E0.343 E1.058 0.373 0.348 E0.326 E1.349 0.698 0.533
Dry'maize Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Rainfall'variability E0.406 E1.196 0.384 0.314
Crop'cluster'x'Rainfall'variability
Mixed'by'Rainfall'var. 1.236 E1.436 3.909 0.365
Irrigation'by'Rainfall'var. 0.575 E0.843 1.993 0.427
Wheat'by'Rainfall'var. 0.578 E0.413 1.568 0.253
Maize'by'Rainfall'var. Ref Ref Ref Ref
Farm'size
Annual'crops'<'500'ha E0.479 E1.216 0.258 0.203
Annual'crops'>'500'ha Ref Ref Ref Ref
















Independent'variables B Low'CI High'CI Sig. B Low'CI High'CI Sig. B Low'CI High'CI Sig.
Age Par.'Est.
Younger E0.035 E1.189 1.119 0.952 0.084 E1.026 1.194 0.882 B'<'0 p'<'.10 p'<'.05
MiddleEaged 0.239 E0.723 1.201 0.626 0.220 E0.702 1.142 0.640 B'>'0 p'<'.10 p'<'.05
Older Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Education E0.909 E1.900 0.082 0.072 E1.014 E1.969 E0.059 0.037
Age'x'Education
Younger'x'Education E0.089 E1.446 1.268 0.897 0.163 E1.151 1.476 0.808
MiddleEaged'x'Education 1.035 E0.057 2.127 0.063 1.189 0.133 2.245 0.027
Older'x'Education Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Political'identity 0.169 E0.313 0.652 0.491 0.127 E0.335 0.589 0.589
Political'identity'x'education E0.496 E1.080 0.088 0.096 E0.510 E1.073 0.053 0.076
Crop'cluster
Mixed 1.083 E0.823 2.988 0.265 1.420 E0.429 3.270 0.132
Irrigation 1.596 0.454 2.738 0.006 2.590 1.413 3.767 0.000
Dry'wheat E0.262 E1.268 0.744 0.610 1.029 E0.198 2.256 0.100
Dry'maize Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Rainfall'variability E0.445 E1.220 0.329 0.260 E0.605 E1.367 0.158 0.120
Crop'cluster'x'Rainfall'variability
Mixed'by'Rainfall'var. 1.257 E1.370 3.885 0.348 1.480 E1.051 4.011 0.252
Irrigation'by'Rainfall'var. 0.627 E0.771 2.026 0.379 1.099 E0.273 2.472 0.116
Wheat'by'Rainfall'var. 0.582 E0.390 1.554 0.241 0.860 E0.100 1.820 0.079
Maize'by'Rainfall'var. Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Farm'size
Annual'crops'<'500'ha E0.610 E1.345 0.126 0.104 E0.942 E1.684 E0.200 0.013
Annual'crops'>'500'ha Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref Ref
Total'profit E0.253 E0.589 0.083 0.140 E0.238 E0.560 0.084 0.147
More'rotation'crops E0.112 E0.425 0.201 0.483 E0.278 E0.643 0.087 0.135
LowEtillage'implements E0.229 E0.539 0.082 0.149 E0.330 E0.663 0.002 0.051
Crop'residue'burning
Never'burn 0.999 0.276 1.722 0.007 1.618 0.844 2.392 0.000









Figure G.1: The interaction effect of education and political identity on the ranks assigned to 









Figure G.2: The interaction effect of farm size and crop residue burning on the ranks assigned to 
weather and climate change, as well as their difference. 
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